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ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the relationship between the level of 
Forward-Looking Information Disclosure (FLID) and Earnings Management (EM) practices 
among non-financial Jordanian companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
during the period 2008-2013. Content analysis was used to explore the items of FLID, and 
the level of FLID was measured using the disclosure index. Three models, Jones (1991), 
Modified Jones (1995) and performance-matched Kothari et al. (2005) models, were 
employed to estimate discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM. The panel regression results 
show a negative and significant relationship between the level of FLID and EM. The findings 
of the study are consistent with agency and signalling theory perspectives. 
Secondly, the study seeks to investigate the effect of the CEO’s personal characteristics (age, 
gender and overconfidence) on the level of FLID. Three measures of overconfidence were 
used: Net Buyer, Capital Expenditure, and Leverage ratio. The results indicate that the CEO’s 
age has a negative and significant relationship with FLID. Conversely, the outcomes of the 
regression analysis show that the CEO’s gender and male characteristics such as 
overconfidence’ have a positive and a significant association with the level of FLID. 
Finally, the study investigates the effect of CEOs’ personal characteristics on EM practices. 
The empirical tests indicate that overconfidence has a positive and significant association 
with EM practices, which is consistent with signalling theory. However, there is no evidence 
to suggest that age and gender affect EM practices. Overall, the findings of the study confirm 
that a higher level of FLID improves the quality of financial reports. Furthermore, the results 
show that CEOs’ characteristics affect managers’ decisions. Thus, this study contributes to 
knowledge by shedding light on the relationship between the level of FLID and EM practices. 
It also provides new evidence on the impact of the CEO’s characteristics on the level of FLID 
as a proxy for voluntary disclosures and EM practices, in the context of a developing country. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces and offers a rationale for this study. It begins with an overview in 
section 1.1. Section 1.2 addresses the background of the study. Section 1.3 explains the study 
motivations. Section 1.4 discusses the study’s aim and objectives. Section 1.5 reports the 
research methodology. Section 1.6 provides the contribution of the research. Section 1.7 
explains the study’s scope, and the last section, 1.8, presents the structure of the study.  
1.1. OVERVIEW 
Disclosure is one of the monitoring tools used by internal and external users to develop an 
understanding of how managers manage resources, and to judge a company’s decisions. 
Furthermore, corporate disclosure bridges the gap in the information between the manager 
(agent) and owner (principal) (Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Healy and Palepu 2001). Since 
investors are not able to monitor managers’ behaviour and performance without confidential 
information from the firm, the disclosure of more than basic requirements such as accounting 
and other financial and non-financial information which are important to different 
stakeholders is defined as voluntary disclosure (Meek et al. 1995). Thus, voluntary disclosure 
such as Forward-Looking Information Disclosure (FLID) is considered as one of the 
monitoring tools that controls managers’ opportunistic behaviour (Bushman and Smith 2000). 
FLID is a voluntary disclosure (Francis et al. 2008b) which allows investors to assess a firm’s 
future performance and improve their ability to make rational investment decisions (Kieso et 
al. 2010). Celik et al. (2006, p. 200), define FLID as “any prediction or information that helps 
to make estimates about the future; it includes management’s strategy, valuations of 
opportunities and risks, and forecasts data”. Furthermore, Hussainey (2004) states that FLID 
captures current plans and future forecasts to enable financial statement users to understand 
future performance. Undeniably, the lack of FLID may end up in volatile stock prices and 
uncertainty in investments. 
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In summary, FLID is a mechanism to provide more information (financial or non-financial) 
to investors and other stakeholders through formal and informal channels, and is widely 
perceived as a feature of an efficient capital market. 
On the other hand, Earnings Management (EM) is an accounting process that managers adopt 
to manipulate the earnings of the company through accounting choices and discretionary 
accruals. Over the last two decades, a considerable amount of literature has investigated the 
nuances of how managers manage earnings (Barua et al. 2010b; Chang and Sun 2010; 
Jackson and Liu 2010). In most cases, EM occurs when managers have the flexibility to 
choose accounting methods such as revenue recognition, depreciation expenses and 
employing discretion in financial reporting to estimate accruals and to alter financial reports 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999). EM behaviour can be classified as: (1) misreporting EM, 
involving the discretionary accounting of decisions and outcomes already realized; and (2) 
direct or real EM, which involves the strategic timing of investment, sales, expenditure and 
financing decisions (Degeorge et al. 1999).  
Furthermore, EM involves several accounting transactions that are consistent with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) which could be either conservative or aggressive 
accounting procedures aimed at manipulation of financial information (Xiong 2006). Healy 
and Wahlen (1999, p. 7) state that, “EM takes place when management (executives) use their 
discretions in financial reporting and in structuring transactions, to change financial reports, 
in order to mislead some stakeholders about underlying economic performance of a firm or to 
affect contractual outcomes relying on reported accounting practices”. In a similar vein, 
another definition suggested that EM is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the 
constraints of GAAP, to bring about the desired level of reported earnings” (Davidson III et 
al. 2007, p.369). Furthermore, Roychowdhury (2006) verified that EM practice is driven by 
standard daily business practices motivated by the desire of managers to misguide some 
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stakeholders into accepting certain financial reporting information. Previous literature 
suggests two contradictory theoretical viewpoints to explain the association between FLID 
and EM practices: managerial opportunism and long-term perspectives (Choi et al. 2013). 
The managerial opportunism viewpoint suggests that companies might be strategically using 
FLID to cover their opportunistic EM actions. In such cases, FLID is used as an 
entrenchment instrument to hide this opportunistic performance and to defend companies’ 
managers against shareholders’ potential attention and reaction. In line with this view, Sun et 
al. (2010) suggest that managers are motivated to disclose more voluntary disclosure 
(corporate social and environmental disclosures) in order to divert stakeholders’ attention 
from their EM practices. Several empirical studies reveal a positive relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and EM (e.g. Kasznik 1999; Jog and McConomy 2003; Prior et al. 
2008). 
On the other hand, the long-term perspective suggests that companies with a high level of 
voluntary disclosure are not only concerned about increasing current profits and managers’ 
wealth but are also looking to create and improve a strong future relationship with 
shareholders. Therefore, such companies will act in an accountable way when reporting 
financial information. In line with this perspective, many studies show a negative relationship 
between voluntary disclosure and EM (e.g. Lobo and Zhou 2001; Jo and Kim 2007; Hribar 
and Yang 2010; Katmun 2012; Gray 2013). Previous studies found that managers in family 
companies are more likely to disclose more FLID than those managing non-family companies 
(Ali et al. 2007; Chau and Gray 2010). Similarly, the current study argues that non-financial 
Jordanian companies with more FLID are less likely to practices EM, since a large proportion 
of Jordanian companies are family controlled. There were 128 (64 percent) family companies 
and 73 (36 percent) non-family companies listed on the ASE over the period 2008-2013 
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(ASE 2015). Thus, this setting in Jordan provides an opportunity for managers to disclose 
more information and practices less EM.  
In summary, the literature on corporate voluntary disclosure and EM practices (Kasznik 
1999; Lobo and Zhou 2001; Patten and Trompeter 2003; Hunton et al. 2006; Prior et al. 2007; 
Sun et al. 2010; Katmun 2012; Yadollah et al. 2012; MeilaniPurwanti 2013; Kiattikulwattana 
2014; Muttakin et al. 2015) broadly supports the argument that the relationship between 
corporate disclosure and EM is contradictory. While several studies find that EM and 
voluntary disclosure are negatively related (Lobo and Zhou 2001; Hunton et al. 2006; 
Katmun 2012; Yadollah et al. 2012), others find a positive relationship between them 
(Kasznik 1999; Patten and Trompeter 2003; Prior et al. 2008; Muttakin et al. 2015). 
Conversely, Sun et al. (2010) and MeilaniPurwanti (2013) find no relationship between EM 
and corporate environmental disclosure. Therefore, the central concern of this study is to 
provide empirical evidence for the potential association between FLID and EM practices and 
to attempt to shed more light on this area in accounting research. In addition, a review of the 
literature reveals that no single study has examined this field of accounting research in 
Jordan. This consideration provides the motivation for the present study, to bridge this gap in 
the literature by providing evidence on the nature of the relationship between FLID and EM 
in the context of Jordan.  
However, it has been argued that financial reporting practices vary predictably with particular 
individual characteristics of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and that these characteristics 
have an effect on managers’ decisions. In this regard, Bamber et al. (2010) and many other 
researchers have found evidence that CEOs’ characteristics play a significant role in their 
decisions. Considering this, the current study has chosen three personal characteristics of 
CEOs (age, gender, and overconfidence) to examine the impact of these characteristics on the 
level of FLID and EM practices. 
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The related literature on voluntary disclosures and EM reports that economic conditions 
affect a company’s economic performance, which in turn, may motivate executives to 
manipulate earnings. In this regard, Berndt and Dipl-Kfm (2011) provide empirical evidence 
that managers are more likely to exercise EM practices during periods of economic crisis. 
Therefore, it is expected that in the face of uncertainty, such as the global financial crisis of 
2008, EM behaviour will not be uncommon (Pong et al. 2007; Habib et al. 2013). 
Additionally, Rolland and Dirige (2013) suggest that there may be a greater likelihood of EM 
practices during and after the period of financial crisis to enhance the confidence of the 
shareholders regarding a company’s financial performance. Consequently, this study has 
adopted a 6-year period from 2008 to 2013, since the financial crisis started in 2008 and 
triggered different reforms and corporate governance practices in the same year in Jordan. 
The study period ended in 2013 due to unavailability of data for subsequent years.    
1.2. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Jordan is a developing Arab country located in the Middle East. It has an open economic 
environment, is politically and economically stable and benefits from a stock market that has 
witnessed relatively gradual development. The economy, however, does not have a high 
ownership state, and in recent years a series of privatization schemes have been put in place 
to lower the proportion of government influence on the Jordanian economy (Al-khabash and 
Al-Thuneibat 2008). 
Within Jordan, it is the responsibility of all registered firms to have their financial reports 
published, to help users from being misled (El-Rajabi and Gunasekaran 2006). Furthermore, 
this helps to increase the quality of the financial information and has a significant effect on 
enhancing investors’ confidence (Noronha et al. 2008). Since 1987, the responsibility for 
undertaking the examination of professional standards and monitoring financial report quality 
has laid with the Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA). In the 
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preparation of financial reports, JACPA uses the International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
Following the introduction of the Securities Law 23/1997 and the establishment of 
the Amman Financial Market (AFM) in 1978, the Jordanian capital market began to 
be transformed from a public to a private market. Three key institutions then evolved to 
facilitate the financial system in Jordan: the Securities Depository Centre (SDC), the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE), and the Jordanian Securities Commission (JSC). The ASE has 
become the biggest stock market within the region due to large foreign investment. For 
example, In 2008, the market capitalization to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was recorded 
at a level of 226.3 % (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010). In addition, in the ASE the listed securities 
are traded electronically. The JSC Law (23/1997), the Directives of Disclosures and Auditing 
and Accounting Standards (1/1998) specified the information that a listed company needed to 
disclose and file the required information with the Commission for 
Enhancing Transparency; in so doing, reporting would accord with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs). There is also a requirement for listed companies to apply the 
International Auditing and Accounting Standards (IAAS) under the supervision of the JSC. 
With the issuing of a new Securities Law, number 76/2002, the Amman Financial Market 
(AFM) was established. In addition, the Law required the formation of an independent 
investor protection fund, more stringent observance of the rule of law, and stricter 
professional and ethical codes (ASE 2015). Also, with the issuing of the Accountancy 
Profession Law (APL) 73/2003, the High Council for Accounting and Auditing (HCAA) was 
established under the Minister of Industries and Trade (MIT). At the same time the enhanced 
version of the JACPA was established. This evolution of the law has shown Jordan to be a 
country where investment decisions can be based upon robust accounting information. So, to 
avoid misleading investors, it is crucial that EM is given consideration (Al-Fayoumi et al. 
2010). 
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The government of Jordan has introduced numerous reforms of accounting regulations, 
securities exchange laws and corporate disclosure practices. These reforms contribute to more 
transparent markets and have resulted in the listed companies enhancing their voluntary 
disclosure (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010; Al-Akra and Ali 2012; JSC 2015). Jordan therefore 
provides a unique national context in which to investigate the link between the narrative 
disclosure of FLID, EM practices and CEOs’ traits. Furthermore, Forward-Looking 
Statements in Jordan allow for a fuller and more powerful approach to analysis because of 
their unique nature. 
1.3. MOTIVATION 
The current study is motivated by several considerations. First, agency theory provides an 
explanation that managers are responsible for making decisions on behalf of the owners, and 
they must practice their duties in such a way as to increase the owners’ wealth and to fulfil 
their expectations (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, the separation between ownership 
and management, together with the incidence of information asymmetry, increases the 
possibility of managers’opportunistic behaviour, against the interest of the owners, hence 
pursuing self-interest objectives (Prior et al. 2008). This means that managers may engage in 
EM practices either to maximize their benefits to the disadvantage of other stakeholders or to 
offer them misleading information concerning the firm’s financial position (Healy and 
Wahlen 1999). It has been acknowledged that EM is considered as a type of agency cost, 
because managers look after their own interests by releasing financial reports that do not 
reflect an accurate economic picture of the company (Prior et al. 2008). Therefore, over 
recent decades, EM practices have been seriously considered by practitioners, investors, 
regulators and academics, following the collapse of many large firms. This increased 
attention to EM has led to the enhancement of corporate governance mechanisms and 
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disclosure as monitoring systems, since without suitable monitoring the separation of the 
firm’s ownership and control may lead to a serious problem.  
Therefore, corporate disclosure is viewed as a form of monitoring mechanism used by 
investors and other outside users to reduce the information asymmetry problem (Huang and 
Zhang 2011). Hence, disclosure is considered as one of the potential solutions to reduce the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders, by reducing information asymmetry 
and consequently reducing the likelihood of EM (Lang and Lundholm 2000; Eng and Mak 
2003). In the literature, few studies have examined the relationship between voluntary 
disclosures and EM practices, all these studies have been conducted in developed countries 
(e.g. Kasznik 1999; Katmun 2012; Bozanic et al. 2013a). Therefore, this study has a strong 
motivation to shed light on the potential effect of FLID on EM practices, in a developing 
economy. 
Secondly, there has recently been a considerable amount of research on the topic of 
managerial characteristics of CEOs. The physiological, sociological, professional and 
individual characteristics of managers may have an effect on various decisions (Shefrin 2001; 
Bonner 2008). Further evidence reveals that financial reporting practices vary with the 
individual characteristics of managers (Dikolli et al. 2012; Schrand and Zechman 2012; 
Davidson et al. 2013). However, there is a limited number of studies that have tested the 
effect of CEOs’ personal traits on the level of voluntary disclosure. Most of these studies 
have been conducted in the US, UK and other developed countries. To date, no empirical 
evidence has been documented in this field of accounting research in developing countries. 
Thus, this consideration provides the motivation for the current study to fill this gap in the 
literature by providing new empirical evidence in this area of accounting in the Middle East 
and Arab countries, and particularly in the context of Jordan. 
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Thirdly, numerous studies have indicated that EM practices are affected by the characteristics 
and motivations of the company’s executives (e.g. Cheng and Warfield 2005; Davidson III et 
al. 2007; Jiang et al. 2008; Berry-Stölzlea et al. 2015). In addition, Lewis et al. (2014) suggest 
that “differences in environmental strategy can be explained by CEO’s characteristics”. 
Nevertheless, only a limited number of studies have examined the effect of the CEO’s age, 
gender and overconfidence on EM in developed countries, and even fewer in Middle Eastern 
countries. Furthermore, Jia et al. (2014) reported that the number of studies that link financial 
reporting practices to the CEO’s personal characteristics is small. Therefore, the study is 
motivated to fill this gap in the literature and to extend the body of knowledge by shedding 
more light on this area.  
1.4.THE AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Based on the findings of previous studies and consistent with them, this study proposes that 
decision making by CEOs might be influenced by their personal characteristics. Thus, this 
study aims to understand the relationship between FLID and EM practices in Jordanian 
companies and identify the effect of CEOs’ personal characteristics on the level of FLID and 
EM practices. To fulfil this aim, the following objectives are determined: 
 To investigate the relationship between FLID and EM practices among non-financial 
Jordanian companies listed on the ASE over the period 2008-2013. 
 To investigate whether or not the CEO’s personal characteristics (age, gender and 
overconfidence) affect the level of FLID within the context of non-financial Jordanian 
companies listed on the ASE during the period 2008-2013. 
  To investigate whether or not the CEO’s personal characteristics (age, gender and 
overconfidence) affect EM practices among non-financial Jordanian companies listed 
on the ASE over the period 2008-2013.  
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1.5.THE STUDY METHOD 
This section provides a summary of the study methods used in this research. Further detail 
and specification of the methods, including the justification for the selection of the study 
methodology and approaches, are provided in the methodology chapter (Chapter 4). 
Regarding the first objective of the study the association between the level of FLID and EM 
practices is addressed in Chapter five. Following the studies of Haniffa and Cooke (2005); 
Celik et al. (2006); Hassan and Harahap (2010); Mathuva (2012) and Athanasakou and 
Hussainey (2014), the present study has used both content analysis and disclosure index 
techniques to capture and measure the level of FLID. In respect of EM practices, the three 
most common EM models have been used to detect EM in terms of the study data: the Jones 
(1991), Modified Jones (1995) and performance-matched Kothari et al. (2005) models. In this 
study, Jones (1991) and Modified Jones (1995) models were used as the main proxies to 
detect EM. As a robustness check, the study also employed the performance-matched Kothari 
et al. (2005) model. The annual reports were used as the main sources of EM and FLID data 
(Salama et al. 2012), while the data on CEOs’ characteristics was collected through 
additional sources such as press releases and direct communication with analysts, for a 
sample of 1,206 firm-year observations over the period 2008-2013. 
In addition to the descriptive analysis, the current study has used multivariate methods to test 
the research hypotheses. These statistical methods include the use of panel regression of 
1,206 firm-year observations in Jordan for 2008-2013. The endogeneity problem has been 
tested using two-stage least square regression and applying instrumental variables, and to 
check whether the results of EM and FLID are affected by this problem of endogeneity 
between EM and FLID variables.  
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Following the work of Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2008); Hackbarth (2008); Campbell et 
al. (2011) and Ahmed and Duellman (2013), this study has used three measures of CEO 
overconfidence: net buyer, capital structure, and leverage ratio methods.  
The multicollinearity problem among the data set has been tested using correlation matrix 
and the variance inflation factor (VIF).   
1.6. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Several contributions to knowledge are made through this research. First, it adds to the 
literature in terms of determinants of EM. Universally, a limited number of studies have 
attempted to examine the association between voluntary disclosures and EM. Although 
previous studies found that FLID enhances investors’ ability to predict future earnings 
(Hussainey et al. 2003; Hussainey and Walker 2009), academic research has shown that no 
study has used the level of FLID to investigate this relationship. Thus, the present study is the 
first to use the level of FLID to provide a better and deeper understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between corporate disclosure and EM practices. In the context of Jordan, this is 
the first study that investigates the effect of voluntary disclosures on EM behaviour. Thus, a 
different viewpoint can be gained from developing countries such as Jordan, which in many 
respects are different and might improve the transparency and credibility of financial 
reporting in the Middle East. Therefore, the present study offers interesting new empirical 
evidence from a country that has different business regulations, a different environment and 
is considered as representative of Middle Eastern and Arab countries.  
Secondly, since financial reporting practices vary predictably with particular individual 
characteristics of CEOs, this study provides two contributions to the literature in terms of 
determinants of FLID. It examines the impact of CEOs’ personal traits on the level of FLID. 
The current literature on the determinants of FLID focus on institutional characteristics. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, to date there is no empirical evidence regarding the effect 
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of the CEO’s age and gender on the level of FLID, other than the work of Nalikka (2009) 
which examined the impact of gender diversity on voluntary disclosure. This study provides 
empirical evidence on the relationship between CEOs traits and FLID. Thirdly, only a limited 
number of scholars that have studied the disclosure of FLID in developing countries, and 
even fewer such studies can be found in Middle Eastern countries. This study provides new 
evidence for the impact of CEO characteristics on the level of FLID, in a developing country 
context. 
In addition, few studies have attempted to address the impact of the CEO’s characteristics on 
EM practices. This study sheds light on the relationship between these characteristics and 
EM, and is the first to investigate their effect in the Jordanian market. Therefore, this study 
makes a contribution to the existing body of knowledge by shedding more light on EM 
practices, by investigating whether a CEO’s personal characteristics (as an explanatory 
factor) have an influence on EM practices. However, existing studies have been carried out in 
developed countries, and to the best of the author’s knowledge, no study has been conducted 
in a developing country. 
1.7. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the level of FLID 
and EM practices and the extent to which a CEO’s personal characteristics (age, gender and 
overconfidence) affect the level of FLID and EM practices in the context of Jordan over the 
period 2008-2013. The rationale behind selecting this area is that, the literature on corporate 
disclosure and EM practices (Kasznik 1999; Lobo and Zhou 2001; Patten and Trompeter 
2003; Hunton et al. 2006; Prior et al. 2008; Sun et al. 2010; Katmun 2012; Yadollah et al. 
2012; MeilaniPurwanti 2013; Kiattikulwattana 2014) broadly supports the argument that the 
relationship between corporate disclosure and EM is contradictory. While, several studies 
find that EM and voluntary disclosure are negatively related (Lobo and Zhou 2001; Hunton et 
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al. 2006; Katmun 2012; Yadollah et al. 2012), others find a positive relationship between 
them (Kasznik 1999; Patten and Trompeter 2003; Prior et al. 2008). However, Sun et al. 
(2010) and MeilaniPurwanti (2013) fail to find any relationship between EM and corporate 
environmental disclosure. Secondly, the previous literature reveals that managers play a 
significant role in their companies’ voluntary disclosure decisions, which might influence 
investors’ decisions (e.g. Bamber et al. 2010; Li 2010). Personal CEO characteristics may 
have an effect on various managers’ decisions (Shefrin 2001). This study will focus on 
providing empirical evidence for the potential effect of managers’ personal characteristics 
(age, gender and overconfidence) on the level of FLID and EM practices in the annual 
financial reports of non-financial Jordanian companies listed on the ASE during the period 
2008-2013. 
The study does not include financial firms and non-listed firms, since they have different 
practices and regulations when compared to those of non-financial companies. In addition, 
the study covers the period 2008-2013 which was when corporate governance reforms was 
initially implemented in Jordan. 
1.8. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The thesis consists of eight chapters, including the current chapter, which introduced the 
study and discussed its aim, objectives and motivation. The remaining part of the thesis is 
organized as follows. Chapter 2 seeks to offer working definitions of EM, and explores EM 
techniques, motivations and measurements; it provides a detailed review of relevant 
literature.  
Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical and empirical studies related to FLID. The first section 
discusses previous studies that attempt to link voluntary disclosure with EM practices and 
CEOs’ personal characteristics. The second section discusses existing theories that attempt to 
link FLID to EM practices and CEOs’ characteristics. 
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Chapter 4 describes the research design and methodology used. As at 2008 when the data 
collection began, 270 companies from three sectors were officially listed on the ASE. After 
excluding all financial companies, and 27 non-financial companies due to unavailability of 
data, the final sample consists of 201 companies and covers the fiscal years 2008-2013, 
making 1,206 firm-year observations. Data were collected from the annual reports of each 
company in the final sample. Different models were proposed using the panel regression 
technique. EM was measured by applying three models, and three proxies were used to 
measure CEO overconfidence.  
Chapter 5 analyzes and summarizes the findings regarding the relationship between FLID and 
EM practices among the study sample. The main aim of this chapter is to achieve the study 
objective regarding the relationship between FLID and EM practices. It presents the results 
from several types of analysis including descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and 
regression analysis. The robustness or sensitivity of the results was checked against the 
potential presence of the endogeneity problem. This was addressed by estimating a lagged 
FLID variable as instrumental variable by applying a two-stage least squares regression 
technique.    
Chapter 6 discusses the main findings of the effect of CEOs’ personal characteristics on the 
level of FLID. Discussion of the descriptive results is followed by checking for the 
multicollinearity problem using correlation matrix and variance inflation factors methods. In 
addition, this chapter presents the empirical results based on three models to test the 
relationship between CEOs’ characteristics and the level of FLID. The empirical results are 
based on the net buyer method, the leverage ratio and finally capital expenditure as proxies 
for CEO overconfidence.     
Chapter 7 reports the results from different types of analysis including descriptive statistics, 
pairwise correlation and the multivariate analysis tests. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
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achieve the final research objective, which is related to the association between CEOs’ 
personal characteristics and EM practices. The first section of this chapter summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of all research variables, and then multivariate regression is used to test 
all the hypotheses related to the study questions. 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the study, summarizing the key research findings and 
discussing the policy implications and potential avenues for future research and 
improvements. 
  
16 
 
CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON EM 
PRACTICES 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As noted, the first objective of the current study is to investigate the association between the 
level of FLID and EM practices among non-financial Jordanian companies listed on the ASE 
during the period 2008-2013. This chapter reviews previouse studies on EM practices, and is 
organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides definitions of EM. Section 2.3 covers EM 
techniques. Section 2.4 illustrates EM motivations. Section 2.5 illustrates measurements of 
EM. Section 2.6 sheds light on the relationship between EM practices and CEOs’ personal 
characteristics. The last section, 2.7, is a summary of the chapter. 
2.2. DEFINITIONS OF EM 
EM is an accounting treatment that managers adopt to manipulate the earnings of the 
company through accounting choices and discretionary accruals. Over the last two decades, a 
large volume of publications has described the nuances of how managers manage earnings. In 
most cases, EM occurs when managers have the flexibility to choose accounting methods 
such as revenue recognition and depreciation expenses, and employ discretion in financial 
reporting to estimate accruals and to alter financial reports (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
Degeorge et al. (1999) divide EM behaviour into two categories: (1) misreporting earnings, 
involving the discretionary accounting of decisions and outcomes already realized; and (2) 
direct or real EM, involving the strategic timing of investment, sales, expenditure and 
financing decisions. The accepted view suggests that “EM involves either aggressive or 
conservative accounting procedures, used within the GAAP framework to bring about the 
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desired level of reported earnings that often mislead users of financial information” 
(Davidson III et al. 2007, p. 369). 
Previous studies have examined various methods to discover how managers manage earnings 
(Barua et al. 2010b; Chang and Sun 2010; Jackson and Liu 2010). Several EM techniques are 
used to reduce or increase the reported earnings (Healy and Wahlen 1999). EM involves 
numerous accounting treatments that are accommodated within GAAP, either conservative or 
aggressive accounting procedures, aimed at the manipulation of financial information (Xiong 
2006).  
Generally, the different ways in which EM is described depend on the researcher’s individual 
assumptions, opinion concerning behaviour and the incentive behind EM, since these are 
subject to numerous issues such as culture. This is in line with the view of Gong et al. (2008) 
who argue that differences in culture should be considered when types of EM and 
motivations are defined. Likewise, Geiger and Smith (2010) claim that motivations for and 
exercise of EM may be different in many countries. A research carried out by Noronha et al. 
(2008) reported that size and the firm’s ownership structure have an effect on the nature of 
EM motivations or techniques. For instance, in China there is strong reason for publicly 
owned firms to manipulate EM in order to increase management compensation. While, firms 
under private ownership pay more attention to tax expense savings. 
For the above reasons, there is no universally accepted definition for EM or full agreement on 
the concept. For example, Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 7) state that, “EM takes place when 
managers use their discretion in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to change 
financial reports, in order to mislead some stakeholders about underlying economic 
performance of a firm; or to affect contractual outcomes relying on reported accounting 
practices”. In a similar vein, another definition suggest that EM is “the process of taking 
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deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles, to bring 
about a desired level of reported earnings” (Davidson III et al. 2007, p. 369). Roychowdhury 
(2006, p. 377) verified that EM practices emerge from standard daily business practices 
which are driven by the desire of managers to manipulate financial information and 
consequently mislead owners in understanding the company’s future circumstances. 
Likewise, Schipper (1989) sees EM as a means of abusing the provisions of accounting 
systems to manipulate financial information by employing accounting techniques for a 
particular purpose. EM has also been considered as comprising methods that include taking 
decisions on the selection of financial procedure and deciding when to recognise expenses 
and revenue (Smith 1993). 
Recently, Rahman et al. (2013) defined EM as the accounting procedures or the discretionary 
accruals control chosen by managers to make earnings meet the expected level, under 
pressure from owners and the constraints of GAAP. Given this definition, EM can be 
considered as structuring accounting transactions or using discretionary accruals based on 
managers’ judgement and reporting them in financial statements so as to mislead some of the 
users concerning the underlying economic position and the company’s future performance 
(Beneish 2001).  
The main concept in the above definitions is that managers are motivated to exercise EM 
either to mislead some stakeholders regarding the company’s underlying economic position, 
or to maximize their private gains within the company. Beneish (2001) argues that EM has 
two perspectives: opportunistic and informative. The aim of the former is to mislead owners 
or to ensure the manager’s job security, compensation and reputation, while the latter seeks to 
disclose more firm-related information to the owners. In respect of Beneish’s argument, 
Fields et al. (2001) mention that managers can use their discretion either opportunistically or 
to maximize the company’s value. Additionally, Parfet (2000) claims that EM is not 
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completely a bad thing if rational and suitable practices are used in a well-managed company 
and if it delivers value to investors. In this regard, Ronen and Yaari (2008) classify 
definitions of EM in three groups: white, grey or black (see Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1: Alternative Definitions of EM. 
White Grey Black 
EM is taking advantage of 
flexibility in the choice of 
accounting treatment to 
signal the manager’s private 
information on future cash 
flows. 
EM is choosing an 
accounting treatment that is 
either opportunistic 
(maximizing the utility of 
management only) or 
economically efficient. 
EM is the practice of using 
tricks to misrepresent or 
reduce transparency of the 
financial reports 
(Kasznik 1999); (Beneish 
2001) 
(Xiong 2006); 
(Roychowdhury 2006) 
(Schipper 1989); (Healy and 
Wahlen 1999); (Davidson III 
et al. 2007) 
Source: Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 25) 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) report that a common criticism of the above definitions is that 
they are unable to distinguish between EM action and financial reporting fraud; EM action 
falls within GAAP, while fraud contravenes it. They admit that there is only a fine line 
between the two concepts. It is not easy to identify aggressive EM by distinguishing 
opportunistic behaviour from legitimate accounting practices without considering the 
managerial motivation to manipulate financial information (see Table 2.2). 
The above definitions indicate that EM is an accounting treatment that managers adopt to 
manipulate the earnings of the company in two ways: discretionary accruals and accounting 
choices. The current study will define EM as a method employed by managers in managing 
earnings through abusing the flexibility of accounting methods available in GAAP. 
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Table 2.2: The Distinction between EM and Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
 Accounting choices with GAAP “Real” Cash Flow Choices 
 
 
“Conservative” 
Accounting 
 
 
 Overly aggressive recognition of 
provisions or reserves. 
 
 Overvaluation of acquired in-
process R&D in purchase 
acquisitions. 
 
 Overstatement of restructuring 
charges and assets write-offs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Delaying sales. 
 
 
 Accelerating R&D or 
advertising expenditures. 
“Neutral” 
Earnings 
 Earnings that result from a neutral 
operation of the process. 
 
 
 
 
“Aggressive” 
Accounting 
 Understatement of the provision for 
bad debts. 
 
 Drawing down provisions or 
reserves in an overly aggressive 
manner. 
 
 
 Postponing R&D or 
advertising expenditures.  
 
 Accelerating sales. 
 
                                             Violates GAAP 
“Fraudulent” 
Accounting 
 Recording sales before they are 
realizable. 
 
 Recording fictitious sales. 
 Backdating sales invoices.  
 Overstating inventory by recording 
fictitious inventory. 
 
 
 
Source: Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 239). 
 
 
 
21 
 
2.3. EM TECHNIQUES 
This section discusses various EM techniques. In accordance with prior studies, it is 
appropriate to define EM as a method of selecting or violating GAAP in order to influence 
the reported earnings. Earlier researchers report that three techniques can be used in earnings 
manipulation: income smoothing, big bath and accounting choices. (See Table 2.3.) 
2.3.1. INCOME-SMOOTHING TECHNIQUE 
According to Barnea et al. (1976, p.110) income smoothing is “the deliberate damping of 
fluctuations about some level of earnings that is currently considered to be normal for the 
firm”. There are two types of smooth-income streams: first, naturally smoothed earnings, 
resulting from an income-generating process; and second, those that are intentionally 
smoothed by managers, resulting from real smoothing techniques (Eckel 1981; Albrecht and 
Richardson 1990).   
Income smoothing is a common form of EM due to its compatibility with different earnings 
objectives. The technique is used to reduce variance in profit over a given period (Sun and 
Rath 2010). For example, managers might use income-decreasing EM behaviour when a 
company tends to shift excess earnings in profitable years to compensate for loss in less 
profitable years. Excessive levels of provision for depreciation allowance and doubtful debts 
may be used by managers in profitable years and are reversed in periods when losses are 
incurred. This technique is called “cookie jar reserves” because high provisions are reported 
as cookies saved in a jar which can be used at the manager’s discretion (Rahman et al. 2013). 
In this specific situation, a company may recognize a larger than essential loss in order to 
save for a better tomorrow, since the likelihood of meeting earnings targets in the present 
period is low (Degeorge et al. 1999). In this regard, DeFond and Park (1997) document that 
in order to even earnings out, managers are inclined to move them from profitable to bad 
years. Conversely, when the present year’s profits are lower than the previous year’s earnings 
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or the results for the current year are negative, earnings may be managed upward through 
aggressive recognition of income in the current year or through deferring expenses to the next 
year. For instance, assets may be recorded for expenditures, which should only be met when 
incurred, such as research and development expenditure (R&D). For example, Markarian et 
al. (2008) carried out a study using data from Italian listed companies for the year 2003; they 
examined the association between the choice of R&D costs and EM incentives. Their results 
reveal that Italian companies use R&D costs as a method of manipulation, suggesting that 
those with low profit are more likely to capitalize R&D expenditure, whereas those with high 
profit tend to expense R&D costs. Likewise, Gunny (2010) conducted a study based on a 
sample of all companies with available financial information from the Compustat industrial 
database over the period of 1988-2002. The findings reveal that companies manage earnings 
in order to meet benchmarks by reducing the discretionary investment of R&D costs and 
Selling, General and Administrative expenses (SG&A) to decrease expenses. Furthermore, 
Rusmin et al. (2012) examined 238 Asian transportation companies over the period 2006-
2009 to see whether managers practice income-smoothing behaviour to meet or beat earnings 
targets. Their findings show that managers are motivated to manage earnings downward 
when the company’s current earnings exceed the previous year’s. On the other hand, they are 
more likely to manage earnings upward if the company’s current earnings are less than the 
previous year’s. In summary, income smoothing is considered as a tool used by managers to 
mislead stakeholders regarding the firm’s risk level or financial performance in order to 
reduce the cost of capital and gain private benefits (Shubita 2015).  
2.3.2. BIG BATH TECHNIQUE  
The big bath technique of EM suggests that companies experiencing a low profit in a current 
year might take discretionary accrual write-downs to decrease even further the present year’s 
earnings (Jordan and Clark 2011). Thus, this technique is used when a firm’s earnings in a 
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given year are unable to meet earnings forecasts or when a firm decreases the level of present 
earnings to improve the level of the subsequent year. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and 
DeAngelo (1988) claim that big bath accounting is used to describe large earnings reducing 
write-offs or “income decreasing EM” in profit and loss statements. In this regard, Healy 
(1985) found that managers save the given year’s earnings by using income-decreasing EM 
when they observe that current earnings are less than the future bonus plan. In addition, when 
the bonus schemes have already been achieved, managers are more likely to manage earnings 
downwards for use in the next year. Furthermore, when a company’s current earnings are 
below expectation and unable to meet targets, income-decreasing practices are employed for 
use in the following year. Likewise, McNichols and Wilson (1988) reported that managers 
manipulate earnings by recording future expenses in a given period when they know that the 
present earnings are inadequate to meet earnings forecasts.  
Moore (1973) examined the relationship between discretionary accrual choices and no 
routine CEO changes, arguing that new managers are more likely to decrease earnings in 
their first year to improve reported financial information in future years, compared with 
previous managers’ results. This allows new managers to blame the previous bad year on the 
managers who came before them. In a similar vein, Pourciau (1993) provides empirical 
evidence that new executives are more motivated to manage discretionary accruals in a way 
that decreases profit in the year the CEO changes and increases earnings in the following year 
to engage in income-decreasing EM in their first year. 
2.3.3. ACCOUNTING-CHOICE TECHNIQUE 
Under accounting standards, EM occurs when managers have the flexibility to choose the 
accounting method, such as revenue recognition, depreciating expenses, investments and 
leases and employing discretion in financial reporting to estimate accruals and to alter 
financial reports (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Nelson et al. 2002; Aljifri 2007). In this regard, 
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Poitras et al. (2002) investigated Singaporean firms based on a sample of 44 public 
companies and concluded that firms abuse the flexibility offered by GAAP in order to 
manipulate earnings using the sales revenue and assets depreciation method. 
In term of inventory-estimated methods, it is argued that companies prefer to employ a First-
in-first-out (FIFO) method to account for inventory costs when they tend to report higher 
earnings. Conversely, they are more likely to apply Last-in-first-out (LIFO) when they want 
to show lower earnings. In this respect, Sweeney (1994) and Aljifri (2007) reported that FIFO 
and LIFO are the most common methods of manipulating inventory valuation. Their studies 
show that FIFO is used when managers desire to increase earnings, particularly when there is 
an increase in prices. Sweeney argues that companies shift between inventory cost methods to 
manipulate earnings when they are in danger of loan default. By the same token, Han and 
Wang (1998) document evidence that firms operating in the oil sector used inventory 
valuation methods as a technique to reduce their reported earnings over the Gulf crisis period.   
In addition, depreciation techniques such as sum-of-the-year’s digits, straight-line and 
double-declining balance are other accounting choices available to managers. While the same 
amount of annual depreciation expense is offered by the straight-line method, the sum-of-the-
year’s digits and double-declining balance methods show the highest depreciation figures 
(lower income) in the first year and lowest amount of depreciation (higher income) in the 
final year of the asset’s useful life. Thus, in order to achieve their earnings target, managers 
are more likely to use depreciation methods that offer them better results. Furthermore, 
deferred tax may be preferred by managers to improve earnings. They may also reduce the 
current year’s expenses through capitalizing expenditure. As evident from the above, 
managers have different techniques to manage earnings which will not be easily observable 
by outside investors. For this reason, many EM studies have focused on EM incentives. The 
following section will discuss EM motivations. 
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Table 2.3: Earnings Management Techniques. 
Techniques Aims Common Areas Types Examples 
 
 
Income Smoothing 
(Cookie Jar Reserves) 
 
 Reducing the variance in 
profit over the period. 
 Estimating sales returns 
and allowances. 
 Estimating bad debt write-
offs. 
 Estimating warranty costs. 
 Estimating pension 
expenses. 
 Terminating pension 
plans. 
 Estimating percentage of 
completion for long-term 
contracts. 
 Income 
Increasing. 
 
 Income 
Decreasing. 
 Defer 
Expenses. 
 
 Defer excess 
incomes. 
 
Big Bath 
 
 Reporting estimated 
expenses on the high side 
to avoid possible 
earnings surprises later. 
 Operations restructuring. 
 Troubled debt 
restructuring. 
 Asset impairment and 
write-down. 
 Operations disposal. 
 Income 
Decreasing. 
 Writing off 
R&D costs. 
 
 
 
Accounting Choices 
 
 Using flexibility of 
GAAP to alter financial 
reports. 
 Revenue recognition. 
 Depreciation expenses. 
 Inventory recognition. 
 Investments and leases. 
 
 Income 
Increasing. 
 
 
 
 Income 
Decreasing. 
 
 Using FIFO 
 Capitalizing 
Expenditures. 
 Deferred Tax. 
 
 Double-
Declining 
Balance. 
 Using LIFO. 
 
Source: Author’s development
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2.4. EM MOTIVATIONS 
Previous publications have reported that managers have both personal and business 
incentives to report impressive and satisfactory earnings levels in their financial reports, on a 
consistent basis (e.g. DeFond and Park 1997; Greenfield Jr et al. 2008). Some have 
investigated different aspects of managers’ incentives to manipulate the reported earnings 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Gaa and Dunmore 2007; Habbash and Alghamdi 2015; Hsiao 
et al. 2016).  
This section covers various motivations for EM, classified into six groups: (1) capital market 
expectations; (2) management compensation; (3) lending contracts; (4) regulatory 
considerations; (5) political cost, and (6) tax avoidance.  
2.4.1. CAPITAL MARKET EXPECTATIONS MOTIVATION 
Capital market expectations are defined as “the Investor’s prospects regarding the risk and 
return of company’s future performance” (ALghamdi and Ali 2012, p. 32). The use of 
financial information to influence stock prices is considered one reason for EM, and 
consequently viewed as an opportunistic action. Hence, previous researchers have reported 
that managers are more likely to be involved in EM in order to maintain or enhance stock 
prices (Friedlan 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Nelson et al. 2002; Graham et al. 2005). 
For example, a study carried out by Nelson et al. (2002) identified EM motivations by using a 
questionnaire survey based on a sample of 253 USA external auditors.  Their findings reveal 
that several incentives act as motivation for managers to practice EM, such as influencing the 
stock price, achieving analysts’ forecasts, managers’ remuneration objectives and increasing 
future performance for various targets. 
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Graham et al. (2005) interviewed and surveyed 400 CEOs working in USA companies and 
used descriptive and correlation matrix analysis to find that managers are motivated to 
engage in EM practices in order to maintain and increase stock prices, consequently 
improving their external reputation and communicating future growth forecasts. In the case of 
the UK, Athanasakou et al. (2009) examined whether companies engaged in EM practices to 
meet analysts’ earnings expectations during the period 1994-2002. Their findings reveal that 
firms are more likely to be involved in EM practices to meet earnings expectations or to 
avoid negative earnings surprises. Similarly, Burgstahler and Eames (2006) found that 
managers of US companies have more motivation to report earnings that meet or beat 
analysts’ expectations. Ebaid (2012) investigated whether Egyptian listed companies were 
involved in EM practices in order to meet or beat earnings benchmarks over the period 1997-
2007. Their results show that these companies are more likely to engage in EM behaviour to 
avoid reporting losses and earnings decreases. Their findings are consistent with those of 
Glaum et al. (2004), who used a sample of 38,714 USA and 3,524 German companies to 
identify EM motivations and found that both practiced EM to avoid losses and a decrease in 
earnings in order to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
A comparative study conducted by Othman and Zeghal (2006) identified EM motivations in a 
sample of 1,674 Canadian companies and 1,470 French company-year observations over the 
period 1996-2000. Their findings indicate that EM practiced in French companies is mainly 
related to the effective tax rates and contractual debt incentives. On the other hand, market-
related incentives such as subsequent equity offerings and initial public offerings are strong 
motivations for EM in Canadian companies. 
Peek (2004) conducted a study using a sample of 134 non-financial companies listed on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the period 1989-2000, using discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for EM to examine the motives of Dutch managers to engage in EM practices. The 
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results show that managers of Dutch companies tend to engage in EM before extraordinary 
items in order to reveal better performance. Likewise, in a sample drawn from Brazilian 
public firms over the period 1995-1999, Martinez (2005) employed a multiple regression 
technique to estimate discretionary accruals with the aim of achieving a better understanding 
of the relationship between capital market incentives and EM. The study reveals that 
Brazilian companies tend to engage in EM practices to prevent  reporting losses, to achieve 
sustainable performance and to maintain stable cashflow.  
By using information collected through 464 questionaries and 16 interview surveys in Egypt, 
Kamel and Elbanna (2009) documented that the primary motivations for managers’ 
involvement in EM are: to enhance their chances of obtaining external finance, to report a 
better income, to sustain the previous year’s performance, to accomplish high stock valuation 
and to avoid reporting losses. 
According to another study conducted by Matsumoto (2002), based on a sample of non-
financial US companies over the period 1993 to 1997, firms with high growth tend to manage 
earnings to avoid negative market response to bad earnings news. Likewise, Madhogarhia et 
al. (2009) used Compustat data on all US companies over the period 1997-2001 to investigate 
EM practices of growth versus value companies. Their findings show that growth companies 
are more likely to aggressively manage their earnings upward and downward than are value 
firms.   
In summary, capital market expectations have been recognized as the key important reason 
for managers to engage in EM practices. This is supported by several studies (e.g. Teoh et al. 
1998; Noronha et al. 2008; Habbash and Alghamdi 2015). For example, managers become 
involved in income-increasing EM to avoid potential losses and decrease in earnings 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Glaum et al. 2004). They also manipulate earnings upward or 
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downward to meet expected dividend levels (Daniel et al. 2008; Atieh and Hussain 2012; 
Ebaid 2012), to maintain or increase share prices (Graham et al. 2005; Ambrose and Bian 
2010) and to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Ebaid 
2012).  
2.4.2. MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION MOTIVATION 
A compensation contract between managers (agents) and owners (principals) motivates 
managers to engage in EM practices (Cheng and Warfield 2005), since this contract is tied to 
the firm’s performance. Thus, managers are encouraged to practice income-increasing EM in 
order to maximize their benefits. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) report empirical results, 
which show that employing discretionary accruals to manipulate the earnings figure is more 
noticeable in companies where the executives’ bonus is tightly linked to the value of options 
and shareholdings. Several researchers have investigated the effect of choice of accounting 
practice on compensation. For instance, a study carried out by Healy (1985) reports that 
increasing the size of a bonus plan can, to a certain extent, be an incentive to manipulating 
earnings. This suggests that managers’ choice of accounting accruals is closely associated 
with income-increasing motivations for their bonus plans. In another words, Healy’s study 
found a strong association between bonus plans and discretionary accruals. Moreover, by 
using the Jones and Modified Jones models in measuring discretionary accruals, Dye (1991) 
demonstrated that using accounting numbers in compensation contracts is considered a most 
important internal incentive for engaging in EM behaviour. Therefore, managers tend to use 
EM to improve and increase their compensation as their bonuses are often tied to the 
company’s earnings.    
Similarly, a study conducted by Guidry et al. (1999) examines whether managers of USA 
companies manage reported earnings to maximize their bonus schemes. The results of the 
study reveal that their bonus plans are a strong motivation for them to make discretionary 
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accrual decisions in order to maximize their bonus schemes. Furthermore, using a sample 
collected from the annual compensation review of the Wall Street Journal, Baker et al. (2003) 
examine whether the structure of management compensation, specifically stock options, is 
associated with discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM behaviour. Their findings reveal that 
higher compensation options are associated with discretionary accrual choices in periods 
before option-award dates. They argue that the relationship between compensation options 
and EM practices is high when executives are seeking to announce earnings before the date 
on which the options are granted. Consequently, they conclude that management 
compensation is an opportunistic motivation for managers to engage in EM actions. 
Leuz et al. (2003) identify EM motivations by examining a sample from 31 countries. The 
study investigates the effect of managers’ compensation plans, stock option and bonus 
schemes on EM practices. They found that these compensation packages are connected to the 
reported earnings figure, thereby creating the motivation.  
In particular, recent evidence suggests that large option packages motivate managers to be 
involved in EM. For example, based on a sample of 37 companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange, MeilaniPurwanti (2013) examined the effect of EM and voluntary 
disclosures on information asymmetry. The study concludes that, when the firm has a bonus 
plan, managers will shift earnings from the future into the present period in order to enhance 
current earnings. Consequently, this increases their own compensation. 
Briefly, most management compensation and bonus plan contracts are associated with the 
firm’s performance. Thus, managers have internal motivation for manipulating earnings using 
different methods. For instance, managers are more likely to shift earnings from the future to 
the current period in order to increase earnings-based bonus awards (Watts and Zimmerman 
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1986; Guidry et al. 1999), or use buyback policy to increase the share price, consequently 
enhancing compensation (Balachandran et al. 2008).    
2.4.3. LENDING CONTRACTS MOTIVATION 
Avoidance of breach of debt convenant is another contractual motivation for EM. In this kind 
of EM, managers are contractually motivated to transfer wealth from debt-holders to 
shareholders through, for instance, excessive dividend payments, increasing their borrowing 
and allowing the firm’s net worth to fall below the minimum level, which has not been 
agreed with their lenders (Aljifri 2007). According to the debt covenant perspective, creditors 
impose restrictions on the share buybacks, on dividend payment and on the issue of more 
loans in terms of reported earnings figures and ratios, so as to ensure the repayment of the 
company’s borrowing (Beneish 2001; Habbash and Alghamdi 2015). Thus, in firms with a 
high financial leverage ratio, managers have strong motivations to manipulate their reported 
earnings so they do not breach their debt covenant (Dichev and Skinner 2002). DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) similarly investigated the behaviour of both abnormal accrual and working 
capital in companies which are technically unable to keep their debt covenant. Their findings 
reveal that firms are more likely to report significantly positive abnormal and working capital 
accrual in the pre-violation year. Their result also suggests that changes in management and / 
or going concern qualification are likely to result in negative violation-year accruals. The 
abnormal total accruals show a positive result when companies that meet these conditions are 
excluded from their sample, but no significant variation from zero. However, their findings 
show a significant positive working capital accrual, which indicates that these accruals are 
manipulated even during a covenant-violation year. 
In light of this reasoning, Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) examined whether 
companies are inclined to breach their debt-lending covenants by changing accounting 
methods such as earnings recognition, accounting of depreciation, inventory methods and 
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accounting estimates, or using other transactions that can increase income and thus avoid 
breaching their debt covenant. Skipper and Healy did not find evidence of EM in these 
companies. Conversely, DeFond and Park (1997) argued that companies who violated their 
lending covenant used accruals to improve their income in the year before the violation. 
Jaggi and Lee (2002) empirically investigated whether the creditors’ waivers of debt-
covenant violations influence the likelihood of income-increasing or income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals. Using data collected from annual reports of 216 USA companies 
during 1989-1996, their findings reveal that managers use positive discretionary accruals 
when companies are granted waivers after violation of the debt covenant. However, managers 
use negative discretionary accrual choices when waivers are not granted. Rodríguez-Pérez 
and van Hemmen (2010) used panel regression to estimate discretionary accruals and to 
investigate the relationship between debt and earnings manipulating among listed Spanish 
companies. They found that marginal increases in lending produce incentives for managers to 
use EM. Also, empirical evidence showed that managers are inclined to manipulate earnings 
so as to decrease the cost of external financing and also to avoid covenant restrictions 
(Dechow and Skinner 2000).   
Based on a sample of 15,000 USA firms during 1992-2005, a study undertaken by Daniel et 
al. (2008) reveals that companies use earnings manipulation to meet dividend expectations. 
Their results report that this motivation is obvious only in firms with a high level of debt to 
avoid breaching their debt covenant.   
In conclusion, external contracts, for example debt covenants, motivate managers to 
manipulate reported earnings by using income-decreasing EM in the case of current good 
performance, in order  to save income for future bad performance with the aim of meeting the 
contract requirements, and vice versa (Kanagaretnam et al. 2003). 
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2.4.4. REGULATORY MOTIVATION 
Regulatory considerations including industry regulations induce managers to manage 
earnings with the aim of satisfying specific industry regulations and to reduce the risk of 
political exposure (Habbash and Alghamdi 2015). Previous studies have reported that 
industry regulations might create pressure for managers to exercise EM action (Lim and 
Matolcsy 1999; Belski et al. 2008). For example, using data collected from annual reports of 
the 500 largest Australian companies listed on the ASE, Lim and Matolcsy (1999) 
investigated the relationship between EM activities and product price controls recognized by 
the Australian government at the beginning of the 1970s. Their results show that Australian 
companies are inclined to be involved in EM income increasing when they are going public, 
in order to control the share price. By using 483 quarterly earnings statements of 47 insurers 
over 1989-1992, Christensen et al. (1999) examined the relationship between EM and 
regulatory standards. The findings of their study confirm that meeting regulatory standards is 
one motivation for managers to engage in EM practices. 
Navissi (1999), using the Modified Jones model to measure discretionary accruals, 
investigated the relationship between discretionary accruals made by New Zealand 
manufacturing companies and Price Freeze regulations issued in 1971-1972. The study found 
that income-decreasing discretionary accruals are applied for price increases, suggesting that 
companies are more likely to be involved in EM actions due to the financial distress caused 
by the introduction of a price freeze regulation. Likewise, a study carried out by Gill-de-
Albornoz and Illueca (2005) examined the effect of price regulation on the accounting 
strategies of all Spanish electricity firms over the period 1991-2001. The outcome of the 
study provides empirical evidence that government price regulations motivate managers to 
engage in EM behaviour.  
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Using the data of listed Chinese corporations during the period 1996-1998, Haw et al. (2005) 
investigated income-increasing EM as a reaction to new statutory regulations, requiring at 
least 10% ROA for companies that seek to offer shares or issue new bonds. The findings 
confirm that those government regulations created strong motivations for EM practices. 
In summary, regulatory considerations put pressure on managers to manage reported earnings 
upward or downward in order to show their compliance with regulations. For example, 
managers of companies subject to higher adverse political or regulatory pressure have 
incentives to manipulate reported earnings in a way that allow their companies to appear less 
profitable, to reduce potential political exposure (Hsiao et al. 2016). However, companies are 
inclined toward income-increasing EM when they are going public, in order to increase the 
share price (Lim et al. 2007).  
2.4.5. POLITICAL COST MOTIVATION 
Political costs are a concern for companies and may lead managers to manage reported 
earnings. Therefore, firms may make use of annual financial reports to report more or fewer 
earnings to reduce government interference (Aljifri 2007). For example, managers may 
engage in EM and present a low profit to reduce political risk (Habbash and Alghamdi 2015; 
Hsiao et al. 2016). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) documented that political pressure 
motivates companies to engage in income-decreasing EM, avoiding public attention because 
of their high reported earnings, therefore reducing the impact of adverse political actions and 
minimizing expected cost. 
 Han and Wang (1998) investigated EM practices during the first Gulf Crisis and reported 
that companies in the US oil and gas sector were more inclined to manage their earnings 
downward during the last six months of their financial year, so as to decrease the impact of 
political costs which may result from possible unfavourable political action (e.g. antitrust 
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government policies and regulations). Thus, by reporting lower earnings, managers might 
reduce political costs in various ways (Key 1997). Likewise, Monem (2003) revealed that 
Australian companies engage in income-decreasing EM in order to decrease political costs. 
MeilaniPurwanti (2013) argues that in large firms with a high political cost, managers are 
more likely to delay reporting earnings for the current period and purposely report these 
earnings in future periods in order to reduce reported earnings for the current period. This is 
because political costs arise when high profitability attracts the attention of consumers and 
the media. Hsiao et al. (2016) examined whether US oil and gas companies were involved in 
EM practices over the 2011 Arab Spring period. Their findings show that US oil and gas 
companies engaged in income-decreasing EM practices at this time so as to reduce public 
scrutiny and mitigate potential political costs.  
In summary, political cost creates motivations for managers to make accounting choices to 
show lower reported earnings (income-decreasing EM), in order to reduce potential political 
costs generated by possible adverse political actions such as government antitrust regulations 
and policies (Hsiao et al. 2016).  
2.4.6. TAX AVOIDANCE MOTIVATION 
Managers’ response to anticipated changes in tax policy has been identified as one of the 
reasons why they manage earnings (Adhikari et al. 2005). When the figures and ratios are the 
basis for tax calculation, tax avoidance motivates managers to employ EM actions. For 
example, Lemke and Page (1992) examined the economic determinants of accounting policy 
choice among 287 UK listed companies in 1983. Their findings show that these companies 
chose income-decreasing accruals to influence tax policy, suggesting that they are willing to 
reduce reported earnings in order to decrease tax costs. Adhikari et al. (2005), using data 
from the 177 largest companies in Malaysia during 1994-1997, examined the relationship 
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between the effective tax rate and EM in a non-western context. Their findings suggest that 
for Malaysian companies, the motivation to manipulate reported earnings can be related to 
tax policy changes. Similarly, a comparative study conducted by Othman and Zeghal (2006) 
identified EM motivations in a sample of 1,674 Canadian companies and 1,470 French 
company-year observations over the period 1996-2000. Their findings indicate that EM 
practiced in French companies is mainly related to the effective tax rates and contractual debt 
incentives. On the other hand, market-related incentives such as subsequent equity offerings 
and initial public offerings are strong motivations for EM in Canadian companies. Another 
study undertaken by Goncharov and Zimmermann (2006) examined the impact of tax 
legislation on EM among Russian listed companies and reported that firms were involved in 
EM to minimize tax expenses. Coppens and Peek (2005) investigated whether private 
European companies were using EM concluding that, in the absence of pressure from capital 
market expectations, companies intend to engaged in EM in order to avoid the tax burden. 
The study also reported that, in countries where there are strict tax regulations, private 
companies are more likely to report even small losses and that tax motivations affect EM 
actions. Rahman et al. (2013) suggested that shareholders’ opinions and decisions, 
government regulations and tax laws motivate companies to manage their earnings by 
changing financial statements.  
In summary, tax avoidance motivation is another reason to practice EM. For example, if the 
aim of managers is to maximize company value, reducing the tax cost will provide substantial 
motivation to manipulate taxable income. For this reason, managers are more likely to engage 
in income-decreasing EM to achieve tax savings, consequently minimizing the potential tax 
expenses of the company (Guenther 1994).  
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2.5. MEASUREMENTS OF EM 
EM is grouped into real economic action and accounting action (Kiattikulwattana 2014). Real 
economic action is also known as real-based or transaction-based EM, and this type has an 
impact on cash flow. Healy et al. (1999); Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Roychowdhury 
(2006) used the acceleration of sales, the alteration of shipment schedules, the delay of R&D 
and maintenance expenses, and increased production as examples of real EM techniques 
which managers might employ. Roychowdhury (2006) demonstrates that manipulation of 
sales, reducing discretionary expenses (e.g. R&D, maintenance and advertising), and firm’s 
overproduction activities can be detected from abnormal production costs. Roychowdhury 
(2006) used three measurement: abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal discretionary 
expenses, and abnormal production, to detect real EM. Gunny (2010) modified 
Roychowdhury (2006) model to develop other measures to identify abnormal R&D, 
abnormal SG&A, abnormal gains on sale of assets, and abnormal production costs. The 
accounting action of EM is also known as accrual-based EM, in which certain accruals are 
manipulated with no direct cash flow effect (Kiattikulwattana 2014). In addition, the 
literature on EM suggests that managers tend to manage earnings through accruals since it is 
easier to manipulate them and harder to be observed by outsiders. Thus, abnormal accrual 
values are employed as a proxy for EM. In general, researchers have used three main 
approaches in examining the existence of EM: aggregate accruals (Healy 1985; DeAngelo 
1986; Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Han and Wang 1998; Bowman and Navissi 2003; 
Kothari et al. 2005); specific accruals, such as loan-loss provisions and the loss reserve 
(McNichols and Wilson 1988; Beneish 2001; Beatty et al. 2002; Beaver et al. 2003); and 
frequency distribution of earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999). Each 
of these approaches will be briefly discussed in the following sections. (See Table 2.4). 
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2.5.1. AGGREGATE ACCRUALS APPROACH 
There are several approaches to measuring EM, but the most common used in accounting 
studies is the aggregate accruals approach (Dechow et al. 1995). Aggregate accruals have two 
components: first, Discretionary Accruals (DA) (managed by managers) which represent EM; 
and second Non-Discretionary Accruals (NDA), which are influenced by external factors and 
thus outside the control of managers. The common issue faced by EM methods is how to 
identify and separate the total types of accrual into the two components (Jones 1991), and 
numerous models have been presented in the accounting literature. These range from simple 
models, whereby EM is measured by the perceived change in total accruals, to more 
advanced ones in which aggregate accruals are divided into the DA and NDA types. The 
following sub-sections discuss the most common models in the total accruals approach.  
2.5.1.1. THE HEALY (1985) MODEL 
The Healy (1985) model was the first attempt to estimate discretionary accruals using 
aggregate accruals scaled by the lagged value of aggregate assets in the given year (van Praag 
2002). This model attempts to measure aggregate accruals by deducting reported earnings 
from operating cash flow. Healy’s implicit supposition is that, in the absence of EM, the 
expected aggregate accruals will be zero in the estimation period. Although the Healy model 
assumes that the total accruals comprise DA and NDA, it does not separate them. Healy 
argues that systematic EM occurs in every period. This model is presented as follows: 
   EDAit = TAit / Ait - 1       [2.1] 
Where 
EDAit   Estimated discretionary accruals for the firm i in year t. 
TAit  Total accruals, defined as the difference between reported earnings and operating 
cash. 
Ait – 1   The lagged value of total assets at the beginning of the year.  
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The primary supposition of Healy’s model is that the volume of NDA is estimated to be zero 
over the estimation period. This assumption has been criticised for several reasons: First, 
their volume is not expected to be zero in any given period because it varies depending on the 
firm’s conditions and economic circumstances (Kaplan 1985). Second, due to the influence of 
depreciation expenditure, the level of total accruals including NDA is usually negative for 
many firms (Perry and Williams 1994). 
2.5.1.2. THE DEANGELO (1986) MODEL 
The second attempt to estimate DAs was introduced by DeAngelo (1986), who eliminated the 
weaknesses of Healy’s model by not recognising a benchmark for the anticipated accruals 
(Aljifri 2007). DeAngelo (1986) measures DA through computation of the variance of the 
present year’s DA and the whole accrual in the last year, since NDA may be constant over 
time. In order to check this assumption, DeAngelo defines aggregate accruals as the sum of 
DA and NDA and calculates total accruals as the difference resulting from deduction of net 
income from operating cash flow. In this model, NDA is measured as the total accrual of the 
previous period scaled by the lagged value of total assets.  
EDA it = (TA it – TA it – 1) / A it – 1       [2.2]  
Where 
EDA it     Estimated non-discretionary accruals for the firm i in year t. measured as the 
difference between total accruals in the event year and total accruals in the estimated 
year. 
TA it  Total accruals, defined as the difference between net income and operating cash. 
A it – 1  Lagged value of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
DeAngelo (1986) model works on the assumption that NDA follow a random walk and that 
any change in them is constant over time and is therefore approximately zero in the 
estimation period. However, this has been criticised by several EM researchers, since the 
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NDA should change in response to changes in the firm’s circumstances and not be constant 
over time (e.g. Aljifri 2007; Islam et al. 2014). 
Although the Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models are considered as the simplest 
models, researchers are unwilling to measure DA using them because they neglect the fact 
that the firm’s economic circumstances affect the NDA (e.g. Dechow and Sloan 1991; Jones 
1991). 
2.5.1.3. THE INDUSTRY (Dechow and Sloan 1991) MODEL 
Due to the shortcomings of the Healy (1985) and (DeAngelo 1986) models which assume the 
constancy of the NDA over time, Dechow and Sloan (1991) introduced the industry model to 
capture EM. They argued that companies in the same sector have similar variations in NDA, 
and therefore that they are equal to the median of aggregate accruals in the given year divided 
by the lagged value of aggregate assets for all non-sample companies in the same industry. 
Therefore, in the industry model, NDA are measured as follows:  
NDA it = α 1 it + α 2 it Median j (TA it – 1) / A it – 1      [2.3] 
Where: 
NDA it   Non-discretionary accruals for the firm i in the year t, measured by using the 
difference between total accruals in the event year and total accruals in the 
estimated year. 
Median j (TA it – 1) / A it  Median value of overall accruals industry, firm i in year t scaled by lagged 
value of total assets.  
TA it    Total accruals, resulting from the difference between net income and 
operating cash flows. 
A it – 1    Lagged value of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
α 1 it  and α 2 it   Firm-specific parameters as estimated by using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) on observations in the estimated period. 
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Although the industry model attempts to avoid the shortcomings of the Healy (1985) and 
DeAngelo (1986) models, it has two weaknesses. First, it neglects the variation in NDA that 
is common in the same industry. Therefore, if changes in NDA reflect responses to unstable 
economic circumstances of the company, then DA may be missclassified as NDA. Second, it 
ignores the changes in DA which show correlation across companies in the same sector. 
Thus, the model may not properly distinguish DA from NDA (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 
1995). 
2.5.1.4. THE JONES (1991) MODEL 
This is the most common model used in studies of total accruals, since it can classify accruals 
into DA and NDA (Peek et al. 2013; Islam et al. 2014). It is based on the assumption that the 
total accruals could be the result of managers’ interventions in the financial reporting process, 
and from changes in a company’s economic conditions (Kaplan 1985). Jones (1991) believes 
that changes in revenue would bring changes in operating capital, causing variations in 
accruals. On the other hand, depreciation expense would decrease the accruals (Chen 2012). 
Therefore, Jones suggests a linear regression-based model that controls for the change in 
revenues and depreciation to estimate DA. She uses a two-stage producer to partition 
aggregate accruals into two components: DA and NDA (Xiong 2006). In the first stage, Jones 
relates NDA to the change in revenue (∆REV) and gross property, plant and equipment, all 
standardized by the lagged value of total assets using time-series data as follows: 
        NDA it   = α 1 (1 / A it – 1) + α 2 (∆REV it / A it -1) + α 3 (PPE it / A it -1) + ɛit      [2.4] 
Where 
TAit   Total accruals for the firm i in year t. 
∆REV it   Change in revenue for the firm i in year t scaled by total assets.  
PPE it   Gross property, plant and equipment for the firm i in year t scaled by assets. 
A it – 1    Lagged value of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
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α1, α2, and α3 : Firm-specific parameters.  
ɛit   The residual. 
In the next phase of DA estimation, the parameters α1, α2, and α3 from equation (2.4) are 
used to analyse the data from the given year t. The following equation is used to estimate DA: 
DA it= [TA it / A it -1]–[ α 1 (1 / A it – 1)+α 2(∆REV it / A it – 1)+α 3 (PPE it / A it – 1)+ɛit ]        [2.5] 
Where  
DA it   : Discretionary accurals for the firm i in period t. 
The Jones model includes changes in revenue (∆REV) and fixed assets (PPE) to control for 
the company’s circumstances and depreciation respectively. However, controlling for the 
change in revenue and depreciation of fixed assets without including the change in 
accounting receivables in the event period leads to missing a factor that managers could use 
to alter the earnings (Hoang 2014). The Jones model is based on the assumption that the 
revenues are NDA, since revenues are likely to be manipulated by managers (e.g. increasing 
sales recognition near year-end period). Employing the Jones model will lead to the removal 
of some DA. Aljifri (2007) asserts that in the Jones model, the manipulation of the sales 
revenue is neglected since it supposes the total sales revenue of a given year is not controlled 
by managers and estimates are constant. Therefore, the Jones model does not consider this 
discretionary component of accruals (Islam et al. 2014). Despite the prevalence of this model, 
it has been criticized for providing biased and non-reliable assessments of DA (Stubben 
2010). 
2.5.1.5. THE MODIFIED JONES (1995) MODEL 
In an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the original Jones model, which assumes that 
revenue cannot be controlled by managers and is therefore NDA, Dechow et al. (1995) 
proposed a modified version to minimize the error of measurement in DA through deduction 
of the change in debtors accruals (∆REC) from the change in revenues (∆REV) to omit the 
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element in the change in revenue that is expected to be controlled by managers’ discretion 
(the Modified Jones Model relaxes the assumption that revenues are exogenous). Thus, this 
model uses changes in cash revenue rather than changes in total revenue since some credit 
revenue might be discretionary in the event period (Stubben 2010). The modified Jones 
(1995) model uses the estimated parameters of equation (2.4) (α1, α2, and α3) in the 
following equation: 
DA it =[TA it / A it -1]–[ α 1 (1 / A it – 1)+α 2 (∆REV it / A it – 1 - ∆REC it / A it )+α 3 (PPE it / A it – 1)]    [2.6] 
Where: 
∆RECit   Change in accounts receivable (debtors) for the firm i in given year t. 
Dechow et al. (1995) believe that the variation in accounts receivable in the given year is 
wholly due to DA because it is the result of managers’ discretion in credit sales rather than 
cash sales. However, the assumption that the entire change in receivables in the period is DA 
overestimates these accruals to the extent that the change in receivables results from a firm’s 
economic conditions.  
It is necessary to mention that the standard Jones (1991) model was originally developed in a 
time-series approach, which in turn needs a sufficiently long time-series of data (e.g. at least 
8-10 years) to provide effective estimator coefficients. However, employing a time-series 
method has several limitations. First, it raises the possibility of survivorship bias problems 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Peasnell et al. 2000). Second, the assumption that the 
estimation of changes in gross PPE and revenues are constant over time might not be 
appropriate. In an attempt to avoid these problems, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994); 
Subramanyam (1996) and Becker et al. (1998) employed the cross-sectional version of the 
Jones (1991) model, by resolving equation 2.4 (stage one) for each industry on a year-specific 
rather than a company-specific basis, and then estimating the coefficients of predicted DA for 
each company through equation 2.5 (stage two), to control for year and industry-specific 
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influence. Recently, several studies have preferred to use the cross-sectional approach over 
the time-series approach to avoid the limitations embedded in the latter (Xie et al. 2003b; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Haniffa et al. 2006; Iqbal et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010; 
Katmun 2012; Peek et al. 2013; Islam et al. 2014). 
2.5.1.6. THE PERFORMANCE-MATCHED (Kothari et al. 2005) MODEL 
Several scholars have tried to evaluate the specification and accuracy of the standard Jones 
(1991) model. For example, Dechow et al. (1995); Kasznik (1999) and Kothari et al. (2005) 
found that the findings predicted in the Jones models show that the DA have both a positive 
and significant relationship to the company’s performance measured by return on assets 
(ROA), suggesting that the Jones models do not control for the firm’s economic conditions. 
To overcome this issue of a company’s financial performance-related misspecification, 
several attempts have been made to eliminate the possible impact of the relationship between 
DA and ROA as a proxy for the company’s performance by applying a matched-firm 
performance or portfolio approach to adjust the DA (Kasznik 1999; Bartov et al. 2000; 
Kothari et al. 2005).  
Kothari et al. (2005) claim that the DA, as measured by Jones and modified Jones models, 
may include serious errors of measurement in DA because both neglect the effect of the 
company’s previous performance. They developed a model that contains an intercept and 
control for the company’s performance. Kothari et al. (2005) proposed improving the 
modified Jones models by including ROA as a control for the firm’s financial performance; 
DA are estimated as the residuals of the following regression equation: 
DAit = [TA it/A it – 1] – [ α 1 (1/A it – 1)+α 2 (∆REV it /A it – 1-∆REC it /A it )+α 3 (PPE it /A it – 1)+α 4 ROA it 
– 1]               [2.7] 
Where 
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ROA it – 1  Lagged value of return on assets for the firm i in year t.    
2.5.2. THE SPECIFIC ACCRUALS APPROACH  
It has been observed that most EM scholars rely upon total accruals models rather than the 
specific-accruals approach as a proxy to detect EM (Beneish 2001; Sun and Rath 2010; 
Kashmiri 2014). This neglect of the specific-accrual approach led Healy et al. (1999, p.372) 
to emphasise the need for additional research based on specific accruals. They argue that, 
“Overall, there is remarkably little evidence on EM using specific accruals, suggesting that 
this is likely to be a fruitful area for future research. By examining specific accruals, 
researchers can offer direct evidence for standard setters in areas where standards work well 
and where there may be room for improvement”. Similarly, Beneish (2001) pointed out that 
studies on the specific-accruals approach were required, due to the difficulties involved in 
using total-accruals techniques. Generally, previous studies have employed two types of 
specific-accruals approach, single and multiple accruals. Some studies measure EM by using 
specific accruals, including provisions for bad debt (McNichols and Wilson 1988), deferred 
tax (Teoh et al. 1998; Phillips et al. 2003) and depreciation (Teoh et al. 1998). For example, 
instead of total accrual, the residual value of bad debt provision was used by McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) to measure EM practices. Their findings reveal that companies with 
remarkably low earnings prefer to be involved in income-decreasing EM, suggesting that this 
action is consistent with the big bath technique. Similar studies examined other single 
specific accruals (Elnahass et al. 2014; Ali et al. 2015). For example, Elnahass et al. (2014) 
examined the use of reported loan loss provisions by investors in their valuations of banks. 
Their study decomposes loan loss provisions into DA and NDA, using a sample of Islamic 
and conventional banks listed in the Middle East and North Africa over the period 2006-
2011. The findings reveal that loan loss provision has a positive value relevant to investors in 
both types of bank. Likewise, Ali et al. (2015) using a sample of 291 banks from 35 countries 
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over the period 2003-2010, used loan loss provisions to estimate DA as a proxy for EM. 
Their findings reveal that Islamic banks engage in EM less than conventional banks, perhaps 
because they are subjected to more monitoring by the additional layer of governance. 
Phillips et al. (2003) suggested employing deferred tax expense accruals when measuring 
EM, along with DA. They proved the incremental usefulness of deferred-tax expense over 
total accruals and DA in measuring EM, deduced from both Jones and modified Jones 
models, with the aim of avoiding small loss and decline in revenue. 
With respect to the multiple specific accruals approach, Beneish (2001), for example, 
established a model to measure EM in companies with high financial performance. The 
model contains variables such as prior market performance, ownership structure, capital 
structure, time listed, sales growth and other motivations for managers to violate GAAP. The 
study finds a systematic association between the probability of violating GAAP and the 
variables (e.g. prior market performance, capital structure, and sales growth) that are 
employed as proxies for incentives to manipulate earnings. 
Although there are obvious benefits in using specific accruals in measuring DA in certain 
economic conditions, there are drawbacks when estimating DA in most circumstances, as 
pointed out by McNichols and Wilson (1988). First, specific accruals reflect all the 
managerial discretion. For instance, if the discretion of the manager is exercised through 
different accruals, which is the common case, this will reduce the power of a specific accrual 
measurement for EM. Second, the specific-accruals approach is insufficiently flexible for the 
investigation of additional variables such as corporate governance. Hence, for studies aiming 
to examine the relationship between EM and other hypothesised variables, the specific 
approach is not meaningful since a separate model for each specific accrual is needed, with a 
high probability of being influenced by the hypothesised variables. Third, this model is more 
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appropriate for institutions and is frequently used by financial institutions (banking and 
insurance industries). Furthermore, Sun and Rath (2010) suggest that the number of 
companies that use specific accruals could be small when compared to the number of 
companies using aggregate accruals, which will affect the generalisability of the findings of 
studies on specific accruals. 
2.5.3. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION APPROACH  
The frequency distribution method is built on the assumption that, through avoidance of 
losses or decline in reported earnings, managers are encouraged to meet a specific earnings 
benchmark, with investigation of the earnings distribution around this benchmark. This 
frequency distribution approach differs from previous approaches in that it attempts to detect 
EM by using earnings distribution. Thus, researchers have examined the evidence of EM 
practices through testing the reported earnings distribution (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Degeorge et al. 1999). For example, the first study conducted by Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) used earnings distribution and changes in earnings to examine whether managers 
become involved in EM to avoid loss and to decrease reported earnings. The study reports 
that EM to avoid losses is practiced through unusually low frequencies of slight losses and 
unusually high frequencies of slight profits. Equally, avoiding earnings decrease is practiced 
in forms of unusually low frequencies of minor earnings decreases and unusually high 
frequencies of minor earnings increases. The study reveals that the companies with small pre-
managed profits are involved in income increasing to report earnings increases, and those 
with slightly negative pre-managed earnings are involved in income increasing to report 
higher earnings. The findings also show that the main tools for earnings manipulation are 
changes in working capital and cash flow from operations activities.   
Similarly, the distribution of earnings per share was used by Degeorge et al. (1999) in testing 
whether managers’ EM practices are motivated by loss avoidance, maintaining recent 
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performance and their desire to meet analysts’ forecasts. Their results show that the 
manager’s desire to avoid reporting losses, their quest to report earnings that are at least close 
to previous earnings and their ability to meet the expectations of analysts are the most 
important reasons why managers are involved in EM. 
Beatty et al. (2002) employed the distribution method to investigate whether the desire to 
avoid earnings decrease is the major reason why managers in private and public banks 
practice EM. Their study finds that publicly controlled banks report lower increase in 
earnings and lower level decreases than estimated; however, evidence for fewer small 
decreases in earnings being unexpectedly reported by the private banks is weak. In addition, 
they find that more small decreases in earnings are reported by public banks than by private 
banks, even after differences in their operations are considered (e.g. bank size, cash flow, 
asset growth, loan characteristics and geographic regions). The results of the study show that 
loan provisions and realised security gains and losses are more likely to be used by public 
banks to increase their reported earnings. Generally, public banks are more likely to 
manipulate reported earnings than are private banks. Furthermore, by using the distribution-
earnings approach, Ebaid (2012) examined whether Egyptian companies engage in EM 
practices to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, over the period 1997-2007. Egyptian 
companies are shown to be more likely to engage in EM action with the aim of avoiding 
reporting losses and avoiding earnings decreases in their annual reports. 
Xiong (2006) argues that the distribution reported earnings approach is more effective in 
identification of EM practices than other approaches. However, Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
claim that this method does not measure the level of EM or the specific methods that are used 
for EM. Durtschi and Easton (2005) argued against the method of discontinuity around zero 
and the shapes of frequency distributions on which scholars depend as a proof of EM, and 
that these shapes are affected by depression, criteria for choosing the sample and/or changes 
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in the features of observations to the right and left of zero. Their conclusion is that the shapes 
of patterns of distribution are not sufficient evidence of EM practices. Therefore, researchers 
must rule out these confounding factors before using the shape of earnings distributions 
around zero as evidence of EM. These authors also claim that there is no empirical evidence 
to support the concept that the pervasive discontinuity of DA at zero is a result of EM 
practices. 
Based on the reasons given above, one can conclude that there are significant benefits in 
using the total-accrual approach in detecting EM, rather than the other two approaches. The 
obvious advantages justify why a large number of EM researchers have used the total-
accruals approach to detect EM, and it will be used in the current study in the estimation of 
DA as a proxy for EM. The findings of this review are summarized in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: EM Measurements. 
Measurements Proxies Description Authors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregate Accruals Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discretionary Accruals Proxy 
 Total Accruals. 
 Change in Total Accruals. 
 The residual from 
regression of the median 
of aggregate accruals in 
given year divided by 
lagged value of total 
assets for all non-sample 
companies in the same 
industry. 
 Residual from regression 
of total accruals on 
change in sales and 
property, plant and 
equipment. 
 Residual from regression 
of total accruals on 
change in sales and on 
property, plant and 
equipment, where revenue 
is adjusted for change in 
receivables in the event 
period. 
 Residual from regression 
of total accruals on 
change in sales and on 
property, plant and 
equipment, where revenue 
is adjusted for change in 
 Healy (1985) 
 DeAngelo (1986) 
 The industry model 
            Dechow and Sloan (1991) 
 
 
 
 Jones (1991) 
 
 
 
 Modified Jones Model 
Dechow et al. (1995) 
 
 
 
 Matched-Firm 
Performance. 
Kothari et al. (2005) 
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receivables in the event 
period. Includes ROA as a 
control for the firm’s 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific Accruals Approach 
 
 
Discretionary Accruals Proxy 
 Residual provision for 
bad debt, estimated as the 
residual from a regression 
of the provision for bad 
debts on the allowance 
beginning balance, and 
current and future write-
offs. 
 McNichols and Wilson 
(1988). 
 
 
 
 
Frequency Distribution Approach 
 
 
 
 
Test for Earnings Management 
 Test whether the 
frequency of annual 
earnings realizations in 
the region above (below) 
zero earnings and 
previous year’s earnings 
in greater (less) than 
expected. 
 Test whether the 
frequency of quarterly 
earnings realizations in 
the region above (below) 
zero earnings, previous 
quarter’s earnings and 
analysts’ forecasts is 
greater (less) than 
expected. 
 
 Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Degeorge et al. (1999) 
Source: Moderated from (McNichols 2001, p. 317).   
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2.6. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF EM AND CEOS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
The previous decade has seen a growing amount of research on the topic of managerial 
characteristics. According to Shefrin (2001), the physiological and sociological 
characteristics of managers may have an effect on their decisions. Other studies show that 
CEOs’ personal characteristics influence different decisions; for example, the CEO’s gender 
and risk-taking (e.g. Byrnes et al. 1999), gender and using tools of IT in the learning process 
(Obaidat and Alqatamin 2011), age and investment decisions (e.g. Prendergast and Stole 
1996; Li et al. 2011; Serfling 2012), age and voluntary financial disclosure choices (Bamber 
et al. 2010), overconfidence and corporate acquisitions (e.g. Brown and Sarma 2007), 
overconfidence and capital structure decisions (Tomak 2013), overconfidence and earnings 
forecast (Schrand and Zechman 2012) and overconfidence and voluntary disclosure 
(Andriosopoulos et al. 2013). Nevertheless, the relationship between a CEOs’ personal 
characteristics and EM practices remains ambiguous and controversial. As such, the focus of 
the present study is to acquire an understanding of whether specific characteristics, namely 
CEO’s gender, age and overconfidence, influence EM practices. 
2.6.1. CEOs GENDER 
Previous studies claim that gender is likely to have an influence on a company’s decisions 
and suggest that female executives see a different perspective and demand different 
information compared to men (Peni and Vähämaa 2010; Abdul Hameed and Counsell 2012; 
Dowling and Aribi 2013). Several feminist economists argue that women are more inclined to 
be neutral in moral judgements and behaviour than are men (Nelson 1996; Collins 2000), 
while Barber and Odean (2001) and Nelson (2012) find them on average more inclined to be 
risk-averse than men in decision making. Hansemark (2003) provides evidence for the 
difference between men and women when taking decisions regarding starting a new business. 
Using a sample of 35,000 householders from a large discount brokerage, Barber and Odean 
53 
 
(2001) analysed the common stock investments of male and female during the period 1991-
1997, and reported that males tend to be more overconfident than females. Dowling and Aribi 
(2013) examined the relationship between female directors and UK firms’ acquisitiveness 
over the period 2000-2011, and found that women appear to be less overconfident in their 
decisions making in this respect. Based on data collected from Fortune 1000, Carter et al. 
(2003) reported that a significant relationship exists between the proportion of women on a 
board and the firm’s performance. However, Rose (2007) found no relationship between the 
proportion of females on the board and company performance among Danish firms. This 
result is consistent with previous studies (Shrader et al. 1997; Du Rietz and Henrekson 2000; 
Smith et al. 2006; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008).  
Several attempts have been made to examine the effect of CEOs’ traits on EM practices 
(Geiger and North 2006; Jiang et al. 2008; Matsunaga and Yeung 2008; Peni and Vähämaa 
2010). For instance, Peni and Vähämaa (2010) studied the association between the gender of 
company executives and EM among 500 US S&P firms. Their results show that companies 
with female CFOs have a higher likelihood of using income-decreasing DA. Nonetheless, 
these authors found no evidence for a link between CEO’s gender and EM, and their results 
are consistent with previous studies (e.g. Geiger and North 2006; Jiang et al. 2008; 
Matsunaga and Yeung 2008). Conversely, Gavious et al. (2012) used multivariate analysis 
among Israeli high-technology companies listed in the USA during 2002 and 2009 and found 
a negative relationship between the presence of females on the board and EM practices, 
arguing that EM is lower in companies with female CEO/CFOs. Srinidhi et al. (2011) provide 
empirical evidence that a greater proportion of women on the board of directors improves 
earnings quality. Similarly, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) and Srinidhi et al. (2011) examined 
the association between gender diversity and earnings quality and found that companies with 
a higher percentage of females in top management are more likely to increase the quality of 
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reported earnings than those with a lower percentage of female executives. Thus, female 
CEOs may have higher moral standards and be more trustworthy than male CEOs, and 
therefore less likely to engage in EM or to manipulate corporate financial disclosures 
(Bernardi and Arnold 1997; Heminway 2007).  
Using samples of 1,222 and 1,559 US firms from 2004 and 2005 respectively, Barua et al. 
(2010a) examined the association between CEO/CFO gender and discretionary accruals as a 
proxy for financial reporting quality, measured by the modified Jones (1995) and 
performance-matched (2005) models. They found that CEO/CFO females are significantly 
and negatively associated with DA. Likewise, based on a sample of 1,500 S&P firms during 
the period 1996-2010, Jia et al. (2014) examined the association between facial structure of 
CEOs and their company’s financial misreporting. Their results show that companies with 
CEOs who have more masculine faces have a higher incidence of financial misreporting. 
Recent studies by Ho et al. (2015) and Thankom et al. (2015) show that female directors tend 
to adopt restrained EM and more conservative accounting policies, given the conservative 
mind-set of female CEOs and their tendency to be less aggressive and more anxious. In 
addition, the literature indicates that females in business are associated with better 
organizational performance, due to their rational decisions (e.g. Gul et al. 2011). The ethical 
behaviour in the workplace of both women and men has been widely examined, the result 
showing that females and males display distinct differences in values and interests and in 
their tendency to become involved in unethical business activities (Gilligan 1982; Betz and 
Boreiko 1989). Males are more concerned about financial benefits and a successful 
profession and are more likely to break the law and rules to attain competitive success, while 
females lean more towards appropriate relationships and helping people and are less likely to 
engage in unethical issues (Betz and Boreiko 1989; Mason and Mudrack 1996). Therefore, 
55 
 
from the findings of the studies mentioned above, the present study expects a Positive 
relationship between CEOs gender and EM practices. 
2.6.2. CEO’s AGE 
The literature indicates that the CEO’s age is one human aspect that influences decision 
making (e.g. Hambrick 2007; D'Ewart 2015), since older and younger managers may have 
different attitudes that effect their decisions (Lin et al. 2014). Thus, some studies have 
attempted to explain the relationship between the CEO’s age and decision-making processes. 
For example, Serfling (2012) assumes that older CEOs invest less than younger ones because 
the latter are more prone to take risks. Serfling (2012) also argues that the CEO’s age has a 
significant impact on corporate financial decisions, because younger CEOs do not have a 
previous record related to their accomplishments. Likewise, Bertrand and Schoar (2002) used 
birth cohorts (year of birth) as a proxy for age to investigate the relationship between the 
CEO’s age and investment decisions, using a sample of the 800 largest US firms. Their 
findings show that CEOs from earlier birth cohorts are more likely to be conservative in 
making investment decisions, suggesting that younger CEOs are more likely to make more 
investment decisions than older CEOs. Similarly, Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Li et al. 
(2011) reported that younger CEOs are likely to make more investment decisions than older 
ones because they want to demonstrate their capability to the stakeholders. Conversely, 
Miller and Shamsie (2001) found that the CEO’s age has a positive association with a firm’s 
performance: older CEOs tend to make more investment decisions than younger ones, 
thereby influencing the firm’s performance. Moreover, evidence suggests that the CEO’s age 
has a significant effect on mergers and acquisitions (Yim 2013). Lin et al. (2014) in a study 
of 4,374 non-financial USA firms, found a negative and significant association between the 
CEO’s age and internal control quality. Davidson III et al. (2007) investigated the impact of 
age and career horizon on EM practices. Their findings indicate that companies with older 
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CEOs, especially those nearing retirement, are associated with EM practices, as they are more 
interested in their current company’s performance and less concerned about the future with 
the aim of maximizing their own wealth or pension. Based on the above discuision, this study 
expects a significant statistical association between CEOs’ age and EM practices. 
2.6.3. CEO’s OVERCONFIDENCE 
According to Hambrick (2007), the senior manager’s personal characteristics affect 
judgement and decision making, and among these characteristics is overconfidence. 
Overconfidence is the tendency of individuals to consider themselves above average 
(Svenson 1981; Alicke 1985; Kruger 1999). Langer (1975, p.315), defines overconfidence as 
“an overestimation of one’s own abilities and outcomes relating to one’s personal situation”. 
Weinstein (1980) and Alicke (1985) reported that overconfidence is often seen in managers 
(Cooper et al. 1988; Landier and Thesmar 2009). The influence of CEO’s overconfidence on 
corporate decisions has received significant attention in the academic literature. For  example, 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Frank and Goyal (2009) documented that CEOs’ 
overconfidence might have a significant influence on the variation in leverage across 
companies. Similarly, Malmendier et al. (2011) found that overconfidence influences 
investment decisions. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) suggested that managers who are 
overconfident are more likely to be over-optimistic about their firm’s future performance and 
overestimate their own capacity to maximize future earnings. 
Employing data from 4,238 CEO-year observations of 500 S&P companies during the period 
1992-2001, collected from the ExecuComp database, Francis et al. (2008a) investigated the 
effect of the CEO’s reputation (as a proxy for overconfidence) on earnings quality. They 
found that the coefficient of reputation is positively and significantly related to earnings 
quality and suggested that companies managed by reputed managers have better-reported 
earnings. Moreover, using data from 78,423 US firm-year observations collected from 
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ExecuComp over the period 1989-2009, Demerjian et al. (2012) examined the association 
between managerial ability and earnings quality, and found that they are positively linked. 
The outcome of the study is consistent with the idea that managers’ characteristics can and do 
influence the quality of the judgements and forecasts used to form earnings, suggesting that 
companies managed by more able managers are more likely to report higher-quality earnings. 
Schrand and Zechman (2012) used a sample of 49 corporations subject to the accounting and 
auditing enforcement Issues by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and examined 
the relationship between CEOs’ overconfidence and their overstatement of earnings. They 
found a positive relation between CEOs’ overconfidence and financial-reporting fraud, 
arguing that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in fraudulent practices. Hribar 
and Yang (2010) indicated that there is a positive relation between overconfidence and the 
likelihood of income-increasing EM. Furthermore, Hsieh et al. (2014) examined the 
relationship between CEOs’ overconfidence and EM using only US companies during the 
period 1991-2009. Their results show that overconfident CEOs are more likely to engage in 
income-increasing EM behaviour, relative to non-overconfident CEOs. Similarly, based on 
data merged from Compustat North America’s executive compensation, and using 288 firm-
year observations over the period 2009-2013, a study carried out by Berry-Stölzlea et al. 
(2015) investigated the relationship between managerial overconfidence and EM. Their 
findings provide evidence that the coefficient of the CEO’s overconfidence is positively and 
significantly related to the likelihood of income-increasing EM.  
Based on studies of the effect of manager’s overconfidence on decision-making processes in 
general, and EM in particular and consistent with the idea that overconfident managers are 
considered risk takers (Malmendier and Tate 2005a) who are more likely to disclose 
overestimated information and underestimate the risks, this study is therefore motivated to 
examine whether the CEO’s overconfidence influences EM practices. Consistent with the 
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work of Schrand and Zechman (2012); Hsieh et al. (2014) and Berry-Stölzlea et al. (2015), 
this study expects to find a positive and significant association between CEOs’ 
overconfidence and EM practices. 
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2.7. SUMMARY 
Chapter 2 has introduced a broader understanding of EM by offering several definitions and 
discussing those factors that encourage managers to manipulate reported earnings. To meet 
earnings forecasts, managers may use numerous accounting techniques without violating 
GAAP, allowing them to select alternative accounting methods in estimating the company’s 
performance during the event period. The literature presents different methods and models 
for measuring EM. Although researchers have used specific-accruals models and frequency 
distribution as alternative approaches, the total-accruals approach, which captures the total 
effects of accruals on earnings, is the most widely reported one. Under the aggregate accrual 
approach, the models are based on classification of the total accruals into two components: 
manageable and non-manageable accruals. Non-manageable accruals are adjustments 
mandated by accounting standards, while discretionary or manageable accruals are 
adjustments made by managers. Although the literature suggests several models for 
measuring EM, the Jones, modified Jones and performance-matched models are the most 
common and most accurate in testing EM (e.g. Guay et al. 1996; Peasnell et al. 2000; Katmun 
2012; Islam et al. 2014). Therefore, this study will employ these three models to estimate DA 
as a proxy for EM, using the residual value of DA to investigate the association between EM 
and the level of FLID.     
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW: FLID 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews several aspects that are relevant to FLID as a proxy for voluntary 
corporate disclosure. It also reviews previous studies on CEOs’ characteristics and corporate 
disclosure, and is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the corporate information 
disclosure definitions and voluntary disclosure of FLID, while section 3.3 covers FLID 
motivations. Section 3.4 discusses empirical studies related to FLID. Section 3.5 covers the 
theoretical framework for voluntary disclosure of FLID. Finally, section 3.6 provides a 
summary of the chapter.  
 3.2. FLID DEFINITIONS 
Corporate disclosure is a mechanism to provide more information (financial or non-financial) 
to investors and other stakeholders through formal and informal channels, and has been 
widely perceived as a feature of an efficient capital market (Meek et al. 1995). Therefore, 
corporate disclosure is considered as a primary tool that managers adopt to communicate 
information to investors. Various definitions of corporate disclosure have been proposed. For 
example, Gibbins et al. (1990, p.122), define it as “the release by a firm of information, 
which may be financial or non-financial, qualitative or quantitative; mandatory or voluntary, 
disseminated through formal or informal channels”, while Abraham et al. (2006, p.3) prefer 
“communicating a firm’s financial performance to outside investors and capital markets”. In 
addition, many studies report that companies disclose their financial and non-financial 
information using a variety of means, for instance annual reports, press releases, interim 
reports, direct communication with analysts and conference calls (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 
1993; Botosan 1997; Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; Abed et al. 2011). Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) and Botosan (1997) reported that companies are more likely to use the annual 
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financial report , given its efficiency as a marketing tool and an avenue for conveying a 
particular corporate message (Preston et al. 1996). However, in the literature corporate 
disclosure is categorized as both mandatory and voluntary disclosures (Uyar et al. 2013). 
Mandatory disclosure is compulsory for firms since a minimum level of information, such as 
the financial statements and corresponding footnotes in their annual reports, is demanded by 
the law or the regulatory framework (Wallace et al. 1994; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Uyar et al. 
2013) of certain organizations, such as the Exchange Security Authorities (ESA), 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB). Consequently, this type of disclosure fails to offer sufficient information 
about a firm’s value and management performance (Healy and Palepu 2001). Voluntary 
disclosure provides additional and private information when an adequate depiction of the 
firm’s value and management performance is unlikely to be achieved through mandatory 
disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001; Akhtaruddin 2005). Voluntary disclosure is widespread, 
and companies provide much of their private information without laws or other specific 
requirements (Botosan 1997). Thus, when the information disclosed exceeds the minimum 
requirements and involves accounting, financial and other non-financial information which 
executives of a firm judge to be relevant to the needs of different users, it is defined as 
voluntary disclosure (Meek et al. 1995). In general, voluntary disclosure comprises two large 
categories of information (Marco et al., 2014): 
1. The disclosure that is included in regulated annual report statements, such as financial 
statements’ footnotes, management’s strategies, etc. 
2. The disclosure provided through voluntary communication with shareholders, for 
example, press releases, analysts’ presentations, and other regulated corporate reports. 
Voluntary disclosure, such as FLID, is considered essential to demonstrate a company’s 
position to the stakeholders and other interested parties (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Lim et 
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al. 2007). In fact, a number of studies argue that the most significant items in voluntary 
disclosure are to be found in FLID (Morton and Neill 2001; Francis et al. 2008a; Wang and 
Hussainey 2013; Qu et al. 2015). Francis et al. (2008b) and Kieso et al. (2010) define FLID 
as a voluntary disclosure which allows users of firm’s financial reports to assess the firm’s 
future performance and improve their ability to make rational investment decisions.  
Celik et al. (2006,  p. 200) define FLID as “any prediction or information that helps to make 
estimates about the future; it includes management’s strategy, valuations of opportunities and 
risks and forecasts data”. Hussainey (2004) argues that FLID captures current plans and 
future projections to enable users of financial statement to understand future performance. In 
the same vein, Menicucci (2013, p. 1668) defines FLID as “the type of information regarding 
future forecasts that allows users to assess a firm’s future performance”. It includes 
assessments of opportunities and risks, management’s strategies and anticipated data about 
the firm’s operations. Similarly, Alkhatib (2014, p. 858) defined FLID as “ corporate 
predictions regarding the future of the company state of affairs that ultimately provide owners 
with valuable financial information concerning the firm’s future circumstances”. 
In the above discussion, all the definitions indicate that the primary purpose of FLID is to 
provide stakeholders with useful information about a firm’s future performance and improve 
their ability to make rational investment decisions. In line with this argument, the present 
study considers FLID as a primary tool that allows users of a firm’s financial reports to assess 
the firm’s future performance.  
 3.3. FLID MOTIVATIONS  
Companies have many motivations for disclosing voluntary information. For example, a 
considerable amount of literature has reported that extending the level of voluntary disclosure 
helps to reduce information asymmetry between agents and principals, and consequently 
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increases financial analysts’ confidence (e.g. Barry and Brown 1986; Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991; Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Morton and Neill 2001; Lundholm and Van 
Winkle 2006). A review of existing empirical studies in the voluntary disclosure field by 
Lundholm and Van Winkle (2006) concludes that companies are more likely to disclose 
FLID in order to add value to their communication with their shareholders, with the aim of 
reducing the level of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and take 
advantage of a lower cost of capital.  
Graham et al. (2005) reveals that managers in the US make a voluntary disclosure for three 
reasons: i) to enhance a reputation for transparent reporting; ii) to address the insufficiencies 
of mandatory disclosure; and iii) to minimize the information risk assigned to the company’s 
stock. Hence, managers are more likely to disclose more FLID to the stakeholders to increase 
their confidence about the company’s future performance (Singhvi and Desai 1971; Healy 
and Palepu 2001). 
Using a sample of 300 firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange during the period 1989-
1991, Clarkson et al. (1994) indicated that the disclosure of such information is viewed as 
one measurement of financial reporting quality, suggesting that financial reports including 
FLID are more likely to be percieved as qualitative. 
Other studies considered that the disclosure of accounting information is essential for parties 
who utilise this information in order to make rational investment decisions (Kieso et al. 2010; 
Menicucci 2013). For example, the study by Menicucci (2013) which assessed the level of 
FLID in management commentaries of a sample of 40 companies listed on the Italian  Stock 
Exchange during 2010 reported that FLID would enhance the ability of shareholders to assess 
future cash flows, estimate future earnings and make better decisions regarding their 
investments. In particular, current and potential investors rely on financial information to take 
decisions in order to buy, sell or maintain their investments.  
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Based on an examination of 1,113 US firm-year observations over the period 1985 to 1989, 
Shaw (2003) found that corporate disclosure is one of the fundamental means of 
communication between stakeholders and the company’s management. Thus, managers 
should use voluntary disclosure to declare essential information about the firm’s 
circumstances to those parties, which in turn leads to a stronger relationship between 
managers and stakeholders. In addition, Verrecchia (1983) and Verrecchia and Weber (2006), 
using samples of UK and Indonesian companies respectively, reveal that even if disclosure is 
costly because of product market consequences, managers may tend to extend the level of 
voluntary disclosure in order to avoid undervaluation of their shares by the capital market. 
Furthermore, expanding the level of disclosure can improve intermediation for a firm’s stock 
in the capital market (Core 2001).   
Numerous studies have attempted to explain what encourages managers to disclose additional 
information. Healy and Palepu (2001) and Walker and Tsalta (2001) concluded that 
companies disclose more information because they suppose expected benefits will exceed 
costs.  
Kieso et al. (2010) argued that FLID included financial and non-financial information 
valuable to investors in their decision-making process, because investors pay more attention 
to the firm’s future forecasts than to past performance. Schleicher and Walker (1999) and 
Hussainey et al. (2003) suggest that increased FLID in annual reports improves the capital 
market’s ability to estimate future earnings surprises.  
3.4. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
This section reviews the two strands of the literature most relevant to this study’s hypotheses: 
the first is the relationship between corporate disclosure and EM practices, and the second 
focuses on the association between CEOs’ personal characteristics and corporate disclosures. 
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3.4.1. CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND EM PRACTICES 
The literature on corporate disclosure and EM practices (e.g. Kasznik 1999; Lobo and Zhou 
2001; Patten and Trompeter 2003; Hunton et al. 2006; Prior et al. 2007; Sun et al. 2010; 
Katmun 2012; Yadollah et al. 2012; MeilaniPurwanti 2013; Kiattikulwattana 2014; Muttakin 
et al. 2015) broadly supports the argument that the relationship between corporate disclosure 
and EM is contradictory. Although several studies find that EM and voluntary disclosure are 
negatively related (e.g. Lobo and Zhou 2001; Hunton et al. 2006; Iatridis and Kadorinis 2009; 
Katmun 2012; Yadollah et al. 2012) and, conversely, others find a positive relationship 
between them (e.g. Kasznik 1999; Patten and Trompeter 2003; Prior et al. 2008; Muttakin et 
al. 2015). However, the study undertaken by Sun et al. (2010), using data collected from the 
Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange for a sample of 245 UK companies over the 
years 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007, examines the relationship between corporate 
environment disclosure and EM, and investigates the impact of corporate governance on that 
relationship. Their findings show no significant relationship. Likewise, MeilaniPurwanti 
(2013) fails to find any relationship between EM practices and the level of voluntary 
disclosure.  
Lobo and Zhou (2001) using a sample of 2,531 company-year observations, investigated the 
relationship between corporate disclosure and DA as a proxy for EM, employing the 
modified Jones model. The results show that corporate disclosure is negatively and 
significantly associated with EM practices, indicating that companies that disclose more 
information are less involved in EM. Furthermore, Shen and Chih (2005) examined the 
relationship between investor protection and EM practices. In their model, they added a 
disclosure index as one of the control variables for EM, using a data set collected from 48 
countries, including Jordan, from 1993 to 1999 as a sample. Their study reports that the 
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coefficient of disclosure index shows a negative and significant association with EM actions, 
confirming the role of voluntary disclosure in constraining executives’ EM behaviour. 
Using a sample consisting of 90 Swiss companies collected from the SPI Global Index over 
the period 1997-2001, Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006) conducted a study to explore the 
association between voluntary disclosure and EM practices. The results show a negative and 
significant relationship between them and suggest that DA as a proxy for EM are reduced for 
companies that voluntarily disclose more information.   
Hunton et al. (2006) employed an experimental approach using a data set of 62 USA public 
firms, their findings confirming that disclosures that are more transparent will reduce the 
probability of managers being involved in EM action. Similarly, Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) 
studied the relationship between EM practices and voluntary disclosure among UK 
companies. Their findings reveal that voluntary disclosure is negatively and significantly 
related to EM actions. These results suggest that companies that practice more voluntary 
disclosure seem to be less motivated to be involved in EM practices. 
Using a sample of 19 Tunisian companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange, collected 
between 1999 to 2008 and employing the Kothari et al. (2005) model to measure DA, a study 
by Riahi and Mounira (2011) explored the association between voluntary disclosure 
frequency and EM practices. They found that companies with a higher level of information 
disclosure were associated with a lower level of DA. Their findings suggest that disclosing 
more information decreases information asymmetry and increases transparency, thereby 
giving managers less motivation to engage in EM behaviour. Furthermore, using data of 700 
Iranian company-year observations for the period 2001-2010, and the Kasznick and modified 
Jones models to measure EM, Yadollah et al. (2012) investigated the relationship between the 
quality of corporate disclosure and EM practices, and found that companies with high-quality 
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disclosure have fewer DA. Moreover, Gray (2013), argued that managers that engage in EM 
are less likely to disclose voluntarily private information.  
Richardson (2000) provided further evidence of the relationship between corporate disclosure 
and EM, using information identified from the Fitch data sheets and New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) daily sales reports for all NYSE companies for the period 1988-1992, to 
examine the relationship between information asymmetry measured by voluntary disclosure 
and EM. The result of the study shows that companies with higher information asymmetry 
had a higher level of DA, suggesting that companies disclosing more information will reduce 
information asymmetry and, consequently, reduce the level of EM. Chih et al. (2008), 
employing multinational company data from 46 countries and 1,653 firms, investigated 
whether corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSR) has an effect on EM. Their findings 
reveal that companies with a significant commitment to CSR disclosure employ a low level 
of earnings smoothing. A study undertaken by Kim et al. (2012) investigated whether 
voluntary disclosure measured by CSR disclosure constrains EM practices, by using data of 
18,160 USA firm-year observations during the period 1991-2009. Their findings show that 
companies with a high level of CSR have less motivation to manage earnings through DA or 
real earnings. Similarly, using data from 2,042 South Korean firm-year observations for 
2002-2008 and employing the modified Jones model, Choi et al. (2013) explored the 
association between EM and the level of voluntary disclosure as a proxy for CSR. Their 
results conclude that the coefficient of the level of CSR is significantly and negatively 
associated with EM practices. Likewise, Scholtens and Kang (2013) found that Asian 
companies with a relatively high level of voluntary disclosures as a proxy for CSR are less 
involved in EM. 
On the other hand, using a sample of 366 USA corporations during from 1987 to 1991, a 
study undertaken by Kasznik (1999) examined the relationship between EM and voluntary 
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disclosure. The findings of the study indicated that voluntary disclosure is higher for firms 
with higher DA and argued that managers who have overestimated earnings are more likely 
to shift reported earnings toward their expectations. Furthermore, Patten and Trompeter 
(2003), using a sample of 40 USA chemical companies, examined the association between 
corporate environmental disclosure and EM. Their findings indicate that the coefficient of 
magnitude of DA is found to be positively and significantly related to the level of 
environmental disclosure, and they thus argued that firms with greater levels of 
environmental disclosure are more likely to engage in EM actions. Their findings are 
consistent with the view that corporate managers may believe that corporate disclosure is an 
effective solution for reducing exposure to possible regulatory cost and that decisions to 
manage earnings are tied to a superior strategy for dealing with increased political pressure. 
In a similar vein, Prior et al. (2008) in their investigation of the relationship between CSR and 
EM using DA, provided evidence from 26 countries (Europe, Australia, and North America) 
using data of 593 companies over  2002-2004. This showed a positive relationship between 
CSR and EM practices. However, Sun et al. (2010) and MeilaniPurwanti (2013) in their 
studies in two different countries, the UK and Indonesia respectively, examined the 
relationship between corporate environmental disclosure and EM and concluded that there is 
no association between the two variables.  
The literature indicates that two perspectives are related to the relationship between corporate 
voluntary disclosure and EM: managerial opportunism and the long-term perspectives. The 
managerial opportunism perspective suggests that companies might be strategically using 
voluntary disclosure to cover their opportunistic EM action (Sun et al. 2010). This is 
consistent with the central assumption of agency theory that “all individual action is driven 
by self-interest and that individuals will act in an opportunistic manner to increase their 
wealth” (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In such cases, voluntary disclosure is used as an 
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entrenchment instrument to hide this opportunistic performance and to defend managers 
against potential attention and reaction from shareholders. In line with this view, several 
empirical studies reveal a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and EM (e.g. 
Kasznik 1999; Patten and Trompeter 2003; Prior et al. 2008; Muttakin et al. 2015) 
On the other hand, the long-term perspective suggests that companies with a high level of 
FLID are not only concerned about increasing current profits and managers’ wealth but are 
also looking to create and improve a strong future relationship with shareholders. Since FLID 
constitutes an important component of a company’s information disclosure, it will provide 
shareholders with superior and value-relevant information that can assist them in making 
more informed decisions (Qu et al. 2015). Therefore, such companies will act in an 
accountable way when reporting financial information. This perspective is consistent with 
agency and signalling theory, which suggest that managers are likely to disclose more FLID 
to interested parties in order to decrease information asymmetry and increase owners’ 
confidence about the future performance of the company (Singhvi and Desai 1971; Hossain 
and Hammami 2009; Uyar et al. 2013).  
In line with this perspective, prior empirical evidence shows a negative relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and EM (e.g. Lobo and Zhou 2001; Jo and Kim 2007; Katmun 2012; 
Kim et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2013). 
3.4.2. CEOS’ CHARACTERISTICS AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE   
The last decade has seen a growing amount of research on the topic of the personal 
characteristics of CEOs. Physiological, sociological, professional and individual 
characteristics may have an effect on various decisions, including disclosure decisions (e.g. 
Shefrin 2001; Brown and Sarma 2007; Bonner 2008; Bamber et al. 2010; Hirshleifer et al. 
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2012; Dejong and Ling 2013; Ho et al. 2015; Hribar and Yang 2015). These characteristics 
were discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.6). 
In particular, few studies have examined the influence of CEOs’ characteristics on voluntary 
disclosures. For example, Bamber et al. (2010) investigated the effect of top managers’ 
characteristics: their experience, education and age, on voluntary corporate disclosure, using 
a sample of 1,500 S&P  firms over 1995 to 2005. The study divided age into two cohorts: 
managers who were born before World War II and those who were born after it. The former 
were shown to be more likely to develop conservative communication styles than the latter.  
Based on a sample of 108 firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during 2005 to 2007, 
Nalikka (2009), using a dummy variable for measuring CEO and CFO gender, studied the 
relationship with voluntary disclosure. The results show a significant relation between the 
CFO’s gender and the level of voluntary disclosure; while the CEO’s gender has no 
significant relationship with it.  
Using a sample of 400 companies primarily listed in the UK over the period 1997-2006, 
Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) investigated the effect of CEO characteristics, namely 
overconfidence, tenure, connectedness, nationality, founder, and educational background, on 
information disclosure and share-buyback completion rates. CEOs’ overconfidence was 
found to be significantly and positively associated with both voluntary disclosure and share-
buyback completion rates, suggesting that overconfidence influences corporate disclosure. In 
the same vein, Hribar and Yang (2015) examined the effect of overconfidence on 
management forecasting behaviour across US firms. They concluded that overconfidence is 
positively associated with the decision to issue voluntary forecasts and that their forecasts 
have a greater optimistic bias. Hence, overconfident CEOs are more likely to disclose a high 
level of FLID. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) examined the association between CEO 
overconfidence and accounting conservatism, their results suggesting a negative relationship 
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among US firms. Since overconfident CEOs usually overestimate future sales and return on 
assets, they have an incentive to disclose more information. Building on the above discussion, 
the current study proposes that there is a significant relationship between the level of FLID 
and CEOs’ personal characteristics, as reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: CEO’s Characteristics and Corporate Disclosure. 
CEO’s 
characteristics 
Authors Year Data Aims Findings and Results 
 
CEO’s Age 
(Bamber et al. 
2010). 
 
 
(Andriosopoulos et 
al. 2013). 
1995-2005. 
 
 
 
1997-2006. 
1,500 S&P firms. 
 
 
 
400 UK companies. 
Investigate the impact of 
CEO’s age on voluntary 
disclosure styles. 
 
CEO’s age and information 
disclosure and buyback 
completion rates. 
Negative relationship 
between age and disclosure 
style. 
 
 
Positive relationship between 
CEO’s age and buyback 
completion rates. 
 
CEO’s Gender 
(Nalikka 2009). 2005-2007. Non-financial listed 
companies on the 
Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. 
Examine the effect of 
CEO’s gender on the level 
of voluntary disclosures. 
No significant relationship 
between the study variables. 
 
 
 
CEO’s 
Overconfidence 
(Andriosopoulos et 
al. 2013). 
 
 
 
(Hribar and Yang 
2015). 
 
 
(Ahmed and 
Duellman 2013). 
1997-2006. 
 
 
 
 
2001-2010. 
 
 
 
1993-2009. 
400 UK companies. 
 
 
 
 
US companies. 
 
 
 
1,500 S&P firms. 
CEO’s overconfidence and 
information disclosure and 
buyback completion rates. 
 
 
CEO’s overconfidence and 
management forecasting. 
 
 
CEO’s overconfidence and 
accounting conservatism. 
Positive relationship between 
CEO’s overconfidence and 
buyback completion rates and 
information disclosure. 
 
Positive relationship between 
CEO’s overconfidence and 
management forecasting. 
 
Negative relationship 
between overconfidence and 
accounting conservatism. 
Source: Author’s Development. 
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3.5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Several theories associated with corporate disclosure and EM have been established to 
demonstrate the motivations behind the decision to disclose voluntary and better information. 
The survey of this literature revealed that amongst them were agency theory, signalling 
theory and stakeholder theory (e.g. Watson et al. 2002; Prencipe 2004; An et al. 2011). 
3.5.1. AGENCY THEORY 
A large and growing body of literature has defined agency theory as “a contract under which 
one or more persons (principals) engage another person (agent) to achieve some service on 
their behalf that includes delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976, p. 308). In the business environment, the agent represents the managers 
of a company while the principals refer to the company’s owners. Based on this definition, 
agency theory focuses on the relationship between owners and managers. Deegan and 
Samkin (2008, p. 71) reported that agency theory is based on the central assumption of 
economics that “all individual action is driven by self-interest and that individuals will act in 
an opportunistic manner to increase their wealth”. There are two derivative assumptions for 
agency theory, drawing on the central assumption: 
1. Both the agent and the principal are utility maximizers who tend to maximize their 
returns by all means (An et al. 2011). 
2. The interests of the two parties might not be aligned (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
It is anticipated that managers (agents) will to a certain extent act in their own interests in 
order to maximize their personal wealth, and not necessarily as the principal requests (e.g. 
Davidson et al. 2004; Uyar et al. 2013). Thus, when managers undertake opportunistic 
actions to achieve their goals, a conflict of interest between agents and principals exists 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Information asymmetry is another key concept of agency theory 
that arises from this conflict of interests and motivates managers to engage in EM (Davidson 
74 
 
et al. 2004; Jiraporn et al. 2008). The issue of asymmetric information has gained prominence 
through ground-laying work (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973; Stiglitz 1982). Previous studies 
recognized the meaning of information as a market determinant, which has extensive 
applications in a range of disciplines. It follows that since managers are better informed than 
investors, the motivation to disclose voluntary information focuses on reducing the 
asymmetric nature of the information problem and on gaining the investor’s confidence. The 
same phenomenon was discussed under agency theory, which has been employed in several 
academic fields, including accounting, finance, political science, economics and marketing 
(Clarke 2004). According to agency theory, the conflict could deepen when management 
discloses incomplete or asymmetric information to evaluate their performance. Thus, 
revealing more information voluntarily is considered as a real solution to mitigating the 
information asymmetry problem between managers and owners (Sun et al. 2010; Urquiza et 
al. 2010; Uyar et al. 2013) and to convincing the owners that they are acting in an optimal 
manner. Furthermore, this will influence the investment decision-making process (Kieso et al. 
2010), including a possible reduction in the firm’s cost of external financing (Bujaki and 
Zéghal 1999). In the Jordanian environment, the agency problem of listed companies may 
result from conflicts of interest between the majority and the minority shareholders, since the 
majority of Jordanian companies are family-owned. A family company is one where 
members of the founding family continue to hold positions in top management, either as top 
executives or as directors, or they are blockholder (possibly silent partners) in the company 
(Chen et al. 2008). Compared to non-family companies, family companies face fewer agency 
problems that arise from the separation of management and ownership (type one agency 
problem), due to the latter having more ability to monitor managers (Demsetz and Lehn 
1985). Furthermore, family shareholders have more long-term investment orientation than 
non-family shareholders (Chen et al. 2008). These characteristics of family companies raise 
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very interesting issues about their disclosure practices (Ali et al. 2007). Previous studies 
employed agency theory to explain disclosure behaviour arising from different forms of 
ownership structure. There are two types of agency problems that arise from the differences 
in ownership structure (e.g.,  Ali et al. 2007; Wan-Hussin 2009; Al-Akra and Hutchinson 
2013). The first type of agency problem focuses on the conflicts between managers and 
owners while the second deals with conflicts between majority and minority shareholders 
(Ali et al. 2007; De Massis et al. 2015; Cucculelli et al. 2014). Thus, theoretically there are 
two contradictory perspectives regarding the relationship between family companies and 
voluntary disclosure, the convergence of interest and the management entrenchment 
perspectives (Morck et al. 1988). The convergence of interest between the owners and 
outside investors occurs when the owner’s holding is significant; an increase in the owner’s 
holding will reduce stockholders’ needs to monitor insiders and thus decrease the need for 
voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, in family companies, the management entrenchment 
perspective assumes that, founding family may have a high proportion of equity in their 
companies. This control gives them power to seek private benefits at the expense of the 
minority shareholders, maximizing the chances of information asymmetry problem between 
majority and minority investors. When investment decisions are more likely to be made to 
maximize the insiders’ interests (founding family) at the expense of outside investors 
(minority investors), outsiders will find it necessary to monitor owner-managers by 
expanding the level of voluntary disclosure (Chau and Gray 2010). 
In fact, there is no clear evidence concerning the issues of agency problem in the Jordanian 
context because of the shortage of studies in this area and because of emergence of corporate 
governance. It could be argued that agency relationship between agents and principals may be 
weaker in developing countries such as Jordan.  
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In summary, agency theory suggests that companies may use various techniques, such as 
compensation schemes or voluntary disclosure, to mitigate or reduce the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders  (Sun et al. 2010), consequently decreasing opportunistic 
behaviour such as EM practices.  
3.5.2. SIGNALLING THEORY 
Corporate information disclosed by managers can be considered as a signal to capital 
markets. Signalling is a reaction to asymmetric information, in which firms have information 
that owners do not (Watson et al. 2002). This suggests that managers use voluntary disclosure 
to signal the private information that they have about the business (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986). According to signalling theory, the information asymmetry problem could be reduced 
or avoided if the party (company) who has more information in regard to the company’s 
operation discloses the private information voluntarily to the other (investors)  and sends 
signals to the market (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). The sending of a message is based on 
the assumption that it should be favorable to the signaller, such as indicating a higher quality 
of product than its competitors’ in order to attract existing or potential investors (Sun et al. 
2010). However, Hughes (1986) argues that the credibility of information disclosed by a 
company is an element in confirming lower information asymmetry. In this regard, 
Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2003) argue that a good company can differentiate itself from a 
bad one by conveying a credible signal to capital markets about its operational quality. This 
signal will be reliable only if the bad company selects not to outbid the good company by 
sending the same message. Furthermore, Morris (1987, p. 51) argues that to ensure that 
information signalled from companies is effective in reducing information asymmetry, the 
asymmetry costs “must be borne by the agent so that he has an incentive to signal truthfully”. 
However, Abhayawansa and Abeysekera (2009, p. 297) reported that there is no assurance 
that companies will offer accurate information despite bearing the signalling cost, because 
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managers’ disclosure decisions are also determined by the “marginal benefit to be gained 
from reducing the information asymmetry in the market”. 
A number of studies employ signalling theory as a ground method. For example, Cheung and 
Lee (1995), in their theoretical work, suggested that being listed in a reputable stock 
exchange market (e.g. NYSE) signals a company’s high level of disclosure and increases its 
chances of being listed on other stock exchange markets. Chiang and Chia (2005) also used 
signalling theory as a theoretical framework, indicating that high company transparency 
signals sound company performance. Hussainey and Aal-Eisa (2009) documented that 
voluntary disclosure of FLID is superior to sharing the information in respect of decreasing 
investor uncertainty about future earnings and thereby confirming the assumption of the 
signalling theory.  
Given that corporate disclosure is used by shareholders as a monitoring tool to mitigate 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour (Bushman and Smith 2001), it is expected to reduce the 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. In this regard, Healy and Palepu 
(2001) reported that investors require information to monitor the activities of managers and 
link managerial decisions to the performance of the firm. Based on the idea that corporate 
disclosure is a beneficial tool to avoid information asymmetry, previous studies anticipated a 
negative association between information asymmetry and corporate disclosure (e.g. Welker 
1995; Coller and Yohn 1997; Brown et al. 2004). Managers are therefore likely to disclose 
more FLID to the interested parties in order to decrease information asymmetry and to 
increase owners’ confidence about the future performance of the company (long term 
perspective) (Singhvi and Desai 1971; Hossain and Hammami 2009; Uyar et al. 2013). Thus, 
the shareholders will feel safer with an increase in the level of FLID. Furthermore, companies 
disclose more specific information to investors to signal that they are better than other 
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companies in the market for the purpose of attracting new investments and enhancing their 
reputation (Campbell et al. 2001; Sun et al. 2010). 
Based on the above discussion, it can be seen that a substantial overlap exists between the 
signalling and agency theories since both are related to rational behaviour and information 
asymmetry between companies and investors. Both theories view disclosure as tools to 
decrease information asymmetry (Morris 1987). However, previous studies rely on implicit 
agency theory to clarify EM behaviour (Davidson et al. 2004; Jiraporn et al. 2008; Kent et al. 
2010). From the perspective of agency theory, EM seems to be a kind of agency cost which 
emanates from both the conflict of interest between agent and principal and from asymmetric 
information (Christie and Zimmerman 1994; Prior et al. 2008). In accordance with this view, 
the study carried out by Richardson (2000) reveals that asymmetric information has a positive 
relationship with EM behaviour, which suggests the probability of EM practices being 
dependent on the degree of asymmetric information. Conversely, EM practices will be less 
likely when the level of information asymmetry is relatively small. 
On the other hand, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) recommended that asymmetric information 
between managers and shareholders is reduced with voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) reported that corporate disclosure is perceived as one of the instruments 
mitigating agency cost. Eng and Mak (2003) claimed that the conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders could be reduced using voluntary disclosure, which may lead to 
reducing the level of EM. Thus, the current study employs both agency and signalling 
theories to explain the possible association between the level of FLID and EM. 
3.5.3. STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
Stakeholders are defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman et al. 2010, p. 46). According to 
Clarkson et al. (1994), a company’s stakeholders are divided into two groups: 
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 The primary or powerful group: shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, 
providers and government. 
 The secondary group: which is not considered critical for the company and includes 
environmentalists and the media.  
Freeman et al. (2010) argued that it is necessary to take into account the interest of all 
stakeholders rather than only the shareholders. According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), 
stakeholder theory has three perspectives: descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and 
normative validity or managerial perspective. The first two views propose that a firm should 
strategically manage primary or powerful stakeholders by classifying them with the self-
interest of the organization, while the normative perspective assumes that managers should 
pay attention to all stakeholder groups.  
Based on the descriptive and instrumental perspectives, corporate disclosure is considered as 
a tool to manage the perception only of the primary or powerful stakeholder group (Ullmann 
1985). Therefore, it is employed for the strategic purpose of gaining consent and support for 
the firm’s continuing operation, rather than for accountability purposes (Deegan and Samkin 
2004). In line with this notion, the perception of the important stakeholder group concerning 
the company is managed through corporate disclosure. However, the normative or managerial 
stakeholder viewpoint demonstrates that companies have specific duties and obligations to 
various stakeholders and that corporate disclosure is necessary for the company to ensure 
greater accountability by disclosing information to relevant stakeholders (Guay et al. 1996). 
However, although this perspective offers a prescription for how executives can achieve 
strategies for treating and managing their various stakeholders, it does not have a direct role 
in forecasting managerial behaviour in practice (Deegan and Samkin 2004). This is based on 
the view that a firm is not perceived as a bilateral association between managers and 
shareholders, but as a many-sided set of associations between stakeholders. 
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Stakeholder theory has two branches to explain how accountability is discharged to numerous 
stakeholders: 
1. An ethical branch. 
2. A positive managerial branch. 
The ethical branch bestows certain intrinsic rights on all the stakeholders who should be 
protected by the company, and the managers should be involved in activities that benefit all 
stakeholders (Deegan 2006; Deegan and Samkin 2008). Deegan and Samkin (2008) argue 
that under the ethical branch, the company should support all stakeholder groups with 
information about how they are affected by its activities, irrespective of whether they choose 
to use the information or their ability to directly influence the fate of the company. The 
positive managerial branch of stakeholder theory tries to find an explanation for and to 
forecast how the demands of various stakeholders are taken care of by the company. The firm 
must identify the stakeholder group within this branch, as well as pay special attention to 
those stakeholders who they consider more powerful or significant to the on-going viability 
and success of the company (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Roberts 1992). 
In summary, from the theoretical stakeholder perspective the organization is seen in its wider 
social fabric, and should be positively accountable to various stakeholders groups for 
strategic purposes. Therefore, voluntary disclosure is considered as a strategic initiative and 
an important way for companies to discharge their accountability, leading to reduction of 
information asymmetry and creating a good relationship with stakeholders (Lundholm and 
Van Winkle 2006; An et al. 2011). Thus, managers are likely to be more motivated to use 
their discretion to increase the extent and the amount of information of the financial report to 
avoid the risk of being dismissed (Sun et al. 2010). In most cases, voluntary disclosure makes 
transparent to a broad audience the state of affairs and future prospects of the firm (Healy and 
Wahlen 1999). Thus, a corporate strategy of voluntary communication enhances the 
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relationship between the business and its stakeholders (Salama et al. 2006; An et al. 2011). 
The above discussion reveals that the potential advantages of voluntarily disclosing 
information, such as FLID, tend to support the demand for more transparency and credibility 
and consequently establish long-term relationships with stakeholders (García-Meca and 
Sánchez-Ballesta 2010). This perspective has been used to explain voluntary disclosure and 
recognizes the stakeholders’ importance in the provision of high financial returns (Freeman et 
al. 2010). 
An et al. (2011) proposed the integrated theoretical framework shown in Figure 3.1 
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Figure: 3.1: The Integrated Theoretical Framework. 
Source: Moderated from (An et al. 2011, p. 580) 
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Agency theory (key concepts) 
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Signalling theory (Key concepts) 
 Information asymmetry. 
 Signalling excellence. 
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 To reduce information 
asymmetry. 
 To discharge accountability. 
 To signal excellence. 
 
Stakeholder Theory (Key concepts) 
 Social system. 
 Stakeholders-management. 
 Accountability. 
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3.6. SUMMARY 
This chapter offers a review of FLID, its definitions, motivations and the link between 
different aspects of voluntary disclosure and EM. The literature shows that two perspectives 
exist regarding the relationship between EM and voluntary corporate disclosure. The 
managerial opportunism viewpoint suggests that companies might be strategically using 
FLID to cover their opportunistic EM actions. In such cases, FLID is used as an 
entrenchment instrument to hide this opportunistic performance and to defend companies’ 
managers against shareholders’ potential attention and reaction. In line with this view, several 
studies reveal a positive relationship between FLID and EM (e.g. Kasznik 1999; Jog and 
McConomy 2003; Patten and Trompeter 2003; Prior et al. 2008). This perspective is in line 
with the agency theory assumption that managers will act in an opportunistic manner in order 
to increase their wealth. 
On the other hand, the long-term perspective suggests that companies with a high level of 
FLID are not only concerned about increasing current profits and managers’ wealth but are 
also looking to create and improve a strong future relationship with shareholders. Therefore, 
such companies will act in an accountable way when reporting financial information. In 
support of this view, empirical evidence shows a negative relationship between FLID and EM 
(e.g. Lobo and Zhou 2001; Jo and Kim 2007; Hribar and Yang 2010; Katmun 2012). This is 
consistent with signalling theory, that is managers are likely to disclose voluntarily more 
information to interested parties in order to decrease information asymmetry and increase 
owners’ confidence about the future performance of the company (long-term perspective) 
(Singhvi and Desai 1971; Hossain and Hammami 2009; Uyar et al. 2013). Consequently, 
companies signal that they are better than their competitors at attracting new investment and 
enhancing their reputation (Campbell et al. 2001; Sun et al. 2010). 
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This chapter also focuses on the relevant theories to explain the association between FLID 
and EM practices. The literature indicates that the agency and signalling theories are a more 
appropriate framework with which to identify the relationship between FLID and EM. 
However, stakeholder and legitimacy theories deal with the relationship between 
management and all stakeholders. The chapter also covers the relationship between FLID and 
CEOs’ personal characteristics.  
Given that the primary aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between EM and 
FLID among non-financial Jordanian companies, the agency and signalling theories are 
applied as a framework to explain the study’s results based on Jordanian company’s 
ownership structure. Based on the literature on corporate disclosure and EM, and in line with 
agency and signalling theories, this study expects a negative relationship between FLID and 
EM.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the research methodology used in this study. It is organized as follows. 
Section 4.2 explains the methodology related to assumptions about the nature of social 
science. Section 4.3 discusses the objectives and research questions, and section 4.4 the 
development of hypotheses. Section 4.5 describes the sample selection and data collection 
method. Section 4.6 provides the measurements of the study variables. Section 4.7 explains 
the empirical research models. Section 4.8 discusses practical procedures for data analysis. 
Section 4.9 presents a summary of the chapter.  
4.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Punch (2013) believes it is essential to establish a research approach appropriate to the 
study’s specific issues. Researchers around the world have employed two types of approach, 
namely qualitative and quantitative. According to Berg et al. (2004) the qualitative approach 
suggests a non-numeric and descriptive method for gathering the related data that helps to 
understand the phenomenon. Babbie (2015) claims that the qualitative approach is a flexible 
and active way for studying slight nuances in both behaviour and attitudes in examining 
changes in social processes over time. Conversely, Berg et al. (2004); Bryman (2004) and 
Collis and Hussey (2013) argue that quantitative analysis involves different forms of 
statistical analysis and thus offers more accurate and reliable measurement of the study 
variables and ability to generalize the research outcomes. Furthermore, Berg et al. (2004) 
suggest that by using the quantitative method, the generalisation capacity of the findings will 
improve if a large sample size and longer time periods are used.  
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The qualitative method suffers from some problems. First, if it selects and uses a small 
sample size it does not represent the entire population (Hakim 1987). Secondly, it lacks 
reliability and transparency (Berg et al. 2004). Third, it takes a lot of time and hence may not 
be efficient in achieving satisfactory explanations (Berg et al. 2004). Therefore, because of 
the difficulties of data collection through conducting interviews with different companies and 
the possibility of getting weak responses from these companies, the deductive positivism 
approach which identifies a pre-existing theoretical framework is chosen for the purpose of 
this study and is deemed appropriate for the establishment of the study’s hypotheses.  
4.3. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The present study is motivated by three main objectives:  
1. To examine the relationship between FLID and EM practices among non-financial 
companies listed on the ASE. 
2. To investigate whether the CEO’s characteristics (e.g. age, gender, and 
overconfidence) affect FLID behaviour.  
3. To examine whether the CEO’s personal characteristics influence EM practices within 
the context of non-financial Jordanian companies.  
To achive these objectives, the study has established the following hypotheses: 
4.4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
To achieve the first objective, the first research question is as follows: 
 What is the effect of the level of FLID on EM practices? 
Agency theory explains that it is the responsibility of managers to make decisions on behalf 
of the owners and they must exercise their duties in a manner that increases the wealth of the 
owners and meets their expectations (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, due to the 
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separation of ownership and management, together with the existence of asymmetric 
information, there is a strong possiblity of managers’ opportunistic behaviour and their 
pursuance of self-interested objectives (Prior et al. 2008).  
For the fact that, managers engage in EM activities either to maximize their benefits, to the 
disadvantage of other stakeholders, or to offer them misleading information regarding the 
financial position of the firm (Healy and Wahlen 1999), researchers acknowledge EM as a 
kind of agency cost. This is because managers are more likely to maximize their personal 
interests through provision of  financial information that does not give a true picture of the 
company’s circumstances (Prior et al. 2008). Corporate disclosure, on the other hand, is 
considered as a form of monitoring tool that enables investors and other external users to 
minimize the problem of asymmetric information (Huang and Zhang 2011). Hence, one of 
the possible ways of reducing agency conflict between managers and shareholder is through 
disclosure, since it reduces asymmetric information and consequently the likelihood of EM 
practices (Lang and Lundholm 2000; Eng and Mak 2003). Based on agency theory, this study 
expects a negative relationship between FLID and EM practices. The following hypothesis 
has been developed: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the level of FLID and EM practices. 
The second objective of this study is to investigate whether a CEO’s personal characteristics 
(e.g. age, gender and overconfidence) affect the level of  FLID. In other words, the study 
aims to establish the relationship between the CEO’s personal characteristics and the level of 
FLID. The rationale behind selecting such personal characteristics age, gender and 
overconfidence is that they are potentially related to risk-taking attitude, and will affect the 
manager’s decisions, including on voluntary disclosure and EM practices (e.g. Byrnes et al. 
1999; Ge et al. 2011). To achieve this, the second research question will be divided as 
follows:  
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 What is the relationship between the CEO’s age and the level of FLID? 
A number of studies have attempted to explain the relationship between a CEO’s age and the 
decision-making process. For example, Miller and Shamsie (2001) found that older CEOs 
tend to take faster investment decisions due to their accumulated experience and knowledge. 
On the other hand, Bertrand and Schoar (2002) showed that older CEOs are more likely to be 
conservative in making investment decisions, and  that they are more likely to use 
conservative accounting choices (Ge et al. 2011). Bamber et al. (2010) confirm that older 
managers are more likely to develop conservative disclosure styles than younger ones. 
Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Li et al. (2011) found that younger CEOs are likely to make 
more investment decisions since they need to signal their capability to the stakeholders. Lin 
et al. (2014), however, found a negative significant relationship between CEOs’ age and 
internal control quality. There is no evidence so far on the relationship between the CEO’s 
age and the level of FLID.  
 What is the relationship between the CEOs gender and the level of FLID? 
Several studies suggest that men are more likely to be risk-takers than women in making 
decisions about investments (Fellner and Maciejovsky 2007; Eckel and Grossman 2008; Ge 
et al. 2011). Furthermore, the literature suggests that the gender of company executives has 
an influence on corporate decisions. In addition, a number of studies have found a positive 
relationship between the gender diversity of the board of directors and the company’s 
performance (Siciliano 1996; Erhardt et al. 2003). Byrnes et al. (1999) found that females, on 
average, are more risk averse than males in a variety of decision-making contexts. 
Hansemark (2003) provided further evidence of the difference between men and women in 
starting a new business. Dowling and Aribi (2013) found that females are less likely to appear 
overconfident in their decision making regarding the level of acquisitions of a company. 
Empirically, the evidence shows that female managers and risky decisions are negatively 
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related (e.g. Barua et al. 2010a). In support of this, psychological studies report that women 
are more cautious, ethical and risk averse than men. For instance, Jia et al. (2014) examined 
the relationship between the facial structure of CEOs and their company’s financial 
misreporting, and showed that companies with CEOs who have more masculine faces have a 
higher incidence of financial misreporting. There is evidence that gender diversity affects the 
level of voluntary disclosure. For example, Nalikka (2009) found a positive significant 
relationship between female CFOs and the degree of voluntary disclosure. This study expects 
that CEO gender has an impact on the level of FLID.  
 What is the relationship between the CEO’s overconfidence and the level of FLID? 
The influence of a CEO’s overconfidence on corporate decisions has received significant 
attention in the literature. Frank and Goyal (2009) found that the CEO’s overconfidence has a 
significant influence on the variation of leverage ratio across companies. Malmendier et al. 
(2011) found that overconfident CEOs are more likely to use debt levels (external finance) 
rather than equity. In particular, the results of Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) suggest a positive 
relationship between CEOs’ overconfidence and voluntary disclosure in UK firms. Moreover, 
Ahmed and Duellman (2013) reported a negative relationship between CEO overconfidence 
and accounting conservatism among US companies. Since overconfident CEOs usually 
overestimate future sales and return on assets, they have an incentive to disclose more 
information (Hribar and Yang 2010, 2015). Based on the discussion and arguments above, 
the following hypotheses have been developed:  
H2: There is a negative relationship between the CEO’s age and the level of FLID. 
H3: The level of FLID is positively associated with the presence of male CEOs.       
H4: There is a positive relationship between the CEO’s overconfidence and the level of 
FLID. 
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The third objective of the present study is to investigate whether the CEO’s personal 
characteristics affect EM practices. To achieve this, the third primary study question will be 
divided as follows:  
 What is the relationship between the CEO’s age and EM practices? 
Some studies have attempted to explain the relationship between the CEO’s age and EM 
practices. For example, Davidson III et al. (2007) investigated whether age and career 
horizon affect EM practices, their findings indicating that companies with older CEOs, those 
nearing retirement, are associated with EM practices, as they are more interested in their 
current company’s performance and less concerned about the future, aiming to maximize 
their own wealth or pension. Hambrick (2007) suggested that specific personal characteristics 
of top management affect the decision-making process, clarifying how personal 
characteristics influence judgement and decision making (JDM). JDM research proposes 
three aspects that affect the decision-making process: the person, environment and task 
(Bonner 2008). The group of person-related issues refers to how specific attributes such as 
age, overconfidence and attitudes to risk affect the procedures that lead to decision making 
(Ge et al. 2011).  
 What is the relationship between the CEO’s gender and EM practices? 
Gavious et al. (2012) found a negative relationship between the presence of females on the 
board and EM practices, concluding that EM is lower in companies with a female CEO/CFO. 
Furthermore, Srinidhi et al. (2011) provided empirical evidence that the percentage of women 
on the board of directors improves earnings quality. Similarly, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) 
found that firms with a higher proportion of females in top management have a greater 
likelihood of improving the quality of reported earnings. In addition, the literature indicates 
that females in business are associated with better organizational performance, due to their 
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rational decisions (e.g. Gul et al. 2011). The ethical behaviour in the workplace of both 
women and men has been widely examined, proposing that females and males display 
distinct differences in values and interests and in their tendency to become involved in 
unethical business activities (Gilligan 1982; Betz and Boreiko 1989). Males are more 
concerned with financial benefits and a successful career and are more likely to break the law 
and bend rules to attain competitive success; while females lean more towards appropriate 
relationships and helping people and are less likely to engage in unethical practices (Betz and 
Boreiko 1989; Mason and Mudrack 1996).  
 What is the relationship between the CEO’s overconfidence and EM practices? 
Schrand and Zechman (2012) found a positive relationship between CEOs’ overconfidence 
and financial-reporting fraud, arguing that overconfident managers are more likely to engage 
in fraudulent practices. Hribar and Yang (2010) indicated that there is a positive relationship 
between overconfidence and the likelihood of greater EM. Based on several studies of the 
effect of managers’ overconfidence on decision-making processes in general and EM in 
particular, and consistent with the idea that overconfident managers are considered risk takers 
(Malmendier and Tate 2005a), it is suggested that they will be more likely to disclose 
overestimated information and underestimate the risks the company faces. Thus, the motive 
of the current study is to examine whether CEOs’ overconfidence influences their EM 
practices. The current study expects a positive association between CEOs’ overconfidence 
and EM practices. 
Based on the discussion and arguments above, the following hypotheses have been 
developed:  
H5: There is a positive relationship between the CEO’s age and EM practices. 
H6: EM practices are positively associated with the presence of male CEOs.       
H7: There is a positive relationship between the CEO’s overconfidence and EM practices. 
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4.5. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
4.5.1. SAMPLE SELECTION 
The hypotheses were tested using data from the ASE in Jordan, established in 1999. The ASE 
lists 270 financial and non-financial companies, divided into three main sectors: (1) Financial 
(banking, insurance and real estate); (2) Industrial (pharmaceutical and medical, chemical, 
paper and cardboard, printing and packaging, food and beverages, tobacco and cigarettes, 
mining and extraction, engineering and construction, electrical, textiles and clothing, and 
glass and ceramics); and (3) Services (healthcare, education, hotels and tourism, transport, 
technology, media, utilities and energy, and commercial services). Following previous 
studies, the current study has excluded all 42 financial companies from the initial sample, 
given their unique characteristics, specific regulatory framework, and disclosure 
requirements, which may have an impact on the results (e.g. Naser et al. 2002; Hasseldine et 
al. 2005; Sun et al. 2010; Alsharairi and Salama 2012; Al-Akra and Hutchinson 2013; 
Athanasakou and Hussainey 2014; Al-Najjar and Abed 2014; Sun et al. 2014). The study also 
excludes any companies with missing data (Habbash et al. 2014), and any sector with fewer 
than six firms1 (Athanasakou et al. 2009; Katmun 2012). Thus, the final sample consists of 
201 ASE listed companies (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). The related literature on voluntary 
disclosures and EM reports that economic conditions affect a company’s economic 
performance, which in turn may motivate executives to manipulate earnings. In this regard, 
Berndt and Dipl-Kfm (2011) provide empirical evidence that managers are more likely to 
engage in EM during periods of economic crisis. Therefore, it is expected that in the face of 
uncertainty such as the global financial crisis of 2008, EM behaviour will not be uncommon. 
Additionally, Rolland and Dirige (2013) suggest that there may be a greater likelihood of EM 
practices during and after the period of financial crisis, to enhance the confidence of the 
                                                     
1 OLS regression is used to estimate DA. It requires at least six observations for each industry to ensure 
unbiased estimation (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Subramanyam 1996; Kasznik 1999).   
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shareholders regarding the companies’ financial performance. Consequently, this study has 
adopted a 6-year period from 2008 to 2013 since the financial crisis started in 2008 and in the 
same year triggered different reforms and corporate governance practices in Jordan. The 
study period ends in 2013 due to the unavailability of data in subsequent years.    
Jordanian companies were selected as Jordan offers an appropriate as well as an attractive 
setting for this study, because of its unique financial reporting system and socio-economic 
environment. In addition, Jordan is a developing country with an open economy. Trade 
liberalisation and adoption of a market economy underlie its economic philosophy and this 
has enabled the country to adopt its own laws in accordance with those of its international 
counterparts (Aljifri and Khasharmeh 2006). The practice of corporate governance in Jordan 
began in 2008 (Abed et al. 2012). The Jordanian corporate governance code number 15 
requires that credibility and transparency of financial reporting should be increased among all 
listed companies through adoption of IFRS. This has since led to an increase in voluntary 
disclosure practices among all Jordanian listed companies (Al-Fayoumi et al. 2010; Al-Akra 
and Ali 2012). The ASE has become the biggest stock market within the region, operating an 
automated order-driven Electronic Trading System, working in close collaboration with the 
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) on the issue of surveillance, and maintaining strong ties 
with other associations, exchanges and international organizations. The Jordanian capital 
market has shown a reasonable growth and is integrated with the Middle East market, which 
implies little long-term risk diversification (Saadi-Sedik and Petri 2006). The government of 
Jordan has introduced numerous reforms through accounting regulations, securities exchange 
laws and corporate disclosure practices. These reforms contribute to more transparent 
markets and the listed companies have enhanced their voluntary disclosure (Al-Fayoumi et al. 
2010; Al-Akra and Ali 2012; JSC 2015). Omar (2007), indeed, found that Jordan showed a 
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significant improvement in disclosure after changes to the economic and accounting 
regulations (see Appendices 1A and B).  
Table 4.1: Procedure for sample selection for the study period 
Description 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Pooled 
Initial Sample 270 270 270 270 270 270 1620 
Excluded: 
Financial industries 42 42 42 42 42 42 (252) 
Sectors with fewer than six firms 
 Healthcare 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 
 ITC 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
 Media 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 
 Paper and cardboard 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 
 Utilities and energy 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 
 Printing and packaging 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
 Tobacco and cigarettes 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 
 Glass and ceramics  1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
(102) 
Firms with unavailable data 10 10 10 10 10 10 (60) 
Final Sample 201 201 201 201 201 201 1206 
 
Table 4.2: Final distribution of the sample by industry. 
Description Number Percentage 
Educational services 26 12.93% 
Hotels and tourism 38 18.90% 
Transport 23 11.44% 
Commercial services 41 20.39% 
Pharmaceutical and medical industries 12 5.97% 
Chemical industries 15 7.46% 
Food and beverages 17 8.45% 
Mining and extraction industries 14 6.96% 
Engineering and construction 6 2.98% 
Textiles, leather and clothing 9 4.47% 
Total 201                         100% 
Source: (JSC 2015). 
4.5.2. DATA COLLECTION 
The data of the study were collected from the annual reports published in 2008-2013. Each 
annual report was reviewed manually. Most of the annual reports are available on the 
websites of the companies. Most companies release their annual reports within the first 
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quarter of the year after the exercise. Botosan (1997) and Jizi et al. (2014) demonstrated that 
annual reports provide a good proxy and are a comprehensive resource for the information 
disclosed by a firm. They are also considered as a primary source of voluntary disclosure to 
the user group (e.g. Neu et al. 1998; Hussainey and Walker 2009). Furthermore, these 
financial reports are more easily compared across companies than are other informal channels 
of communication such as press releases or direct contact with analysts (Chang and Most 
1985; Abed et al. 2012; Jizi et al. 2014). To cover some missing financial information in the 
annual reports, websites of the Securities Depository Centre (SDC), ASE and OSIRIS 
databases were used as additional sources. 
4.6. MEASUREMENT OF THE STUDY VARIABLES 
4.6.1. MEASUREMENT OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE (EM) 
Previous studies found that the process of measuring or detecting EM is arduous, because it is 
not possible to observe it directly (Islam et al. 2014). However, researchers have tried to find 
a simple technique to measure it using statistical methods, including the specific accrual 
method, overall accruals method and frequency distribution method (McNichols and Wilson 
1988; Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). (See Chapter 2, 
section 2.5.). 
Regardless of its advantages, using the specific-accruals method to estimate EM is 
insufficiently flexible to examine additional variables such as corporate governance and 
FLID (McNichols 2001). The frequency distribution method has also been criticized because 
it does not enable researchers to assess the extent of EM or to differentiate between DA and 
NDA (McNichols 2001). However, total accruals are widely applied in the accounting 
literature as a proxy for EM (e.g. Dechow et al. 1995; Holthausen et al. 1995; Subramanyam 
1996; Bartov et al. 2000; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Boulila Taktak and Mbarki 2014; 
Hsiao et al. 2016), for the following reasons: 
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 Total accruals allow researchers to control for additional variables. 
 Total accruals distinguish between DA and NDA. 
 Market participants view total accruals as a less reliable component of earnings. 
 Total accruals are easier to subject to a manager’s manipulation and therefore are 
valid measures of EM. 
The literature suggests that managers tend to manage earnings through accruals since it is 
easier to manipulate them (Alsharairi and Salama 2012). Furthermore, due to the low degree 
of detectability of DA by users of financial reports when used for EM makes it a suited 
instrument for implementing opportunistic accounting choices (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 
1995; Van Praag 2001; Kothari et al. 2005). Therefore, the total accruals approach is 
preferred over the other methods in recent EM studies (Mohamad et al. 2011; Yip et al. 2011; 
Kim et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 2013; Islam et al. 2014). Thus, consistent with 
the large body of literature advocating its efficacy, this study uses the total accruals approach 
to detect DA. The absolute discretionary accrual values have been used here, since the aim is 
to capture the extent of EM practices (Raman and Shahrur 2008; Mouselli et al. 2012; 
Böcking et al. 2015). However, in order to use this approach, three necessary steps have to be 
followed: first, estimation of total accruals; second, predicting DA to determine NDA; and 
third, calculating DA for each firm in the particular sector. The three stages are discussed 
below. 
4.6.1.1. ESTIMATING TOTAL ACCRUALS 
Total accruals are the result of net income deducted from operating cash flow. Two 
approaches have been used to predict total accruals: the traditional balance sheet and cash 
flow approaches. Most studies prefer to use the latter when the purpose is to estimate total 
accruals in the context of EM (e.g. Subramanyam 1996; Becker et al. 1998; Klein 2002; Kim 
et al. 2012; Pyo and Lee 2013), because the incidence and level of errors that results by using 
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the balance sheet is substantially greater than when using the cash flow (Hribar and Collins 
2002). Furthermore, when firms experience acquisitions or merger, using the cash flow 
method may be preferred since error in the balance sheet method of estimating DA is 
correlated with the company’s economic characteristics, reducing the power of the model to 
detect EM and its potential to generate valid inferences regarding EM (Hribar and Collins 
2002; Stubben 2010).  
Based on the cash flow approach, total accruals result from deducting earnings before 
extraordinary and abnormal items from the operating cash flow during the practical period. 
Following previous studies on EM, the present study uses the cash flow approach for 
estimating total accruals, as predicted by the following equation (Jo and Kim, 2007, p. 572): 
TAt = EBXAt - CFOt         (4.1) 
Where 
EBXAt: Earnings before abnormal and extraordinary items in year t. 
CFOt   Cash flow from operation activities in year t. 
 
4.6.1.2. ESTIMATING DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS (DA) 
The EM literature shows different models that have been widely used to predict DA as a 
proxy for EM (see Chapter 2, section 2.5). A large number of researchers (e.g. Peasnell et al. 
2000; Sun et al. 2010; Chen 2012; Islam et al. 2014) have suggested that the Jones, Modified 
Jones, and performance-matched Kothari et al. (2005) models are more powerful than the 
alternatives since they measure discretionary accruals, which is in line with opportunistic 
accruals, assessing performance hypotheses. Furthermore, it is evident that the Jones and 
Modified Jones models with cross-section, popular for detecting EM, guarantee more control 
than when a times series is used (Guay et al. 1996; Subramanyam 1996; Beneish 2001; 
Kothari et al. 2005; Sun and Rath 2009; Jiang and Xin 2012; Choi et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 
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2013). Thus, consistent with the large body of literature advocating its efficacy, the current 
study uses the original Jones (1991) and Modified Jones models (1995) as the primary 
proxies to detect EM practices. The performance-matched model, of Kothari et al. (2005) will 
be used as a robustness test (Katmun 2012). 
4.6.1.2.1. JONES (1991) MODEL 
Jones (1991) claimed that a company’s economic situations has an effect on accounting 
accruals and attempted to control for such influences. The Jones study uses the change in 
revenue value as a proxy to control for the company’s economic situation and the value of the 
gross fixed assets (PPE) as a proxy to control for the impact of depreciation. 
The second step in predicting DA is estimating NDA. Total accruals are composed of NDA 
(unmanaged accruals) and DA (managed accruals). In this step, the Jones Model is applied to 
capture NDA, with the choice of one of two options: the original time-series and the cross-
sectional approach. Recent studies related to EM prefer to use the latter (Dechow et al. 1995; 
Holthausen et al. 1995; Warfield et al. 1995; Subramanyam 1996; Bartov et al. 2000), for the 
following reasons: 
 The original time-series, Jones Model works with an inappropriate assumption, 
arguing that the coefficient estimates of the variation in sales revenue and PPE level 
remain fixed over time. 
 A specification problem in the form of serially correlated residuals may arise from the 
use of time-series models. 
 The survivorship bias problem found in the time-series approach may be avoided be 
using cross-sectional accruals models; and 
 Applying cross-sectional models permits the addition of firms with short histories 
(Subramanyam 1996; Bartov et al. 2000; Peasnell et al. 2000). 
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Thus, this study uses the cross-sectional Jones Model to estimate NDA for each year and 
industry. 
The following regression equation of the cross-sectional Jones Model is applied to measure 
NDA: 
NDAjit = α0 (1/Ajit-1) + α1 (∆REVjit / Ajit-1) + α2 (PPEjit / Ajit -1) + ɛjit (4.2) 
Where 
NDA = Non-discretionary accruals 
∆REV = Change in revenue 
PPE =  Gross property, plant and equipment 
A = Total assets 
J =  Firm j; 1...N 
T = Industry i; 1...N 
ɛ = Error term. 
In the second step, DA for each company j were calculated by deducting NDA from total 
accruals, as illustrated in Equation 4.1: 
DAj = [TAjit / Ajit – 1]–[α0 (1 / Ajit – 1) + α1 (∆REVjit / Ajit – 1) + α2 (PPEjit – 1 / Ajit -1) + ɛjit] (4.3) 
Where 
DA = Discretionary accruals  
J = Firm j; 1...N 
α0, α1, and α2 = the predicted coefficients from equation 4.2. 
 
4.6.1.2.2. MODIFIED JONES (Dechow et al. 1995) MODEL 
The Modified Jones Model adjusts the change in revenue by deducting the change in 
accounts receivable from revenue during the given period. The assumption is based on the 
notion that manipulation of earnings through recognition of credit sales is easier than 
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manipulation of cash sales. Thus, in this model, the estimation of DA is achievable using two 
steps, as suggested by (Dechow et al. 1995). The first step, NDA is calculated by using the 
following regression equation: 
NDAjit = α0 (1 / Ajit – 1) +α1 (∆REVjit/Ajit – 1 - ∆RCEjit / Ajit) + α2 (PPEjit / Ajit – 1) + ɛjit   (4.4) 
Where 
NDA = Non-discretionary accruals 
∆REV = Change in revenue 
∆RCE = Change in accounts receivable 
PPE = Gross property, plant and equipment 
A = Total assets 
J = Firm j; 1...N 
I = Industry i; 1…N 
T =  Year; 1…N 
ɛ = Error term 
The second step is capturing DA by using the following equation: 
DA = [TAjit / Ajit -1] – [α0 (1 / Ajit –1) + α1 (∆REVjit / Ajit – 1 - ∆RCEjit / Ajit) + α2 (PPEjit / Ajit 
– 1) + ɛjit]                     (4.5) 
Where 
DA = Discretionary accruals  
J = Firm j; 1...N 
α0, α1, and α2 are the predicted confidence from equation 4.4. 
4.6.1.2.3. PERFORMANCE MATCHED (Kothari et al. 2005) MODEL 
Kothari et al. (2005) argued that a company’s financial performance has an effect on 
accounting accruals, and therefore added financial performance to the modified Jones (1995) 
model to check its effect on accounting accruals. Their study uses the lagged value of return 
101 
 
on assets (ROA) as a proxy for the company’s financial performance to reduce the problem 
of heteroscedasticity and to avoid the problem of misspecification of measurement. 
Two steps are employed to measure DA according to the Performance Matched Model 
(Kothari et al. 2005). The first is to predict NDA using the following equation: 
NDAjit = α0 (1 / Ajit – 1) + α1 (∆REVjit / Ajit - 1 - ∆RCEjit / Ajit – 1) + α2 (PPEjit / Ajit – 1) + 
ROAjit + ɛjit                 (4.6) 
 Where 
NDA = Non-discretionary accruals 
∆REV = Change in revenue 
∆RCE = Change in accounts receivable 
PPE = Gross property, plant and equipment 
ROA = Return on assets 
A = Total assets 
J = Firm j; 1...N 
I  = Industry i; 1…N 
T = Year; 1…N 
ɛ = Error term. 
The second step is to estimate discretionary accruals by applying the following equation: 
DAj = [TAjit / Ajit – 1] – [α0 (1 / Ajit – 1) + α1 (∆REVjit / Ajit - 1 - ∆RCEjit / Ajit – 1) + α2 (PPEjit / 
Ajit – 1) + ROAjit + ɛjit]                 (4.7) 
Where          
DA = Discretionary accruals 
J = Firm j; 1...N 
α0, α1, and α2 are the predicted coefficients from equation 4-6. 
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4.6.2. MEASUREMENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
4.6.2.1. MEASUREMENT OF FLID 
Content analysis was employed to gather and explore the items of FLID in the study sample, 
as extensively reported in the literature as a powerful tool to explore corporate disclosures 
(Harte and Owen 1991; Cunningham and Gadenne 2003; Hussainey et al. 2003; Beattie et al. 
2004; Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; Salama 2009; Aribi and Gao 2010; Mathuva 2012; Salama 
et al. 2012; Menicucci 2013). In addition, the disclosure index approach has been used to 
measure the level of FLID (Maali et al. 2006). Content analysis refers to “a research 
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context” 
(Krippendorff 2012, p.21). Similarly, Carney (1972, p.21) defines content analysis as a 
“research technique for making the inference by objectively and systematically identifying 
specified characteristics of messages”. This study uses content analysis for several reasons: 
 It looks directly at texts and hence at a central aspect of communication. 
 It is easy to apply and allows both quantitative and qualitative analysis; and  
 It provides valuable historical insights through the analysis of textual content for 
different periods (e.g. longitudinal data). 
In content analysis, the selection of recording units such as sentences, words, lines, a group of 
words, pages, paragraphs or a whole document is needed. This research uses the word as a 
recording unit of analysis since words are considered more reliable than longer alternatives 
(Hackston and Milne 1996; Al-Najjar and Abed 2014). Ng (1985) argued that using portions 
of pages and sentences may be inappropriate because column, font sizes and page sizes may 
differ from one annual report to another. To overcome these problems, the current study uses 
a number of words as recording units.  Keyword search is used to identify FLID items within 
the voluntary section in each annual report, the study has used a list of 35 forward-keywords 
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established by Hussainey et al. (2003) such as anticipate, next period, coming period, next, 
etc. (see Appendix 2.)  
For content analysis to be used in a replicable manner, a checklist of four categories describes 
the criteria for identifying disclosure as FLID, as in the work of (Barako et al. 2006; Maali et 
al. 2006). Regarding the disclosure categories, Wallace and Naser (1996) and Francis et al. 
(2008b) reported that there is no consensus or general theory about categories to be selected 
for examining the extent of disclosure. The selection could be based on reviewing the 
literature or inspecting the content of FLID (Marston and Shrives 1991; Clarkson et al. 1994; 
Bryan 1997; Barako et al. 2006). 
In this study, the categories and the list of FLID items include both financial and non-
financial information disclosed by listed firms. These items are grouped into four categories 
and 45 items. Since the focus of this study is FLID, the preliminary categories and list were 
sent to various individuals chosen on the basis of their expertise and knowledge of accounting 
practices (academics and accounting professionals). Based on their valuable 
recommendations, the four categories were confirmed, while the initial list was reduced to 28 
items. This method is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Kent and Ung 2003; Barako et al. 
2006; O’Sullivan et al. 2008; Menicucci 2013). (see Appendix 3.)  
The study has also employed three steps to ensure the reliability and validity of the content 
analysis process. This is necessary because of the ambiguity of word meanings (Weber 1990, 
p.15). In content analysis, two types of reliability and validity should be assessed: stability 
and reproducibility (Krippendorff 2012). Stability is ensured when the same unit is coded 
more than once by the same researcher (the results of content classification are constant over 
time), while reproducibility refers to how far the same result could be achieved by content 
classification if more than one researcher codes the same unit. 
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To ensure reliability and validity, common steps have been employed: 
1. Development of a set of specified and explicit coding instruments (e.g. label of a 
meaning unit, abstraction) to minimize discrepancies and ensure objectivity, 
consequently reduce subjective instruments (Aribi and Gao 2011). 
2. To assess reproducibility, five annual financial reports were tested by several coders 
to ensure that all coders adopt the same procedures, ensuring that differences between 
them are minimized and then resolved (Hussainey 2004; Aribi and Gao 2011; Salama 
et al. 2012). 
3. To check the validity coding process, categories and checklist items were re-
confirmed by five professional accountants (Barako et al. 2006; Beretta and Bozzolan 
2008; Salama et al. 2012), and the results compared in order to identify possible 
disagreements, ensure consistency and assess reliability. 
In addition to the content analysis, the present study has used a disclosure index to measure 
the extent of FLID (Ho and Wong 2001a; Maali et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2008b; Menicucci 
2013). Cerf (1961) was the first to employ a disclosure index to assess the degree of 
corporate disclosure, but since then many researchers have extensively used it to measure the 
amount of information disclosed in annual financial reports (e.g. Cooke 1989; Marston and 
Shrives 1991; Barako et al. 2006; Maali et al. 2006; Mathuva 2012).  
The decision to focus on the level of disclosures is because the extent of disclosure measures 
is often employed as a proxy for disclosure quality (Beattie et al. 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan 
2008). The study’s approach in scoring FLID items is dichotomous in that an item scores a 
value of 1 if disclosed, otherwise 0; and the approach to scoring is equally weighted. The 
disclosure index was constructed as a ratio obtained by dividing the number of FLID items 
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disclosed by the total number of FLID items for each company (e.g. Cerf 1961; Rizk et al. 
2008; Muttakin et al. 2015). 
This study used the following disclosure index to measure the level of FLID: 
FWD = ∑𝑑𝑖  
Where FWD refers to the forward-looking category disclosed, and 𝑑𝑖 = 1 if the category 
contains forward-looking items and zero if not.  
The FLID for each company is set as:  
FWD/TDS  
Where TDS is the maximum number of disclosures provided by the companies in their 
published annual financial reports.  
4.6.2.2. MEASUREMENT OF CEOS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Following previous studies (Davidson III et al. 2007; Skalpe 2007; Cornett et al. 2008; 
Cornett et al. 2009; Andriosopoulos et al. 2013; Lin et al. 2014), this study measured the 
CEO’s age as the difference between date of birth and the years of the study period. The 
CEOs gender is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the CEO is male and 0 if female 
(Skalpe 2007; Yu et al. 2010; Andriosopoulos et al. 2013; Yim 2013). Regarding the CEO’s 
overconfidence, several authors have built up various kinds of proxy for this. For example, 
Oliver (2005) at Michigan University estimated it using a consumer sentiment index, which 
considered opinions about both current economic conditions (40% of the index), and future 
perceptions (60%). Baker and Wurgler (2011) have used an investors’ index as a proxy for 
overconfidence, but limited data regarding consumers’ and investors’ perceptions of overall 
economic conditions makes these proxies unsuitable in the current study.  
Some researchers used the entrepreneurial status of a manager to indicate the degree of 
overconfidence, arguing that entrepreneurs have a greater tendency towards overconfident 
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behaviour (Barros and Silveira 2009). Campbell et al. (2011) and Andriosopoulos et al. 
(2013) estimated CEO overconfidence by a late-option exercise,  a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for those CEOs who have held an option at any time during the sample period 
until its expiry, otherwise 0. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b) developed four different types of overconfidence 
measurement:  
I) Long holder.  
II) Holder 67%.  
III) Net buyer.  
IV) Press assessment of CEOs.  
The first three of these measurements Malmendier and Tate (2005a) were based on the 
personal portfolio decisions of CEOs. In long holder and holder 67%, the timing of the option 
exercises is used to detect CEOs’ overconfidence, while net buyer uses the habitual 
acquisition of stock and options of the company. Both long holder and holder 67% 
measurements require comprehensive information about the CEO’s personal portfolio 
transactions in the firm’s stock and options (e.g. time, investment period of each CEO option 
package and exercise price), while the net buyer measure is based on the acquisition of the 
company’s stock and options. This last relies on the tendency of CEOs to purchase additional 
company stock, even if already exposed to company risk. If during the sampling period, a 
CEO is a net purchaser of the stock and options of his or her own company, then the net 
buyer dummy variable is 1; otherwise 0. The fourth measurement is based on the press 
assessment of CEOs, with a CEO being classed as overconfident if described by a greater 
number of adjectives such as confident or optimistic than those implying a conservative 
nature, such as reliable, cautious, practical, frugal or steady. The shortcoming of this 
approach is that the data can be very limited, as every article needs to be verified.  
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The current study measures overconfidence using three different proxies. The first measure 
focuses on option holding behaviour and stock purchases, that is the net buyer method. First, 
following Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2008), overconfidence is considered as a reflection 
of the degree to which CEOs fail to minimize the extent to which their personal wealth is 
exposed to company-specific risk. The measurement is based on the CEO’s tendency to 
purchase extra stock from his/her own company despite his/her own personal wealth being 
exposed to a higher level of company risk. This is because the CEO overestimates the 
prospective returns of his/her own projects in the belief that the company stock price would 
rise more under his/her leadership than would normally be expected. If the CEO has such 
overconfident beliefs, he/she tends to buy up stock in the company in the hope of profiting 
from the expected future gains. Thus, the study defines the CEO as overconfident based on 
the net buyer measure if he/she is a net buyer of his/her own-company stock in the initial six 
years of the sample. It ought to be noted that in detecting overconfidence in a CEO, he/she is 
defined as being overconfident for all the relevant years if the options increase or remain 
constant. A dummy variable is established with 1 representing overconfidence and 0 
otherwise (Malmendier and Tate 2005a). 
The second measurement of CEO overconfidence is based on the CEO’ investment decisions. 
Previous studies document that companies’ investment decisions are associated with 
managerial overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Campbell et al. 2011), and that 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to overinvest in capital projects (Malmendier and Tate 
2005a; Ben-David et al. 2010). Following (Campbell et al. 2011; Ahmed and Duellman 
2013), the present study measures CEOs’ overconfidence by using capital expenditure, a 
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company’s capital expenditure scaled by the 
lagged value of total assets in a given year is higher than the median level of expenditure 
scaled by the lagged value of total assets for the industry type in the same year; otherwise, 0.  
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The third measurement of CEO overconfidence is based on financing decisions and capital 
structure. The overconfident CEO can significantly influence debt/equity choice, and he/she 
will choose to issue more debt than their rational peers do. This occurs because the biased 
CEO believes that the firm is less likely to experience financial distress than is actually the 
case (Hackbarth 2008). In the same vein, Malmendier et al. (2007) indicate that overconfident 
managers use a higher level of debt than rational managers. Thus, he/she will underestimate 
the expected cost of bankruptcy and will take on more debt to exploit its tax benefits. The 
current study uses the leverage ratio as the third proxy for the overconfidence.  
4.6.3. MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
The current study uses three empirical models to test the research hypotheses. In the first 
model, EM is considered as a dependent variable, and the level of FLID as an independent 
variable. However, in the second model the level of FLID becomes the dependent variable 
while the CEO’s characteristice are considered independent variables. In addition to these 
dependent and independent variables, a number of control variables are used, to control for 
the possible effect of a company’s characteristics and corporate governance factors that may 
affect the extent of EM and FLID. 
4.6.3.1. FIRM’S SIZE 
Several studies have reported mixed results regarding the association between company size 
and EM practices (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Becker et al. 1998; Lobo and Zhou 2001; 
Pincus and Rajgopal 2002; Xie et al. 2003a; Sun et al. 2010), that is company size may be 
positively or negatively related to EM practices. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) argued that government security and political cost are higher 
for larger companies, which tend to be involved in income-decreasing EM. From a different 
perspective, Richardson (2000) reported that market pressure is higher for larger firms since 
they are subject to closer monitoring by shareholders and financial analysts. Hence, large 
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companies are more likely to use aggressive accounting policies, which in turn results in 
income-increasing EM. Conversely, Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2003a) examined the 
relationship between firms’ characteristics and EM, indicated that the likelihood of EM 
increases as the size of the firm decreases. Yadollah et al. (2012) found a positive relationship 
between a firm’s size and the quality of financial reporting. Recently, a number of empirical 
studies have supported the negative association between company size and EM (Hong and 
Andersen 2011; Yip et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Pyo and Lee 2013).  
In respect to a firm’s size and voluntary disclosures, agency theory assumes that larger 
companies perform a greater number of business transactions, which are more complex than 
in smaller companies, and consequently agency cost depends on the firm’s size (Pérez 2004). 
Larger firms are more likely to publish voluntary disclosures to decrease these costs. In this 
regard, several studies have found a positive relationship between company size and the level 
of voluntary disclosures (Barako et al. 2006; Salama et al. 2012; Al-Najjar and Abed 2014; 
Jizi et al. 2014; Qu et al. 2015). The present study assumes that large Jordanian companies 
have a greater likelihood of disclosing more information and that they have fewer 
motivations to be involved in EM practices. Following earlier studies, company size is 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets at the year-end (Yadollah et al. 2012; Gul et 
al. 2013; Sartawi et al. 2014).  
4.6.3.2. FIRM’S PROFITABILITY 
Previous studies documented that DA models cannot completely measure EM since they are 
linked with the company’s profitability, a proxy for performance (Dechow et al. 1995; 
McNichols 2001). In addition, highly profitable companies are less likely to engage in EM 
practices. For instance, numerous studies have found that the coefficient of a firm’s 
profitability is negatively and significantely related to DA (Yang et al. 2013; Boulila Taktak 
and Mbarki 2014; Habbash et al. 2014; Kiattikulwattana 2014; Sun et al. 2014). On the other 
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hand, Gavious et al. (2012) and (Hsiao et al. 2016) found a positive and significant 
relationship between the firm’s profitability and EM practices. 
The current study also uses company profitability to control the potential effects on the level 
of FLID (Urquiza et al. 2010; Alkhatib and Marji 2012; Uyar and Kilic 2012; Alkhatib 2014). 
For example, Alkhatib and Marji (2012) and Uyar and Kilic (2012) found that companies 
with high profits are motivated to disclose more information than those with small profits. 
This finding is consistent with signalling theory; firms will be more liable to signal their act 
to investors when their performance is good (Watson 2002). Thus, following previous studies 
(Lobo and Zhou 2001; Kiattikulwattana 2014), the current study adds company profitability 
as a control variable, to control for the influence of its financial performance on the level of 
FLID and EM practices. The coefficient of company profitability is expected to show a 
positive and significant relationship with the level of FLID and to be negatively and 
significantly associated with EM practices. Profitability is measured by return on assets 
(ROA) (net income before tax divided by total assets). 
4.6.3.3. FIRM’S FINANCIAL LEVERAGE  
Previous studies have documented that managers of companies with a high debt ratio have 
more motivation to use income-increasing accruals in order to satisfy covenant debt criteria 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Jiang et al. 2008; Ali et al. 2010). In this regard they have 
found a positive association between the firm’s leverage ratio and EM practices (e.g. Gavious 
et al. 2012; Habbash et al. 2014; Wasiuzzaman et al. 2015). However, extremely indebted 
companies might be less able to exercise EM since their lenders carefully monitor them. 
Chung et al. (2002); Park and Shin (2004) and Alsharairi and Salama (2012) found a negative 
relationship between financial leverage ratio and EM practices. 
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In respect to the relationship between the financial leverage ratio and the level of FLID,  
agency theory claims that  highly leveraged firms have a greater contractual obligation to 
fulfil the information requests of long-term and short-term lenders, and therefore may offer 
more details to meet those needs than would a less leveraged company (Watson et al. 2002; 
García‐Meca and Sánchez‐Ballesta 2009). The literature has reported that leverage ratio has 
an effect on the level of FLID (Deshmukh 2005; Li and Zhao 2008; O’Sullivan et al. 2008; 
Hussainey and Walker 2009; Basiddiq and Hussainey 2012; Al-Najjar and Abed 2014). 
Consistent with other studies (Park and Shin 2004; Alves 2012), the financial leverage ratio is 
included in the current study’s testing models. The financial leverage ratio is measured by 
total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
4.6.3.4. FIRM’S DIVIDEND PAID 
Previous studies found that managers are motivated to practice income-increasing EM to 
avoid reduction in dividends when unmanaged earnings are lower than the amount of 
earnings to be reported for target dividend payment (e.g. Kasanen et al. 1996; Daniel et al. 
2008). Thus, the dividend ratio is found to be positively associated with EM behaviour. For 
example, Kasanen et al. (1996) reported that managers manipulate earnings upwards in 
response to pressure from powerful institutional owners to pay dividends. Similarly, Daniel et 
al. (2008) found a positive relationship between dividends and EM practices. Conversely, 
Healy and Palepu (1990) found no evidence that companies manage reported earnings in 
order to avoid the dividend restriction. With respect to dividends and FLID, this study 
considers dividend policy as one of its key drivers. Indeed, the relationship between the level 
of FLID and the firm’s dividend policy has recently gained considerable attention. For 
example, Hussainey and Walker (2009) argued that FLID and dividend payments are 
alternative methods to convey important information to investors. Their findings are 
consistent with signalling theory, which suggests that companies with a lower level of FLID 
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are inclined to increase the dividend payment, which will indicate their future forecasts to 
present and future shareholders (Wang and Hussainey 2013). However, several studies have 
found a positive and significant relationship between dividends and FLID (e.g. Deshmukh 
2005; Li and Zhao 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar 2011; Basiddiq and Hussainey 2012). 
Dividend ratio is measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same period. 
4.6.3.5. FIRM’S SECTOR TYPE 
Sector type is another determinant of company information disclosure (Celik et al. 2006; 
Alkhatib and Marji 2012). Mixed statistically significant results were found. For example, 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) examined the relationship between sector type and voluntary 
disclosure among US, Swedish and Canadian companies, and their findings confirm that 
there is a significant association between industry type and corporate disclosure. Salama et al. 
(2012) examined the relationship between a number of UK company’s characteristics and 
environmental responsibility disclosure, revealing that industry type has a significant positive 
impact on environmental disclosures. Similarly, Cooke (1992) and Alkhatib (2014) found a 
significant association between industry type and FLID. On the other hand, other scholars 
have documented an insignificant relationship between industry type and FLID (McNally et 
al. 1982; Wallace 1987; Wallace et al. 1994). Following studies conducted by Aljifri and 
Hussainey (2007); Mathuva (2012) and Alkhatib (2014), the present study assumes that 
different accounting policies, valuation techniques, accounting measurements and disclosure 
techniques will be used by industrial and service sectors which will influence the level of 
FLID and EM practices. To identify the industry type, this study used the International 
Securities Identification Number (ISIN) issued by the JSDC (a unique ten-digit number 
indicating the firm’s type and the sector in it operates) as a proxy for industry type.  
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4.6.3.6. BOARD SIZE 
Board size is viewed as a crucial element of board characteristics that may influence EM 
activities. The Jordanian corporate governance code (15) suggests that the number of board 
members be left to the internal system of the firm, although members of the board should not 
exceed thirteen and should not be less than three in all cases. There is lack of consensus 
regarding the influence of board size in controlling management. For instance, Jensen (1993); 
Yermack (1996); Huther (1997); De Andres et al. (2005); and Santiago and Brown (2009) 
indicated that smaller board size (four to six members) might be able to make valuable 
decisions and monitor opportunistic managerial behaviour. Nevertheless, the majority of 
previous studies show that a larger board with a variety of expertise is better able to improve 
effective monitoring of the board to reduce the likelihood of EM actions (Xie et al. 2003a; 
Peasnell et al. 2005; Dâvila and Watkins 2009; González and García-Meca 2014). A more 
plausible explanation for this opinion is the dominance of smaller boards by block-holders or 
executive managers, while a larger board has more members from different positions and 
backgrounds, enhancing transparency and encouraging managers to voluntarily disclose more 
information (Gandía 2008). Several studies have agreed that larger boards improve the 
company’s disclosure policies (Adams and Mehran 2005; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Al-
Najjar and Abed 2014; Sartawi et al. 2014), ensuring better supervision of managers’ 
behaviour. The size of the board is measured by the total numbers of board members.  
4.6.3.7. BOARD DUALITY 
Another corporate governance issue raised by researchers is whether the CEO and 
chairperson of the board of directors is the same person. The Jordanian codes of corporate 
governance recommend that these roles should be separated to ensure that the CEO does not 
have unfettered powers of decision. A board with the same person in both positions is less 
likely to be actively monitored, which in turn makes it less likely that EM practices will be 
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reduced (Visvanathan 2008). In other words, CEO duality is a means of achieving a 
considerable concentration of CEO power, which can facilitate manipulation of earnings. 
Thus, the separation of the CEO’s power may result in more efficient monitoring (Cornett et 
al. 2008). According to agency theory, the separation of CEO and chairman of the board of 
directors increases the board’s independence from management and leads to better 
monitoring and overseeing (Jensen 1993).  
Previous studies have found that the combination of the role of CEO and chairperson is 
related to a lower level of voluntary disclosure, with a negative relationship between CEO 
duality and voluntary disclosure (Ho and Wong 2001b; Gul and Leung 2004; Donnelly and 
Mulcahy 2008). In this study, board duality is used as a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the CEO and chairperson are the same person, and 0 otherwise. 
4.6.3.8. BOARD MEETING 
While the code of corporate governance in Jordan is not specific on the number of meetings 
required for the board of directors, in order to effect the quarterly endorsement of the 
financial statements, the board is required to meet at least four times in a given year. 
However, the frequency of meetings in each year is subject to the duties delegated to board 
members and the company’s size, so as to ensure that the performance of the board meets 
future objectives (Zgarni et al. 2014). The regularity of meetings has been employed in 
previous research as a proxy for a board’s diligence, since an inefficient board is less likely to 
monitor managers effectively. It is argued that active boards that meet frequently have a 
greater chance of performing their duties in line with the interests of their shareholders; they 
put more effort into controlling issues such as EM, financial reporting integrity and conflicts 
of interest (Habbash 2010; Qu et al. 2015). 
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Concerning board meeting and voluntary disclosure, the literature shows a positive 
relationship (e.g. Kent and Stewart 2008; Jizi et al. 2014). Therefore, board meeting is used 
as a control variable in this study, to reduce its effect on the level of FLID. Board meetings 
are measured by the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. 
4.6.3.9. BOARD INDEPENDENCE 
According to agency theory, boards with a high percentage of outside directors are supposed 
to be more effective in overseeing managers (Jizi et al. 2014). The board’s independence 
should be achieved by the presence of non-executive directors. Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
pointed out that non-executive directors might influence the quality of directors’ information 
and their decisions, which may lead to enhanced performance. Altogether a number of 
studies, for example, Klein (2002); Xie et al. (2003a); Davidson et al. (2005); Benkel et al. 
(2006); Niu (2006); Jaggi et al. (2009); Sarkar et al. (2008); and Riro (2013), have 
documented a negative association between the percentage of outside directors and EM.  
In respect to the board’s independence and voluntary disclosure, numerous studies have 
found a positive relationship between the number of independent directors and voluntary 
disclosures (e.g. Forker 1992; Ajinkya et al. 2005; O’Sullivan et al. 2008; Hossain and 
Hammami 2009; Qu et al. 2015). Therefore, consistent with previous studies and agency 
theory, this study expects a negative relationship between EM and a board’s independence, 
and a positive association between FLID and the board’s independence, among non-financial 
Jordanian companies. Board independence is measured by the total number of outside 
directors. 
4.6.3.10. MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP 
Agency theory argues that when managers do not own a considerable proportion of the firm, 
their behaviour is influenced by self-interest and not geared towards maximisation of the 
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firm’s value, leading to EM practice (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Conversely, if managers 
invest a significant percentage of their wealth in the acquisition of stock in the firm which 
they manage, they are more likely to align  their wealth to that of other investors (Mehran 
1995). Thus, managerial ownership is acknowledged as a valuable tool to limit the scope of 
EM practice, and has been considered as a possible incentive mechanism. Most previous 
studies supposed that share ownership by insiders leads to a suitable alignment of interest 
(Warfield et al. 1995; Peasnell et al. 2005) between managers and stockholders, since it gives 
managers an incentive to maximize the firm’s performance (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
From the agency theory perspective, companies with a large proportion of managerial 
shareholdings are more likely to have a better corporate governance structure, which in turn 
enhances the quality of financial reporting (Sánchez and Meca 2005). In line with this 
argument, a negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and EM is 
therefore expected. Thus, consistent with the literature, this study assumes that managerial 
ownership and EM practices are negatively related, while managerial ownership and 
voluntary disclosure are positively related. Managerial ownership is measured by the number 
of total shares held by managers as a proportion of the total number of shares.  
4.6.3.11. FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
There is considerable discussion on how family ownership affects managerial behaviour 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003; Wang 2006; Sánchez et al. 2007; Jiraporn and DaDalt 2009), with 
two opposing views. The first argues that the monitoring provided by the founding family, 
with long-term investment, should limit the capacity of managers to manipulate reported 
earnings (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Jiraporn and DaDalt 2009). In short, compared with non-
family companies, family-controlled companies are more likely to maximize the wealth of 
the company over the long term. Therefore, there is less motivation to gain private benefit to 
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the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests, in turn, increasing earnings quality 
(Sánchez et al. 2007).  
On the other hand, opponents argue that the controlling family might confiscate the wealth of 
minority shareholders (Jaggi et al. 2009). The first perspective can be explained by agency 
theory, that concentration of ownership reduces agency problems (Tosi Jr and Gomez-Mejia 
1989). In other words, family-controlled firms typically have strong motivation to confront 
agency problems stemming from conflict between minority and majority investors (type II 
agency problem) (Ali et al. 2007). In particular, family-controlled firms are less likely to 
manipulate earnings than non-family-controlled companies (Jiraporn and DaDalt 2009). 
Previous empirical studies suggested that companies controlled or owned by families seem to 
be associated with a higher level of earnings quality (Wang 2006; Ali et al. 2007; Jiraporn 
and DaDalt 2009). However, theoretically there are two contradictory views regarding the 
relationship between family companies and voluntary disclosure: the convergence of interest 
perspective, and the entrenched management perspective (Morck et al. 1988). Family 
ownership is measured by the percentage of total shares held by the family. 
4.6.3.12. INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
Institutional ownership has received significant consideration in previous studies, as owners 
have considerable influence over the business, which consequently improves the overall 
controlling processes and mitigates opportunistic actions. It is argued that institutional 
ownership can be a vital governance mechanism in monitoring managers’ discretion and 
enhancing the effectiveness of information in capital markets (Balsam et al. 2003; Koh 2003; 
Ferreira 2010). For example, Koh (2003) provides evidence that there is a negative 
relationship between the level of institutional ownership and EM practices. A number of 
other studies have argued that a higher proportion of institutional ownership should lead to a 
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significant negative influence on the incidence of EM (Bushee and Noe 2000; Hsu and Koh 
2005; Charitou et al. 2007; Habbash 2010).  
 Previous studies have investigated the effect of institutional ownership on the level of 
voluntary disclosure. For example, Ajinkya et al. (2005); Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and 
Truong and Dunstan (2011) showed that companies with greater institutional ownership are 
more likely to disclose more management forecasts. In addition, Qu et al. (2015) argued that 
effective corporate governance, including institutional ownership, motivates managers to 
disclose more FLID. In this regard, previous studies have found a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure (Carson and Simnett 1997; Bushee 
and Noe 2000; Barako et al. 2006). Thus, this study expects that a high percentage of 
institutional investors may lead to reduction of EM actions and increase the level of FLID. 
Institutional ownership is measured by dummy variable 1 if there are institution-held shares 
and 0 otherwise.  
4.6.3.13. BLOCKHOLDER OWNERSHIP 
Another form of ownership is that in which different types of investor, such as individuals, 
mutual and pension fund corporations, fund managers, private equity firms, banks and trusts 
are considered as blockholders (Habbash 2010). Previous studies have found blockholder 
ownership to be a useful tool for monitoring managers’ actions (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 
1986; Jensen 1993; Persons 2006; Iqbal and Strong 2010), finding a negative association 
between EM practices and large blockholder ownership. However, Ching et al. (2006) found 
a positive relationship between these variables. Two opinions have emerged; the first 
argument is that more monitoring mechanisms could be achieved through concentration of 
ownership, which will reduce opportunistic activities. The second argues that a majority of 
stakeholders may work together with managers against minority shareholders, to maximize 
their interest (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Furthermore, concentrated ownership may be a 
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motivation for blockholders to employ accounting information in their personal interests, 
such as income-decreasing strategies, in order to decrease the remaining claims of other 
shareholders (Claessens et al. 2000). In fact, neither view can be generalized; for instance, the 
first view may be a phenomenon in developed countries because of strict regulation and 
investors’ protection; in developing countries, the second opinion may be justified for many 
reasons, such as weak rules and regulation, and poor accounting disclosure and investor 
protection. 
Mixed results have been reported on the impact of blockholder ownership on voluntary 
disclosures. For example, several studies have found that, blockholder ownership is 
negatively related to the level of voluntary disclosure (McKinnon and Dalimunthe 1993; 
Mitchell et al. 1995; Schadewitz and Blevins 1998), while others have provided evidence that 
it is positively associated with voluntary disclosures (e.g. Huafang and Jianguo 2007; 
O’Sullivan et al. 2008). Blockholder is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the firm has an external stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares, and 0 
otherwise. 
4.7. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH MODELS 
This study has three main objectives. To recap: 
 Investigate the relationship between the level of FLID and EM practices among non-
financial companies listed on the ASE. 
 Examine the relationship between CEOs’ personal characteristics and the level of 
FLID among non-financial companies listed on the ASE. 
 Examine the relationship between CEOs’ personal characteristics and EM practices 
among non-financial companies listed on the ASE. 
To achieve these objectives, the following regression models are applied (key in Table 4.3): 
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1. EMit = β0 + β 1 FLIDit + β 2 FSIZEit + β 3 FPROFit + β 4 FDIVIDit + β 5 FLEVERit + β 6 
FISINit + β 7 BSIZEit + β 8 BDUALit + β 9 BMEETit + β 10 BINDEPit + β 11 MOWNEit + 
β 12 FOWNEit + β 13 INSTITUit + β 14 BLOCKHit + Year Controls + Industry Controls 
+ ɛi. 
 
2. FLIDit = β 0 + β 1CAGEit + β 2 CGEND + β 3 COVER + β 4 FSIZEit + β 5 FPROFit + β 
6FFDIVIDit + β 7 FISINit + β 8 BSIZEit + β 9 BDUALit + β 10 BMEETit + β 11 BINDEPit 
+ β 12 MOWNEit + β 13 FOWNEit + β 14 INSTITUit + β 15 BLOCKHit + Year Controls + 
Industry Controls + ɛi. 
 
3. EMit = β 0 + β 1 CAGEit + β 2 CGEND + β 3 COVER + β 4 FSIZEit + β 5 FPROFit + β 6 
FFDIVIDit + β 7 FISINit + β 8 BSIZEit + β 9 BDUALit + β 10 BMEETit + β 11 BINDEPit + 
β 12 MOWNEit + β 13 FOWNEit + β 14 INSTITUit + β 15 BLOCKHit + Year Controls + 
Industry Controls + ɛi. 
Where 
Table 4.3: Variables’ definitions and measurements. 
Label Variable Description 
Dependent Variable 
EM Earnings Management The absolute value of discretionary accruals 
estimated using 
1. Cross-sectional Jones model. 
2. Cross-sectional modified Jones model 
3. Cross-sectional performance-match model 
Independent Variables 
FLID Forward-Looking 
Information Disclosure 
Total level of FLID score (independent variable 
in model one and dependent variable in the model 
two) measured by disclosure index. 
CEAGE CEO’s Age Measured by the difference between the CEO’s 
date of birth and the years of the study period. 
CGEND CEO’s Gender A dummy variable taking value 1 if CEO male, 
and 0 if CEO female. 
COVER CEO’s Overconfidence Measured using  
1. Net Buyer: dummy variable taking value 1 
if the proportion of CEO share ownership, 
options and stock exercise increases, and 0 
otherwise. 
2. Capital Expenditure: dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the capital expenditure 
scaled by lagged total assets in a year t is 
greater that the median level of capital 
expenditures to lagged total assets for the 
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firm’s industry in that year and 0 
otherwise. 
3.  Leverage ratio: measured by total long-
term debt divided by total assets. 
Control Variables 
FSIZE Firm Size The natural log of a firm’s total assets.  
FPROF Firm Profitability Measured by ROA (net income before tax divided 
by total assets).  
FDIVID Dividends Ratio Cash dividends divided by net income for the 
same period.  
FLEVER Leverage Ratio Used as another proxy for CEO overconfidence in 
models two and three; measured by total long-
term debt divided by total assets. 
FISIN Industry Type Measured by using the ISIN code, as stated by 
Jordanian Securities Depository Centre.  
BSIZE Board Size Measured by the total number of members on the 
board.  
BDUAL Board Duality A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
CEO and chairman are the same person and 0 
otherwise. 
BMEET Board Meeting The number of meetings per year held by the 
board of directors. 
BINDEP Board Independence Measured by the total number of outside 
directors. 
MOWNE Managerial Ownership Measured by the proportion of total shares held 
by executive directors divided by the total number 
of shares.  
FOWNE Family Ownership Measured by the proportion of total shares owned 
by the family. Dummy variable takes 1 if a family 
or individual holds 10% or more of equity and 0 
otherwise. 
INSTITU Institutional Ownership Measured by dummy variable taking 1 if there are 
any institution-held shares and 0 otherwise. 
BLOCKH Blockholder Ownership A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm has an external stockholder owning 5% or 
more of the outstanding shares, and 0 otherwise. 
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4.8. EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES OF DATA ANALYSIS 
This section covers the steps in data analysis: preliminary analysis technique, multivariate 
analysis technique and robustness tests.  
4.8.1. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Preliminary analysis of the data comprises three primary analyses: descriptive statistics, 
univariate analysis, and correlation matrix. Descriptive statistics are employed to describe 
and summarize the data in terms of central tendency tests and shape of distribution on a 
single variable in a sensible way. Central tendency tests comprise minimum values, 
maximum values, mean, median, and standard deviation. A histogram is used to test the 
normality of data distribution (see Appendix 4). The correlation between sample explanatory 
variables is tested using a pairwise correlation matrix and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
method, in order to explain the level of linear relationship between two explanatory variables 
(Gujarati and Porter 2011). The correlation coefficient is in the range +1 to -1, where +1 
refers to a strong linear relationship between explanatory variables. According to Grewal et 
al. (2004); Gujarati (2008) and Harris and Raviv (2008), a higher degree of the correlation 
coefficient between explanatory variables harms the results of the regression analysis due to 
the multicollinearity problem. These studies suggest ± 80% or above as the beginning of a 
serious multicollinearity problem which would affect the regression results. 
4.8.2. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In general, statistical multivariate data analysis can be classified into two categories, 
parametric and non-parametric methods. However, the researcher decides the choice of 
technique based on the nature and characteristics of the data. Gujarati (2003) proposes five 
fundamental assumptions to be examined before choosing the type of multivariate analysis: 
1.  Normality: This assumes the distribution of the data set to be normal. 
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2. Linearity: This hypothesis assumes that the association between the dependent and 
explanatory variables is linear. 
3.  Heteroscedasticity: This hypothesis assumes that there is constant change in the 
dependent variables.  
4. Multicollinearity: This assumes no collinearity among independent variables. 
5. Independence: In this assumption, the error term of two or more observations should 
not be associated.  
To check whether it is more appropriate in this study to use the parametric or non-parametric 
test, several tests were employed to check the above assumptions. First, the histogram test 
was used to check the normality problem. Second, the linearity problem was examined using 
the Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q plot) test. Third, this study used the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg and White’s general tests to test for heteroscedasticity. Fourth, the pairwise Pearson 
correlation matrix and VIF tests were both applied to check the independence and 
multicollinearity problems.  
4.8.2.1. PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The study used regression analysis as the primary tool to examine the research hypotheses, in 
which the researcher seeks a positivist understanding of how the methodological process 
which is “unaffected by individual perceptual differences” is to be conducted (Ardalan, 
2012). Hair et al. (2009) stated, “The appropriate method of analysis when the research 
problem involves a single metric variable is presumed to be related to two or more 
independent variables”. Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2008) argued that panel data models have a 
remarkable advantage for measuring non-observable individual effects that reduce the 
problem of the reliability of explanatory variables in explaining the dependent variable. 
Moreover, the panel data regression model facilitates the analysis of cross-sectional and time-
series data and involves a large number of observations, which increases the degree of 
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freedom and improves the efficiency of the statistic (Pesaran et al. 2000; Gaud et al. 2005; 
Sakata et al. 2010). 
The major difference between the panel data model and pooled regression is that the latter 
does not distinguish between the various companies and times, whereas the former does 
distinguish between the companies and varies over time, allowing researchers to remove any 
unobservable heterogeneity in the sample (Himmelberg et al. 1999). It also considers both 
spatial (units) and worldly (time) scope, and is thus an important technique for linear 
information examination. The linear aspect represents several cross-sectional surveillance 
components such as companies, state, countries and commodities. The temporal dimension 
denotes regular periodic annotations of a set of variables in cross-section units over a 
particular period (that is 2008-2013). Panel data is also a primary means of longitudinal data 
analysis especially when the sources of information are different. Indeed, in a situation 
whereby the perceptions are long enough for individual analyses, panel data analysis offers 
several procedures, which may be helpful in scrutinizing variations over time in a particular 
kind of cross-sectional unit. The combination of cross-sectional and time-series data in the 
panel data regression method helps in improving the degree of freedom and the data quantity, 
which may be impossible when only one of them is used (Gujarati 2003; Gujarati 2008). 
Other benefits of the panel data technique are the following: 
1. It provides more variability, additional instructive information concerning the data, 
reduces co-linearity among variables, and offers an additional degree of flexibility and 
further effectiveness, given its combination of cross-sectional and time-series 
dimensions. 
2. It is able to identify and measure non-observable impacts when cross-sectional or 
time-series information is used. 
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3. It helps to analyse complex behavioural models, such as technological change, which 
is unlikely to be achieved with only cross-sectional or time-series information. 
4. It aims at eliminating heterogeneity in the process of estimation due to its 
consideration of particular variables.  
Given these advantages of panel data regression, this study chose it as a primary analysis tool 
to investigate the relationship among the study’s variables (Chih et al. 2008; García‐Meca 
and Sánchez‐Ballesta 2009; Chang and Sun 2010; Yu et al. 2010; Wang and Hussainey 2013; 
Ben Othman and Mersni 2014; Ali et al. 2015; Böcking et al. 2015).  
 
4.8.3. FURTHER ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The study conducted additional and sensitivity analysis to confirm that the main findings are 
robust to various measurements and estimators. For example, three models were used to 
measure DA as proxy for EM: the Jones (1991), modified Jones (1995), and Kothari (2005) 
models. In addition, three measurements were employed to measure CEOs’ overconfidence 
(net buyer, financial leverage ratio and capital expenditure). However, to control for the 
endogeneity problem, the lagged value of FLID and CEO characteristics have been used as 
instrumental variables. 
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4.9. SUMMARY 
This chapter explains and justifies the study approaches and methods in accordance with the 
research objectives and questions, in an attempt to provide evidence of the impact of FLID on 
EM on one side and on the effect of CEO characteristics on the level of FLID and EM 
practices, on the other. The data analysis is achieved using panel regression, random effect 
models on the study hypotheses, 1,206 company-year observations (201 non-financial listed 
companies) for the period 2008-2013 are used. 
The next three chapters will highlight and analyse the impact of the level of FLID on EM 
practices. In addition, the effect of CEO characteristics on the level of FLID and EM 
practices is analysed in Chapters six and seven respectively.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: FLID AND EM PRACTICES: RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of empirical analysis through descriptive statistics, the 
correlation matrix and regression analysis. The main purpose of the chapter is to achieve the 
study’s objective regarding the relationship between FLID and EM practices: 
To investigate the relationship between the level of FLID and EM practices among non-
financial Jordanian companies. 
Three empirical research models were used to examine this relationship, based on the 
hypothesis summarized in the methodology chapter (See section 4.4). In order to properly 
analyses the data, the FLID index, Jones, modified Jones and performance-matched models 
were used. In addition, control variables such as company characteristics, board 
characteristics and ownership structure were included in the models. Therefore, this chapter is 
organized as follows: section 5.2 discusses the descriptive statistics, section 5.3 explains the 
correlation matrix and section 5.4 outlines and discusses the findings from examination of the 
hypotheses. Section 5.5 offers alternative measurement of EM, and section 5.6 reports the 
results of the endogeneity tests. Section 5.7 provides a short summary of the chapter. 
5.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 5.1 presents the total observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values and median for all variables used in this study. The dependent variable EM is the 
absolute DA value measured by the Jones and Modified Jones Models. The descriptive 
statistics reveal that the minimum value of EM based on these models are 0.0000 and 0.0001 
respectively, and the maximum values are 0.870 and 0.925, indicating a considerable 
dispersion in the rates. The mean values are 0.0988, 0.0973, which is quite similar to the 
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results of Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010), who found that the mean value of EM among Jordanian 
industrial companies is around 0.10. This result implies that the average value of DA in non-
financial Jordanian companies is 0.09, which can be compared to the findings of Al-Fayoumi 
et al. (2010) and ALghamdi and Ali (2012), who documented that the average values of 
discretionary accruals in Jordanian and Saudi listed companies are around 0.10. However, 
these results imply that the magnitude of EM in Jordan may be higher than those reported by 
Klein (2002); Katmun (2012); Ugbede et al. (2013) and Habbash et al. (2014), who found 
that US, UK, Malaysian and Chinese companies have an average absolute value of DA of 
0.07, 0.065, 0.075 and 0.066 respectively. Nevertheless, they are below the figures of 
Roodposhti and Chashmi (2010) and González and García-Meca (2014), who found that the 
mean value of DA among companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and Latin 
American companies were 0.16 and 0.11 respectively. In addition, the median values are 
0.061 and 0.060 with a standard deviation of 0.114 and 0.112 respectively. This study 
employed the median value as a benchmark to classify high and low levels of EM. The 
independent variable FLID is the percentage obtained using the disclosure index (Uyar and 
Kilic 2012; Menicucci 2013). As can be seen from Table 5.1, the minimum value of FLID is 
0.00 and the maximum 0.78, which indicates a considerable dispersion. The mean value of 
0.3114 shows a low level of FLID across the companies. This study employed the median 
value of 0.33 as a benchmark to classify high and low levels of FLID. This figure is relatively 
higher than those of Uyar and Kilic (2012); Bozanic et al. (2013b) and Menicucci (2013), 
who found that the average value of FLID scores in Turkish, US and Italian companies were 
0.178, 0.314, and 0.325 respectively. With respect to the control variables, the company size 
values are widely dispersed, ranging from .93e+03 to 3.23e+09. The results of profitability 
reveal that it varies between a minimum of -0.859 (loss) and maximum of 0.95 (profit) with a 
standard deviation of 0.1217. In addition, Table 5.1 shows that the mean value of dividend 
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ratio is 0.1882, with minimum and maximum values of 0 and 0.9751 respectively. 
Correspondingly, the median value is zero with standard deviation of 0.3077. The leverage 
ratio ranges from 0 to 0.978 and the mean value is 0.295. The mean value of industry type 
indicates that 0.3618 of companies in the sample operate in the industrial sector.  
Concerning the other control variables, board size has a mean value of 8.011, which is 
relatively consistent with the number reported by (Peasnell et al. 2005). However, the 
maximum board size is 19 members, which indicates that, in general, Jordanian firms do not 
follow the Jordanian corporate governance code number (15), which recommends that board 
size should be no more than 13. A dummy variable of board duality has a mean of 0.205 and 
numbers of meetings and board independence have mean values of 7.572 and 2.020 
respectively. With regard to the ownership structure, managerial and family ownership have 
0.035 and 0.612 mean values respectively, whereas, institutions and blockholders have mean 
values of 0.355 and 0.4892.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of FLID and EM practices. 
Variable N Minim Maxim Mean Median Stan-Dev. 
EMJOMO 1206 0.0000 .8705 0.0988 0.061 .11468 
EMMOJO 1206 0.0001 0.92508 0.0973 0.060 .112734 
FLID 1206 0.000 0.780 0.3114 0.330 0.1844 
2FSIZE 1206 .93e+03 3.23e+09 5.55e+07 1.87e+07 1.57e+08 
FPROF 1206 -0.85904 0.9500 0.0012302 0.01109 .1217121 
FDIVID 1206 0 0.9751 0.1882211 0 0.307755 
FLEVER 1206 0.0002 0.97808 0.2950135 0.240055 0.2320937 
FISIN 1206 1 201 .3631841 101 .481111 
BSIZE 1206 3 19 8.011 7 2.4494 
BDUAL 1206 0 1 .2056 0 .40433 
BMEET 1206 3 28 7.5729 7 2.1378 
BINDEP 1206 0 8 2.0207 2 1.2345 
MOWNE 1206 0 .7185 .03528 0 .08595 
FOWNE 1206 0 .9450 0.6127 .15472 .27206 
INSTITU 1206 0 1 .35547 .3320 .76537 
BLOCKH 1206 0 1 .48922 0 .50009 
EMJOMO= Discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM measured by using Jones model; EMMOJO= 
Discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM measured by using modifies Jones model; FLIDit= Forward-looking 
information disclosure score of company i in year t, expressed as % of total FLI disclosed out of all items. 
FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROA (net income 
before tax divided by total assets). FDIVID= dividend ratio measured as cash dividend divided by net income 
for the same period. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
FISIN= industry type, measured by the ISIN number, as stated by Jordanian Securities Depository Centre. 
BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of board members. BDUAL= Board duality, a dummy 
variable, 1 if the CEO and chairman are the same person and 0 otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, the 
number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BINDEP= board independence, measured by the 
total number of outside directors. MOWNE= managerial ownership, measured by the percentage of total 
shares held by executive directors divided by the total number of shares. FOWNE= family ownership, 
measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the family; a dummy variable, 1 if a family or an 
individual holds 10% or more of equity and 0 otherwise. INSTITU= institutional ownership, measured by 
dummy variable, 1 if any institution-held shares and 0 otherwise. BLOCKH= blockholder ownership, measured 
                                                     
2 Following previous studies company’s size is measured by using the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
year-end (Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; Samaha et al. 2012; Wang and Hussainey 2013). 
131 
 
by a dummy variable, 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
5.3. MULTICOLLINEARITY 
The multicollinearity problem implies that two or more independent variables are associated, 
with a high level of correlation ± 80% (Grewal et al. 2004; Gujarati 2008; Harris and Raviv 
2008). Thus, when multicollinearity exists, it is not easy to distinguish the individual effects 
of descriptive variables, and panel regression random effect estimators may tend to have large 
variances (Murray 2005). Moreover, when a perfect relationship exists between the estimator 
variables, the results of the regression cannot be uniquely calculated. The two common 
methods to check for the incidence of multicollinearity between independent variables are the 
correlation coefficients matrix and VIF with tolerance values. These two methods have been 
employed extensively in the literature on disclosure (e.g. Hair et al. 2006; Abdel-Fattah 2008; 
ALghamdi and Ali 2012). This study uses both correlation matrix and VIF to test whether 
there is multicollinearity between independent variables. There has been no agreement 
between researchers regarding the cut-off correlation percentage (Alsaeed 2006). For 
example, those using a correlation matrix (e.g. Gujarati 2003; Grewal et al. 2004; Harris and 
Raviv 2008; Gujarati and Porter 2011) suggest that a coefficient of ± 80% is considered as 
the starting point at which a serious multicollinearity problem might exist and harm the 
results of the regression analysis, although Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) reported that ± 70% 
is appropriate. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that the highest correlation is between the leverage 
ratio and FLID, with a coefficient of 54.20%. Therefore, the problem of multicollinearity 
does not exist among the data set used in these models. In addition, the results of the VIF test, 
presented in Table 5.4, show the coefficients of each independent variable. According to 
Gujarati (2003, 2008) multicollinearity does not exist among explanatory variables if the 
mean VIF is less than 10, and it can be seen from Table 5.4 that the maximum value of VIF is 
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very low (1.48) and the mean 1.13. Therefore, the results of the VIF test confirm that the 
multiconllineaity problem does not exist in this model. 
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Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix for First Model. 
variables EMJOMO FLID FSIZE FPROF FDIVI FLEVE FISIN BSIZE BDUAL BMEET BINPEN MOWNE FOWNE INSTIT BLOCK 
EMJOMO 1.000               
FLID -0.022 1.000              
FSIZE -0.078** 0.018 1.000             
FPROF -0.003 0.032 0.013 1.000            
FDIVID 0.019 0.071* 0.068** 0.371** 1.000           
FLEVER -0.012** 0.542** 0.032 -0.156** 0.034** 1.000          
FISIN 0.026 -0.008 0.049* -0.021** 0.029 -0.023 1.000         
BSIZE -0.103** -0.010 0.271** 0.017 0.040 -0.026 0.040 1.000        
BDUAL 0.052 0.048 -0.019 -0.068** 0.009 -0.001 -0.102** -0.061* 1.000       
BMEET -0.035 0.029 0.062* 0.052* -0.029 -0.027 -0.084** 0.007 0.022 1.000      
BINDEP -0.006** 0.028 0.049* -0.007 0.062* 0.047* 0.009 0.415** 0.139** -0.081** 1.000     
MOWNE -0.017 -0.007 -0.066* -0.015 -0.025 0.036 -0.063* -0.117** 0.239** 0.016 0.083 1.000    
FOWNE -0.011 -0.010 0.001 -0.040 -0.017 -0.034 0.034 -0.014 0.013 0.006 -0.048 -0.009 1.000   
INSTITU -0.019 -0.073* 0.033 0.052* 0.021 -0.083** 0.024 0.055* -0.140** -0.049* 0.011 -0.170** -0.041 1.000  
BLOCKH -0.031 0.033 0.046 -0.082** -0.053* 0.019 -0.022 -0.010 0.035 -0.025 0.023 0.027 -0.028 -0.009 1.000 
EMJOMO= Discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM measured by using Jones model; EMMOJO= Discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM measured by using modifies Jones 
model; FLIDit= Forward-looking information disclosure score of company i in year t, expressed as % of total FLI disclosed out of all items. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of 
firm’s total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROA (net income before tax divided by total assets). FDIVID= dividend ratio measured as cash dividend divided by net 
income for the same period. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. FISIN= industry type, measured by the ISIN number, as stated by 
Jordanian Securities Depository Centre. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of board members. BDUAL= Board duality, a dummy variable, 1 if the CEO and 
chairman are the same person and 0 otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BINDEP= board independence, 
measured by the total number of outside directors. MOWNE= managerial ownership, measured by the percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the total 
number of shares. FOWNE= family ownership, measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the family; a dummy variable, 1 if a family or an individual holds 10% or more 
of equity and 0 otherwise. INSTITU= institutional ownership, measured by dummy variable, 1 if any institution-held shares and 0 otherwise. BLOCKH= blockholder ownership, 
measured by a dummy variable, 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares and 0 otherwise. 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01, **.   Correlation is significant at the 0.05, *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 
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Table 5.3: Correlation Matrix for Second Model. 
variables EMMOJO FLID FSIZE FPROF FDIVI FLEVE FISIN BSIZE BDUAL BMEET BINPEN MOWNE FOWNE INSTIT BLOCK 
EMMOJO 1.000               
FLID -0.022 1.000              
FSIZE -0.080** 0.018 1.000             
FPROF -0.011 0.032 0.013 1.000            
FDIVID 0.008 0.071* 0.068** 0.371** 1.000           
FLEVER -0.011* 0.542** 0.032 -0.156** 0.034 1.000          
FISIN 0.027 -0.008 0.049* -0.021** 0.029 -0.023 1.000         
BSIZE -0.101** -0.010 0.271** 0.017 0.040 -0.026 0.040 1.000        
BDUAL 0.036 0.048 -0.019 -0.068** 0.009 -0.001 -0.102** -0.061* 1.000       
BMEET -0.035 0.029 0.062* 0.052* -0.029 -0.027 -0.084** 0.007 0.022 1.000      
BINDEP -0.006** 0.028 0.049* -0.007 0.062* 0.047* 0.009 0.415** 0.139** -0.081** 1.000     
MOWNE -0.015 -0.007 -0.066* -0.015 -0.025 0.036 -0.063* -0.117** 0.239** 0.016 0.083 1.000    
FOWNE -0.010 -0.010 0.001 -0.040 -0.017 -0.034 0.034 -0.014 0.013 0.006 -0.048 -0.009 1.000   
INSTITU -0.009 -0.073* 0.033 0.052* 0.021 -0.083** 0.024 0.055* -0.140** -0.049* 0.011 -0.170 -0.041 1.000  
BLOCKH -0.025 0.033 0.046 -0.082** -0.053* 0.019 -0.022 -0.010 0.035 -0.025 0.023 0.027 -0.028 -0.009 1.000 
EMJOMO= Discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM measured by using Jones model; EMMOJO= Discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM measured by using modifies Jones 
model; FLIDit= Forward-looking information disclosure score of company i in year t, expressed as % of total FLI disclosed out of all items. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of 
firm’s total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROA (net income before tax divided by total assets). FDIVID= dividend ratio measured as cash dividend divided by net 
income for the same period. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. FISIN= industry type, measured by the ISIN number, as stated by 
Jordanian Securities Depository Centre. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of board members. BDUAL= Board duality, a dummy variable, 1 if the CEO and 
chairman are the same person and 0 otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BINDEP= board independence, 
measured by the total number of outside directors. MOWNE= managerial ownership, measured by the percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the total 
number of shares. FOWNE= family ownership, measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the family; a dummy variable, 1 if a family or an individual holds 10% or more 
of equity and 0 otherwise. INSTITU= institutional ownership, measured by dummy variable, 1 if any institution-held shares and 0 otherwise. BLOCKH= blockholder ownership, 
measured by a dummy variable, 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares and 0 otherwise. 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01, **.   Correlation is significant at the 0.05, *. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 
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  Table 5.4: VIF Test Results. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
FLEVER 1.48 0.677918 
FLID 1.43 0.701338 
FPROF 1.20 0.830574 
FDIVID 1.20 0.834394 
MOWNE 1.10 0.909320 
BDUAIL 1.10 0.909339 
BSIZE 1.09 0.913442 
FSIZE 1.09 0.913587 
INSTITU 1.06 0.945746 
BOLCKH 1.05 0.948349 
FISIN 1.03 0.947968 
BMEET 1.02 0.977192 
BINDEP 1.01 0.991238 
FOWNER 1.01 0.992831 
MEAN VIF                                     1.13 
 136 
 
5.4. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This section describes the panel regression analysis, the most common method of 
multivariate analysis. In order to test the study’s hypotheses, the relationship between FLID 
and EM practices is examined with cross-sectional panel regressions (e.g. Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera 2008; Peni and Vähämaa 2010). Panel data is considered an appropriate model 
for time-series studies because it distinguishes between various companies and time-series 
data, thus allowing researchers to remove any unobservable heterogeneity among the study’s 
sample (Himmelberg et al. 1999). However, some econometric issues that are related to panel 
data need to be considered. First, the Breusch and Pagan LM test was used to evaluate the 
model fit of both panel and pooled models. The result of the test is highly significant (P-
Value = 0.000), meaning that panel data is more appropriate (Gujarati 2008). However, panel 
data models can be classified into two methods, fixed and random effects, which helps in 
capturing the impact of companies and time-specific heterogeneities. The Hausman test 
performed to determine whether the random or fixed method is more appropriate. The 
outcome was not significant (P-Value = 0.2973) and hence the study could reject the null 
hypotheses (fixed effects) in favour of using the random effect method. 
The Pesaran CD test was employed to check whether this model has serial correlation. The 
test result was not statistically significant (P-Value = 0.3635), meaning that there is no serial 
correlation across entities. Furthermore, the Modified Wald test outcome (P-Value = 0.6018) 
indicated no heteroscedasticity in the study’s model (see Appendices 5A and B). 
The results of the random-effects panel regression analysis are presented in Table 5.5. The 
dependent variable is DA as a proxy for EM, while the independent variable is the level of 
FLID. The firm’s characteristics (size, profitability, leverage, dividend, industry type) and 
internal corporate governance (board size, duality, board meeting, board independence, 
family ownership, managerial ownership, blockholder ownership, and institution ownership) 
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are included in the regression models as control variables. The estimates are reported in two 
panels: in Panel A, the regression outcomes where the DA are measured with the original 
Jones model are reported; in Panel B shows the outcomes of the regressions where the DA 
are measured with the modified Jones model. As can be noted from Table 5.5, regression 
analysis reveals that the values of R2 overall for the two models are relatively small, 18.2% 
and 18.7%. The R2 value indicates that the combination of the independent variables 
demonstrate 18.2% and 18.7% of variation in the dependent variable. Nevertheless, it is 
worth mentioning that low R2 values are normal in this type of accrual regressions (Xie et al. 
2003a; Geiger and North 2006; Davidson III et al. 2007; Jenkins and Velury 2008; Peni and 
Vähämaa 2010). Table 5.5 also shows that the P-Value is highly significant (0.001) in the two 
panels, implying that this model is highly significant and thus has a good explanatory power 
of disclosure.  
The results of regression coefficients are presented in the same, Table 5.5, showing the 
impact of the level of FLID on EM practices. As expected, the regression results show that 
the coefficients of the level of FLID are negatively and significantly related to DA as proxy 
for EM, based on the Jones and modified Jones models (coef. = -.0531565, z = -2.13, p < 
0.033) (coef. = -.051607, z = -2.09, p < 0.037) respectively. These results confirm that the 
EM practices in Jordanian companies with higher levels of FLID are less than in those with a 
lower level. This result supports hypotheses H1, which proposes that there is a negative and 
significant relationship between the level of FLID and EM practices. Hence, H1 is accepted.  
This finding is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Lobo and Zhou 2001; Katmun 2012; 
MeilaniPurwanti 2013). For example, Lobo and Zhou (2001) and Katmun (2012) found that 
companies that disclose more information are less likely to be involved in EM behaviour. 
Agency theory suggests that a problem arises when both the agent and principal seek to 
maximize their own interests, which are not aligned. Asymmetry information is one of the 
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key factors leading to the agency problem of conflicting interests. Pursuant to agency theory, 
a company may use different methods, such as a compensation scheme or voluntary 
disclosure, to reduce conflicting interests between managers and owners as well as other 
stakeholders (Sun et al. 2010; An et al. 2011). In this regard, Li et al. (2008) stated that 
voluntary disclosure can reduce opportunistic action since it provides a more intensive 
monitoring tool for management. Consequently, there is a negative and significant 
relationship between corporate disclosure and EM behaviour. Thus, Jordanian companies that 
disclose more information are usually involved in EM and vice versa. Furthermore, the 
findings of the current study are consistent with the signalling theory’s assumption of a long-
term perspective, suggesting that companies with a high level of voluntary disclosure are not 
only concerned about increasing current profits and managers’ wealth, but are looking to 
create and improve a strong future relationship with shareholders (Singhvi and Desai 1971). 
Therefore, such companies will act in an accountable way when reporting financial 
information. This finding is not surprising since the Jordanian economy is private sector 
oriented; the owner-largest shareholder in Jordan, typically a founder or his immediate family 
usually involve in company management directly or indirectly and effects most of the 
manager’s decisions. 
Overall, since Davidson et al. (2004) view EM as one form of agency cost and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) view voluntary disclosure as one of the mechanisms mitigating agency cost, 
the present study employs agency theory and signalling theory to explain the negative 
relationship between the level of FLID and EM practices. 
With regard to the coefficients of the control variables, company size is significantly and 
negatively related to DA (coef. = -3.77e-11, z = -1.69, p < 0.092) (coef. = -3.77e-11, z = -
1.76, p < 0.078). This finding indicates that large firms tend to report lower levels of DA than  
smaller firms do. Consistent with this notion is that smaller firms are subject to less 
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supervision from authority and consequently have more opportunity to engage in EM 
practices (Klein 2002; Xie et al. 2003a; Kim et al. 2012; González and García-Meca 2014). 
Xie et al. (2003a) and González and García-Meca (2014) argued that smaller firms tend to 
show higher discretionary accruals because they might be working in a business environment 
that is subject to less pressure and regulatory supervision.  
With respect to the coefficient of a firm’s leverage ratio, the results (coef. = .0678708, z = 
2.88, p < 0.004) (coef. = .0686484, z = 2.95, p < 0.003) show a significant and positive 
relationship with DA. This suggests that Jordanian companies with higher leverage ratios 
report higher DA. A possible explanation for this relationship is that companies with higher 
leverage ratios have more motivation to report higher levels of EM, either to evade violation 
of lending contracts or to avoid special adverse effects on their debt rating (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994; Ali et al. 2010). These findings are similar to research that found a positive 
and significant association between the leverage ratio and EM practices (e.g. Prencipe et al. 
2008; Jiraporn and DaDalt 2009; González and García-Meca 2014; Wasiuzzaman et al. 
2015). This result supports the perspective of agency theory that companies with higher 
leverage ratio are more likely to practice EM in order to avoid agency costs. 
The coefficient of board size is negatively and significantly (coef. = -.0034116, z = -1.96, p < 
0.049) (coef. = -.0032643, z = -1.92, p < 0.054) associated with the magnitude of EM. This 
finding suggests that companies with a larger board size are more likely to report lower EM. 
This result is in accordance with the notion that larger boards of directors are more active in 
controlling and monitoring opportunistic managerial behaviour (Zahra and Pearce 1989). 
This finding is also consistent with previous studies, which found that board size is 
negatively linked to the level of EM practices (Xie et al. 2003a; Peasnell et al. 2005; Yu 
2006; Abed et al. 2012; González and García-Meca 2014). The results indicate that, in 
smaller boards, the dominance of blockholders or executive managers is expected, while 
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members from different backgrounds are normally found in larger boards. Therefore, a larger 
board size has better supervision of managers’ behaviour. 
Conversely, several studies conducted in Asia, such as Taiwan, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
documented that the size of the board of directors is positively and significantly correlated 
with the level of EM. For example, Kao and Chen (2004) and Rahman and Ali (2006) 
concluded that the size of the board is positively and significantly associated with EM. In 
spite of the comparable level of development of these countries with that of Jordan, boards in 
Jordan have essentially different characteristics, reflecting culture, political and economic 
aims and practices of corporate goverance. 
Concerning board duality, there is a positive and significant relationship (coef. = .0226021, z 
= 2.18, p < 0.030) (coef. = .0190903, z = 1.88, p < 0.060) between this and the level of EM. 
The results indicate that the monitoring ability of the board of directors is less if the CEO is 
also chairman of the board (Gulzar 2011). This finding is in line with agency theory: the 
separation of CEO and chairman increases the board’s independence from management, 
which leads to better monitoring and overseeing (Jensen 1993). This result is in line with 
other studies, such as by Klein (2002) and Sarkar et al. (2008), who found that EM measured 
by DA is positively associated with CEO duality. The findings of this study support the 
agency theory perspective that a CEO with excessive power over the board can easily 
manipulate earnings. 
The coefficient of board independence is significantly and negatively (coef. = -.0130739, z = 
-2.77, p < 0.006) (coef. = -.0121338, z = -2.62, p < 0.009) associated with EM practices. 
This finding implies that companies with a higher proportion of outside directors have a 
greater likelihood of reporting lower DA, and is thereby consistent with agency theory that 
assumes that a board’s independence is determined by independent directors. Previous studies 
also found that a board with a higher proportion of outside directors is better able to control 
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EM practices (Klein 2002; Xie et al. 2003a; Davidson et al. 2005; Dimitropoulos and 
Asteriou 2010; Riro 2013; González and García-Meca 2014). These findings indicate that 
board’s characteristics is considered as monitoring mechanism in constraining EM practices 
in Jordanian companies. 
In relation to managerial ownership structure, the assumption of agency theory is that more 
insider ownership offers a better mechanism for corporate governance, which leads to 
enhanced quality of financial reporting (Sánchez and Meca 2005). From the analysis of the 
regression, it is evident that the coefficient of managerial ownership is negatively and 
significantly (coef. = -.0756744, z = -1.69, p < 0.071) (coef. = -.0798562, z = -1.67, p < 
0.073) related to DA. This finding confirms that the managerial ownership among Jordanian 
companies is considered as an influential factor on EM. One of the explanation for this 
negative relationship is that; family or identifiable group own the majority of Jordanian 
companies, meaning that managers and owners may have a stronger relationship. This 
relationship helps in aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Thus, 
managerial ownership can be seen as a mechanism to constrain EM activity among Jordanian 
companies. The results are consistent with Peasnell et al. (2005) and Alves (2012), who 
found that a higher level of managerial ownership is related to a low level of EM, agreeing 
with agency theory. 
The coefficient of blockholder ownership is found to be significantly and positively (coef. 
= .010589, z = 1.82, p < 0.067) (coef. = .012917, z = 1.85, p < 0.065) associated with EM. 
These findings are in line with the notion that a majority of stockholders may connive with 
executives against a minority of shareholders in order to increase their own interests (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997). The result confirms the work of Zhong et al. (2007), who found a positive 
relationship between blockholder ownership and the level of DA. 
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None of the coefficients of control variables (profitability, dividend, industry type, board 
meeting numbers, institutional ownership and family ownership) is statistically significantly 
related to DA, suggesting that these variables do not affect the magnitude of DA. The 
company profitability coefficient is insignificant, consistent with findings of Sun et al. (2010) 
who reported an insignificant relationship between a firm’s profitability and EM. The result 
of the coefficient of board meeting numbers is also consistent with previous studies (Ebrahim 
2007; Habbash 2010) which found an insignificant association between the numbers of 
meetings and EM practices. The insignificance of the coefficient of family and institutional 
ownership, these findings are in line with González and García-Meca (2014), who found no 
relationship between family-controlled companies and the value of DA. Chung et al. (2002) 
examined the association between institutional ownership and EM and their findings indicate 
that institutional ownership has no significant effect on EM.   
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Table 5.5 Panel A: Association between the level of FLID and EM practices, based on 
original Jones model (1991). 
Dependent Variable: EM       
Method: Random-effects GLS regression. 
Sample: 201 
Group variable: Company 
Number of groups: 6 
Number of observations: 1206 
EMJOMO Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
FLID -.0531565 .0250026 -2.13 0.033** -.1021606 -.004152 
3FSIZE -3.77e-11 2.14e-11 -1.69 0.092* -7.93e-11 5.95e-12 
FPROF -.0202059 .0289686 -0.70 0.485 -.0769833 .0365715 
FDIVID .00756 .0115475 0.65 0.513 -.0150727 .0301927 
FLEVER .0678708 .0235362 2.88 0.004*** .0217407 .114001 
FISIN 6.92e-12 8.45e-12 0.82 0.413 -9.65e-12 2.35e-11 
BSIZE -.0034116 .0017367 -1.96 0.049** -.0068154 -7.76e-06 
BDUAL .0226021 .0103837 2.18 0.030** .0022505 .0429537 
BMEET -.0017308 .0017332 -1.00 0.318 -.0051279 .0016663 
BINDEP -.0130739 .0047264 -2.77 0.006*** -.0223374 -.003810 
MOWNE -.0756744 .0474862 -1.69 0.071* -.1687456 .0173968 
FOWNE -.0000682 .0001155 -0.59 0.555 -.0002946 .0001582 
INSTITU -.0036966 .0155865 -0.24 0.813 -.0342455 .0268523 
BLOCKH .010589 .0071064 1.82 0.067* -.0028694 .0249871 
_ cons .1162854 .0377028 3.08 0.002 .0423894 .1901815 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.182 
0.0000 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 Following previous studies company’s size is measured by using the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
year-end (Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; Samaha et al. 2012; Wang and Hussainey 2013). 
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Panel B: Association between the level of FLID and EM practices, based on modified 
Jones model (1995). 
EMMOJO Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
FLID -.051607 .0246873 -2.09 0.037** -.0999933 -.0032208 
FSIZE -3.77e-11 2.14e-11 -1.76 0.078* -7.97e-11 4.24e-12 
FPROF -.0245732   .0285813 -0.86 0.390 -.0805915 .0314451 
FDIVID .0037929 .011389 0.33 0.739 -.018529 .0261149 
FLEVER .0686484 .0232395 2.95 0.003*** .0230998 .1141969 
FISIN 6.92e-12 8.22e-12 0.84 0.400 -9.19e-12 2.30e-11 
BSIZE -.0032643 .0016957 -1.92 0.054** -.0065878 .0000593 
BDUAL .0190903 .0101466 1.88 0.060* -.0007968 .0389773 
BMEET -.0016189 .0017013 -0.95 0.341 -.0049533 .0017155 
BINDEP -.0121338 .0046385 -2.62 0.009*** -.0212251 -.0030424 
MOWNE -.0798562 .0464742 -1.67 0.073* -.160944 .0212317 
FOWNE -.00007 .0001141 -0.61 0.540 -.0002936 .0001536 
INSTITUT -.0002161 .0152067 -0.01 0.989 -.0300207 .0295886 
BLOCKH .012917 .0069969 1.85 0.065** -.0007967 .0266307 
_ cons .1105494 .0367691 3.01 0.003 .0384833 .1826155 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.187 
0.0001 
     
EMJOMO= Discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM measured by using Jones model; EMMOJO= 
Discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM measured by using modifies Jones model; FLIDit= Forward-looking 
information disclosure score of company i in year t, expressed as % of total FLI disclosed out of all items. 
FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROA (net income 
before tax divided by total assets). FDIVID= dividend ratio measured as cash dividend divided by net income 
for the same period. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
FISIN= industry type, measured by the ISIN number, as stated by Jordanian Securities Depository Centre. 
BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of board members. BDUAL= Board duality, a dummy 
variable, 1 if the CEO and chairman are the same person and 0 otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, the 
number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BINDEP= board independence, measured by the 
total number of outside directors. MOWNE= managerial ownership, measured by the percentage of total 
shares held by executive directors divided by the total number of shares. FOWNE= family ownership, 
measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the family; a dummy variable, 1 if a family or an 
individual holds 10% or more of equity and 0 otherwise. INSTITU= institutional ownership, measured by 
dummy variable, 1 if any institution-held shares and 0 otherwise. BLOCKH= blockholder ownership, measured 
by a dummy variable, 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares 
and 0 otherwise. 
***. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01, **.   Coefficient is significant at the 0.05, *. Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 
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5.5. ALTERNATIVE MEASUREMENT OF DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
Both Jones models are applied in the current study as primary models, since the findings of 
previous EM studies reveal that they have greater explanatory power than other models (Iqbal 
et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2013; Islam et al. 2014). However, based on previous 
studies (Kothari et al. 2005; Sun et al. 2010; Katmun 2012), the Performance-Matched 
Kothari (2005) model (PM) was chosen as a secondary model for its better explanatory power 
than other models in measuring EM, to examine whether alternative measurement of DA 
affects the primary results or not. The PM model is generally considered one of the most 
effective and useful techniques for detecting DA (e.g. Kothari et al. 2005; Chang and Sun 
2010; Katmun 2012). This study uses the absolute value of DA rather than signed DA, 
because it is interested in capturing the extent of EM, and using signed DA does not alter the 
outcomes of the analysis (Raman and Shahrur 2008; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010). The 
absolute value of the residual obtained from the PM as the dependent variable is applied as a 
different measure of EM practices. The results of the coefficient of FLID and other control 
variables on DA, based on the PM model, are presented in Table 5.6. The regression analysis 
reveals that the overall R2 value is around 11%, which is comparable to the results obtained 
by (Xie et al. 2003a; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010). Although the R2 value is lower than 
that obtained from the main models (Table 5.5 panels A and B), the result of the test is highly 
significant (P-Value = 0.001). 
The coefficient of the level of FLID is negatively and significantly (coef. = -.044843, z = -
1.84, p < 0.066) associated with EM practices. This result is consistent with the primary 
results reported in Table 5.5 panels A and B, suggesting that companies which disclose a high 
level of FLID report lower levels of EM. In respect of the control variables, the leverage ratio 
coefficient is positively and significantly (coef. = .0579144, z = 2.53, p < 0.012) related to 
DA, implying that companies with a higher leverage ratio are more likely to engage in EM 
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actions. This result is in line with the earlier results presented in the Table 5.5 panels A and 
B, and  is similar to previous studies that found a positive relationship between the leverage 
ratio and EM practices (Prencipe et al. 2008; Jiraporn and DaDalt 2009; González and 
García-Meca 2014). 
The coefficient of board size is negatively and significantly (coef. = -.003206, z = -1.73, p < 
0.083) associated to the degree of EM. This finding suggests that companies with large 
boards are more likely to report lower EM, consistent with the primary results. On the other 
hand, the coefficient of board duality is positively and significantly (coef. = .0168839, z = 
1.67, p < 0.094) related to DA. In the light of the above discussion, the results of the effect of 
FLID and some of control variables on EM using the PM model (as an alternative measure 
for EM), are consistent with the main findings presented in Table 5.5 panels A and B. This 
suggests that the main results are reliable and robust under different types of EM 
measurement and are not affected by the different measurements of DA.  
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Table 5.6: Association between the level of FLID and EM practices based on Performance-
Matched Kothari (2005) Model.  
Dependent Variable: EM       
Method: Random-effects GLS regression. 
Sample: 201 
Group variable: Company 
Number of groups: 6 
Number of observations: 1206 
EMPM Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
FLID -.044843 .0243548 -1.84 0.066* -.0925775 .0028915 
FZISE -3.43e-11 2.47e-11 -1.39 0.166 -8.27e-11 1.42e-11 
FPROF -.0155894 .0281464 -0.55 0.580 -.0707554 .0395766 
FDIVID .0008055 .0112311 0.07 0.943 -.021207 .022818 
FLEVER  .0579144 .0229227 2.53 0.012*** .0129867 .1028421 
FISIN 1.20e-11 8.02e-12 1.50 0.135 -3.73e-12 2.77e-11 
BSIZE -.003206 .0018486 -1.73 0.083* -.0068291 .0004171 
BDUAL .0168839 .0100854 1.67 0.094* -.0028832 .036651 
BMEET -.0008686 .0016749 -0.52 0.604 -.0041513 .0024142 
BINDEP .0007639 .0035659 0.21 0.830 -.0062252 .0077529 
MOWNE -.0542585 .0457951 -1.18 0.236 -.1440154 .0354983 
FOWNE -.0000901 .0001125 -0.80 0.424 -.0003106 .0001305 
INSTITU -.0038281 .0148836 -0.26 0.797 -.0329994 .0253432 
BLOCKH .0091849 .0068872 1.33 0.182 -.0043138 .0226836 
_ cons .0789629 .0357584 2.21 0.027 .0088778 .1490481 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.113 
0.001 
     
EMPM= Discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM measured using performance-matched Kothari model. FLIDit= 
Forward-looking information disclosure score of company i in year t, expressed as % of total FLI disclosed out 
of all items. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural log of firm’s total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROA 
(net income before tax divided by total assets). FDIVID= dividend ratio measured as cash dividend divided by 
net income for the same period. FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total long-term debt divided by total 
assets. FISIN= industry type, measured by the ISIN number, as stated by Jordanian Securities Depository 
Centre. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of board members. BDUAL= Board duality, a 
dummy variable, 1 if the CEO and chairman are the same person and 0 otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, 
the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BINDEP= board independence, measured by 
the total number of outside directors. MOWNE= managerial ownership, measured by the percentage of total 
shares held by executive directors divided by the total number of shares. FOWNE= family ownership, 
measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the family; a dummy variable, 1 if a family or an 
individual holds 10% or more of equity and 0 otherwise. INSTITU= institutional ownership, measured by 
dummy variable, 1 if any institution-held shares and 0 otherwise. BLOCKH= blockholder ownership, measured 
by a dummy variable, 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares 
and 0 otherwise. 
***. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01, **.   Coefficient is significant at the 0.05, *. Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 
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5.6. DEALING WITH ENDOGENEITY 
The endogeneity problem occurs when independent variables are connected to error terms 
(Reeb et al. 2012). Endogeneity has three main components: omitted variable, measurement 
error and simultaneity (Brown and Hillegeist 2007; Reeb et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2013). 
Previous studies have reported that models of corporate disclosure and EM suffer from this 
problem (Lobo and Zhou 2001; Cornett et al. 2008; Choi et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2013). The 
common form of endogeneity in the relationship between voluntary disclosure and EM is that 
of simultaneity, which arises when both variables are determined either by external factors 
such as legal effects, rules and regulations concerning the market for corporate control, or by 
internal aspects such as managers’ overall policies (McKnight and Weir 2009; Choi et al. 
2010). Al Farooque et al. (2010) reported that the interaction between the dependent variable 
and explanatory variables may arise in one of three circumstances: first, direct association, 
where independent variables may have a positive or negative significant relationship to the 
dependent variable; second, reverse causality, where the dependent variable is positively or 
negatively related to independent variables; and third, a bi-directional or simultaneity 
relationship, where both dependent and independent variables are positively or negatively 
associated at the same time (simultaneously). Consequently, ignoring the simultaneity 
problem might lead to inconsistent, inefficient and biased inferences when addressing the 
association between voluntary disclosure and EM (McKnight and Weir 2009). In order to 
address the endogeneity problem, two options have been suggested for solving the bias. The 
first uses instrumental variables (IV) (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Himmelberg et al. 1999; 
Coles et al. 2008; McKnight and Weir 2009; Choi et al. 2010) and the second a simultaneous 
system equation (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Cornett et al. 2008; Coles et al. 2008; Al 
Farooque et al. 2010). Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Coles et al. (2008) have used both 
options and obtained similar results. This study addresses this problem by using the lagged 
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values of the endogenous independent variable FLID as an IV to examine whether the 
simultaneity problem affects the association between FLID and EM.  
Both Durbin and Hausman tests were run to check whether bias for the endogenous and 
independent variables exists (Gujarati 2008). The tests gave X2 of 13.68 % and 13.79% (P= 
0.0002, P=0.0002) respectively, which suggests that the null hypothesis of no endogeneity 
between FLID as the independent variable and EM as the dependent variable is rejected. 
Thus, the presence of this problem might be affecting the results, making ineffective, biased 
and inconsistent. Therefore, the instrumental variable two-stage regression model is used to 
control for the endogeneity (simultaneity) problem. The results of the two-stage (2SLS) 
regression of FLID on EM are presented in Table 5.7 panels A and B. After controlling for 
the simultaneity, the coefficient of FLID is significant and negatively (coef. = -.078956, z = -
2.68, p < 0.007) (coef. -.0766124, z = -2.65, p < 0.008) related to EM practices. These results 
suggest that companies with a higher level of FLID tend to report less EM. This finding is in 
line with results of the panel regression random effect model reported in Table 5.5, panels A 
and B, although the level of significance is higher than in the previous results. Furthermore, 
this result is consistent with the findings of Jaggi et al. (2009) and Choi et al. (2010) who 
found a negative simultaneity relation between quality of financial reporting and EM. 
Regarding the control variables, the results show similar outcomes, which suggests that these 
results are consistent with the main findings in Table 5.5 panels A and B. However, some 
coefficient values show a lower level of significance, although the direction and significance 
of the association with EM remain the same. 
In summary, the instrumental variable two-stage model results are consistent with the 
primary results presented in Table 5.5 panels A and B, showing that the simultaneity problem 
between FLID and EM does not affect the main results of FLID and other control variables 
on EM actions. 
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Table 5.7 Panel A: Instrumental variables Two-Stage regression model based on Jones 
model (1991) (using linear regression model). 
EMJOMO Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
LFLID -.078956 .0294212 -2.68 0.007*** -.1366205 -.0212915 
FSIZE -3.77e-11 2.14e-11 -1.76 0.078* -7.97e-11 4.24e-12 
FPROF -.0220118 .0288726 -0.76 0.446 -.0786587 .0346351 
FDIVID .0034032 .0113925 0.30 0.765 -.0189484 .0257548 
FLEVER .0718027 .024028 2.99 0.003*** .0246608 .1189445 
FISIN 6.80e-12 6.19e-12 1.10 0.273 -5.35e-12 1.90e-11 
BSIZE -.0041379 .001368 -3.02 0.003*** -.0068219 -.0014538 
BDUAL .0131983 .0083063 1.59 0.112 -.0030982 .0294948 
BMEET -.0017366 .0015155 -1.15 0.252 -.0047099 .0012367 
BINDEP -.0140927 .0041219 -3.42 0.001*** -.0221797 -.0060057 
MOWNE -.0476752 .0390719 -1.22 0.223 -.1243326 .0289822 
FOWNE -.0000769 .0001181 -0.65 0.515 -.0003087 .0001549 
INSTITU -.0017934 .0121045 -0.15 0.882 -.025542 .0219552 
BLOCKH .011109 .0066954 1.66 0.097* -.0020272 .0242451 
_ cons .1239826 .0294231 4.84 0.000 .0662557 .1817095 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.1168 
0.0039 
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Panel B: Instrumental variables Two-Stage (2SLS) regression model based on modified 
Jones Model (1995) (using linear regression model). 
EMMOJO Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
LFLID -.0766124 028945 -2.65 0.008*** -.1333436 -.0198812 
FSIZE -3.67e-11 2.17e-11 -1.69 0.092* -7.93e-11 5.95e-12 
FPROF -.016051 .0293374 -0.55 0.584 -.0736097 .0415078 
FDIVID .0070739 .0115759 0.61 0.541 -.0156374 .0297853 
FLEVER .0717716 .0244147 2.94 0.003*** .0238709 .1196723 
FISIN 6.85e-12 6.29e-12 1.09 0.277 -5.50e-12 1.92e-11 
BSIZE -.0043286 .0013901 -3.11 0.002*** -.0070558 -.0016014 
BDUAL .0179856 .00844 2.13 0.033** .0014268 .0345445 
BMEET -.0018328 .0015399 -1.19 0.234 -.004854 .0011884 
BINDEP -.0150453 .0041882 -3.59 0.000*** -.0232624 -.0068281 
MOWNE -.0583563 .0397008 -1.47 0.142 -.1362476 .0195351 
FOWNE -.0000749 .00012 -0.62 0.533 -.0003104 .0001606 
INSTITUT -.0058797 .0122994 -0.48 0.633 -.0300106 .0182511 
BLOCKH .0091682 .0068032 1.35   0.178 -.0041794 .0225158 
_ cons .1297682 .0298967 4.34 0.000 .0711121 .1884243 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.1149 
0.0045 
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5.7. SUMMARY 
This chapter reports the empirical results on the relationship between FLID and EM in the 
non-financial Jordanian companies, 2008 to 2013. The literature suggested two viewpoints on 
the association between FLID and EM: managerial opportunism and long-term perspectives 
(e.g. Choi et al. 2013). 
Managerial opportunism suggests that companies might be strategically using FLID to cover 
their opportunistic EM actions. In such cases, FLID is used as an entrenchment instrument to 
hide this opportunistic performance and to defend companies’ managers against shareholders’ 
potential attention and reaction. In line with this view, several empirical studies have shown a 
positive and significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and EM (Kasznik 1999; 
Jog and McConomy 2003; Prior et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, the long-term perspective suggests that companies with a high level of 
voluntary disclosure are not only concerned about increasing current profits and managers’ 
wealth but are also looking to create and improve a strong future relationship with 
shareholders. Therefore, such companies will act in an accountable way when reporting 
financial information. Empirical studies confirm a negative relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and EM (Lobo and Zhou 2001; Jo and Kim 2007; Hribar and Yang 2010; Katmun 
2012; Yadollah et al. 2012). 
Two measurements for EM are used in this chapter to examine the association between FLID 
and EM practices, the Jones and modified Jones models. Further analysis is performed by 
using the PM model to compare and confirm that the main results are consistent and robust. 
In general, the results are in line with the long-term viewpoint, which proposes a negative 
relationship between FLID and EM. 
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The results presented in this chapter are thus in line with agency and signalling theories (the 
long-term perspective), which suggest that FLID is essential in reducing information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders, when the interests of the two groups 
conflict, and implying that Jordanian companies that disclose a high level of FLID are more 
focused in their relationships with stakeholders and less likely to engage in EM practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 154 
 
CHAPTER SIX: CEOS’ CHARACTERISTICS AND FLID: RESULTS 
AND DISCUSSION 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the findings of the data analysis based on the study methods detailed in 
the methodology chapter. Tests are performed to achieve the following research objective: 
To investigate the relationship between CEOs’ personal characteristics and the level of 
FLID among non-financial Jordanian companies. 
The chapter is organized as follows: section 6.2 discusses the descriptive statistics, while 
section 6.3 deals with the multicollinearity problem. Section 6.4 summarizes and critically 
discusses the examination of the hypotheses, and section 6.5 the additional analysis. Section 
6.6 is a concluding discussion.  
6.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 6.1 shows key descriptive statistical analysis for all variables in the full sample. The 
descriptive statistics reveal that the minimum value of FLID rate is 0% and the maximum is 
78%, which indicates a considerable dispersion. The mean value of 31.14% shows a low 
level of FLID across the companies. These results are closer to the findings of Aljifri and 
Hussainey (2007), who found that the minimum and maximum values of FLID among UAE 
companies are 0% and 70% respectively. However, these figures are higher than those of 
Wang and Hussainey’s (2013) UK study, which reports values of 0%, and 45%. The mean 
value is less than those reported by Sartawi et al. (2014), who found that the average value of 
voluntary disclosure among industrial and service sectors in Jordanian companies over the 
year 2012 was 49% and 44% respectively. This study used the median value of 33% as a 
benchmark to classify the high and low levels of FLID, similar to Menicucci (2013) figure of 
32.5% for Italian listed companies. However, this figure is higher than those of Al-Shammari 
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and Al-Sultan (2010); Chau and Gray (2010); Mathuva (2012); Uyar and Kilic (2012) and 
Bozanic et al. (2013b), who found that average values of FLID scores in Kuwait, Hong Kong, 
Nairobi Securities Exchange, Turkish and US companies of 19%, 16.42%, 18.2%, 17.8%, 
and 31.4% respectively. Conversely, the median figure of the present study is lower than the 
averages of 50.46%, 47%, 44%, and 63% reported for Finnish, Bangladeshi, Turkish and 
Jordanian companies respectively (Nalikka 2009; Rouf and Al Harun 2011; Uyar et al. 2013; 
Sartawi et al. 2014). As mentioned previously, the government of Jordan has introduced 
several  accounting reforms with the aim of introducing new securities exchange laws and 
corporate disclosure practices. This comparison implies that Jordanian companies follow 
these reforms and they are more likely to have a higher level of FLID compared with those of 
other countries. In other words, the findings indicate that Jordanian companies are more 
likely to improve the quality of their financial reports by extending the level of FLID.  
Concerning the CEO’s age, the mean value is 51.11 with minimum and maximum ages of 26 
and 84 years. These findings are quite similar to Sartawi et al. (2014), who reported that the 
minimum and maximum ages of directors of Jordanian companies are 28 and 83 years 
respectively. In the present study, the median value age is 51 years, similar to the UK 
findings of Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) who report an average of CEO age is 54 years. 
Following previous studies, for example Lin et al. (2014), this study has used the median age 
as a cut-off point to classify older and younger CEOs. However, this figure is inconsistent 
with Davidson III et al. (2007), who documented that the mean value of CEO’s age in US 
companies is 62. In addition, the descriptive results show that 95% of the sample companies 
are managed by male CEOs and 5% are managed by female CEOs. This is an interesting 
finding, similar to the 5% obtained in Ireland, New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates 
(Grant Thornton International Business Report 2012), and quite close to the percentages for 
the USA and UK (6% females in both countries), but higher than the 3% in Japan, Brazil and 
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Botswana. This finding is expected since the majority of Jordanian companies are owned by 
families. As in this study, Sartawi et al. (2014) found that the percentage of female directors 
of Jordanian companies is 5%. Table 6.1 also shows that 43.54% and 29% of CEOs were 
overconfident about their company’s performance based on net buyer and financial leverage 
ratio respectively. This result is higher than the average of 11% reported for a sample of 572 
companies listed in the Fortune 500 over the period 2000-2004 (Hribar and Yang 2010) and 
400 UK companies (Andriosopoulos et al. 2013). However, the average reported in this study 
is less than the average 44% reported by Hribar and Yang (2015). The company size values 
vary widely from .93e+03 to 3.23e+09. The descriptive results reveal that profitability varies 
from -85.90% (loss) to 95% (profit), with standard deviation of 12.17%. The mean value of 
industry type indicates that 36.18% of the companies in the study operate in the industrial 
sector. Table 6.1 also shows that the average value of dividend ratio is 18.82%, with 
minimum and maximum values of 0 and 0.9751 respectively. Correspondingly, the median 
value is 0 with standard deviation of 30.77%.  
Concerning the other control variables, board size has a mean value 8.011, which is 
consistent with other studies (Peasnell et al. 2005; Sartawi et al. 2014). However, the 
maximum board size is 19 members, which indicates that, in general, Jordanian firms do not 
follow the corporate governance, code number (15), which recommends that board size 
should be no more than 13 members. A dummy variable of board duality has a mean of 
20.5%. This figure is lower than the average reported by Chau and Gray (2010), who found 
that the mean value among Hong Kong listed companies is 54%. Numbers of meeting and 
board independence have mean values of 7.572 and 2.020 respectively. Concerning 
ownership structure, managerial and family ownership have 3.5% and 61.2% mean values 
respectively, while institutions and blockholders are 35.5% and 48.92%. 
 157 
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of FLID and CEOs characteristics. 
Variable N Minim Maxim Mean Median STAN-DEV 
FLID 1206 0.000 0.780 0.311 0.330 0.1844 
CAGE 1206 26 84 51.11 51.00 11.266 
CGEND 1206 0 1 0.953 1 0.2105 
COVE 1206 0 1 0.4354 0.000 0.4911 
FLEVER 1206 0.0002 0.97808 0.2950135 0.240055 0.2320937 
4FSIZE 1206 .93e+03 3.23e+09 5.55e+07 1.87e+07 1.57e+08 
FPROF 1206 -0.85904 0.9500 0.0012302 0.01109 .1217121 
FDIVID 1206 0 0.9751 0.1882211 0 0.307755 
FISIN 1206 1 201 .3631841 101 .481111 
BSIZE 1206 3 19 8.011 7 2.4494 
BDUAL 1206 0 1 .2056 0 .40433 
BMEET 1206 3 28 7.5729 7 2.1378 
BINDEP 1206 0 8 2.0207 2 1.2345 
MOWNE 1206 0 .7185 .03528 0 .08595 
FOWNE 1206 0 .9450 0.6127 .15472 .27206 
INSTITU 1206 0 1 .35547 .3320 .76537 
BLOCKH 1206 0 1 .48922 0 .50009 
FLIDit= Forward-looking disclosure index of the company i in the year t, expressed as % total FLID out of all items. 
CAGE= CEO’s age, measured by the difference between the CEO’s date of birth and years of the study period. CGEND= 
CEO’s gender, 1 CEO male, and 0 if female. COVER= CEO overconfidence, measured by net buyer method; the proportion 
of CEO share ownership, options, and stock exercise. FLEVER= leverage ratio used as another proxy for CEO 
overconfidence, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural logarithm of firm’s 
total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROI (net income before tax divided be total assets). FDIVID= dividends 
ratio measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same period. FISIN= industry type, measured by using the 
ISIN number, as stated by Jordanian Securities Depository Centre. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of 
the board. BDUAL= Board duality, a dummy variable that takes the value 1if the CEO and chairman are the same person 
and 0 otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BINDEP= 
board independence, measured by the total number of outside directors. MOWNE= managerial ownership, measured by the 
percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the total number of shares. FOWNE= family ownership, 
measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the family, a dummy variable 1 if a family or an individual holds 10% 
or more of equity 0 otherwise. INSTITU = institution ownership, measured by dummy variable 1if any institution held 
shares and 0 otherwise. BLOCKH= block-holders ownership, measured by a dummy variable that 1 if the firm has an 
external stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares, and the value of 0 otherwise. 
 
                                                     
4 Following previous studies company’s size is measured by using the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
year-end (Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; Samaha et al. 2012; Wang and Hussainey 2013). 
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6.3. MULTICOLLINEARITY 
Before conducting the regression analysis, the present study tested whether there was a 
multicollinearity problem in the model used to examine the effect of CEOs’ personal 
characteristics on FLID. As described in the previous chapter (section 5.3), the correlation 
coefficients matrix and VIF with tolerance values were used. There has been no agreement 
among researchers regarding the cut-off correlation percentage (Alsaeed 2006). For example, 
Gujarati (2003, 2008), suggests that the coefficient of ± 80% is considered as a starting point 
while Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) accept ± 70%. Table 6.2 shows that the highest 
correlation is between board independence and board size with a coefficient of 41.50%. The 
correlation matrix indicates that no Pearson’s coefficient is more than 70%. Therefore, there 
is no multicollinearity problem among the explanatory variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 
2001; Gujarati 2008). Table 6.3 shows the VIF coefficients of each independent variable, and 
the range from 1.36 to 1.01 is below 10  (Gujarati (2003, 2008), confirming that the 
multicollinearity problem does not exist among the independent variables in this study.
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Table 6.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix: CEOs’ Characteristics and all Control Variables. 
variables CAGE CGEND COVER FSIZE FPROF FDIVID FLEVE FISIN BSIZE BDUAL BMEET BINPEN MOWNE FOWNE INSTIT BLOCK 
CAGE 1.000                
CGEND 0.073** 1.000               
COVER -0.148** -0.018 1.000              
FSIZE 0.020 0.025 0.017 1.000             
FPROF 0.016 -0.008 -0.007 0.013 1.000            
FDIVID 0.092** -0.024 0.117** 0.068** 0.371** 1.000           
FLEVER -0.152** 0.082** 0.206** 0.032 -0.156** 0.034 1.000          
FISIN -0.012 -0.137** 0.009 0.049* -0.021** 0.029 -0.023 1.000         
BSIZE -0.012 -0.047 0.005 0.271** 0.017 0.040 0.026 0.040 1.000        
BDUAL 0.010 0.005 -0.077** -0.019 -0.068** 0.009 -0.001 -0.102** -0.061* 1.000       
BMEET -0.024 0.022 -0.012 0.062* 0.052* -0.029 -0.027 -0.084** 0.007 0.022 1.000      
BINDEP 0.034 -0.130** 0.012 0.049* -0.007 0.062* 0.047* 0.009 0.415** 0.139** -0.081** 1.000     
MOWNE -0.038 -0.030 -0.032 -0.066* -0.015 -0.025 0.036 -0.063* -0.117** 0.239** 0.016 0.083 1.000    
FOWNE -0.034 0.007 0.035 0.001 -0.040 -0.017 -0.034 0.034 -0.014 -0.013 0.006 -0.048 -0.009 1.000   
INSTITU 0.042 0.064* -0.033 0.033 0.052* 0.021 -0.083** 0.024 0.055* -0.139** -0.049* 0.011 -0.170 -0.041 1.000  
BLOCKH 0.008 0.011 0.006 0.046 -0.082** -0.053* 0.019 -0.022 -0.010 0.035 -0.025 0.023 0.027 -0.028 -0.009 1.000 
CAGE= CEO’s age, measured by the difference between the CEO’s date of birth and year of the study period. CGEND= CEO’s gender, take value 1if CEO male, and 0 if female. COVER= CEO 
overconfidence, the proportion of CEO share ownership, options, and stock exercise. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROI (net income 
before tax divided be total assets). FDIVID= dividends ratio measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same period. FLEVER= leverage ratio used as another proxy for CEO overconfidence, 
measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. FISIN= industry type, measured by using the ISIN code, as stated by Jordanian Securities Depository Centre. BSIZE= board size, measured by the 
total numbers of the board. BDUAL= Board duality, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO and chairperson are the same person and zero if otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, the number 
of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BINDEP= board independence, measured by the total number of outside directors. MOWNE= managerial ownership. Measured by the percentage of total 
shares held by executive directors divided by the total number of shares. FOWNE= family ownership, Measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the family, a dummy variable would take one if a 
family or an individual holds 10% or more of equity and the value zero if otherwise. INSTITU = institutional ownership, measured by dummy variable would take one if any institutional held shares and zero 
if otherwise.  BLOCKH= block-holders ownership, measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has an external stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares, and the 
value of zero if otherwise.       
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01, **.   Correlation is significant at the 0.05, *.   Correlation is significant at the 0.10 
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Table 6.3: VIF test results. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
BSIZE 1.36 0.735871 
BINDEP 1.31 0.765823 
FPROF 1.22 0.816691 
FDIVID 1.22 0.887376 
BDUAIL 1.13 0.909320 
FLEVER 1.12 0.892108 
MOWNE 1.12 0.896686 
FSIZE 1.10 0.909160 
COVER 1.10 0.912060 
CAGE 1.07 0.936515 
FOWNER 1.06 0.942859 
CGEND 1.04 0.958167 
FISIN 1.04 0.960483 
BMEET 1.03 0.970041 
INSTITU 1.01 0.987370 
BLOCKH 1.01 0.990753 
MEAN VIF                                                                                            1.12 
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6.4. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The current study used panel data to examine the influence of CEOs’ personal characteristics 
on the level of FLID. As explained in the previous chapter, panel data models can be either 
random or fixed effect to capture the impact of companies and time-specific heterogeneities. 
The study performed Hausman test; the test outcome is not statistically significant (P-Value 
= 81.09%), so random effect models are preferred (see Appendix 6A). The Pesaran CD test 
was employed to check whether the model has a serial correlation, and the result is not 
statistically significant (P-Value = 52.34%). The Modified Wald test outcome (P-Value = 
63.57%) indicated no heteroscedasticity in the study’s model.  
In Table 6.4, the estimates are presented in two panels: panel A reports the results for the 
regressions where overconfidence is measured using the net buyer method, and panel B the 
leverage ratio. The combination of the independent variables R2 demonstrates 25.69%, and 
23.45% of variation on the dependent variable respectively. R2 values are higher than the 
18% reported by (Hribar and Yang 2015). The P-Value is highly significant at the level (P < 
0.001), implying that the model has good explanatory power of disclosure (see Appendix 
6B). The results reported in both panels of Table 6.4 support hypothesis H2, which proposes 
a negative significant relationship between CEO’s age and the level of FLID. The coefficient 
of age is negatively and significantly (coef. = -.0015846, z = -3.19, p < 0.001) (coef. = -
.0011973, z = -2.48, p < 0.013) related to the level of FLID based on the net buyer and 
leverage ratio methods respectively. This finding is consistent with Bamber et al. (2010), that 
older managers are more likely to be conservative in disclosing voluntary information than 
younger CEOs, and less likely to issue forecasts. FLID constitutes one of the key components 
of a company’s information disclosure, therefore making more FLID will provide 
stakeholders with greater and value-relevant information to assist them in making rational 
decisions (Qu et al. 2015). This result is consistent with signalling theory’s long-term 
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perspective, suggesting that managers are more likely to disclose more FLID to interested 
parties in order to decrease information asymmetry and increase their confidence in the 
company’s future performance (Singhvi and Desai 1971). This finding is also in line with 
suggestions that the desire to keep their position will result in a greater likelihood of 
information disclosure by younger CEOs (Hu and Kumar 2004), and with several studies that 
reported a significant negative association between the CEO’s age and other factors such as 
investment decisions (Serfling 2012; Yim 2013). The results of this study indicate that older 
managers tend to avoid risks more than younger managers, whereas younger managers tend 
to reveal their capability to the stakeholders.   
The significantly positive coefficient at level (coef. = .0610475, z = 2.11, p < 0.035) (coef. = 
.0415782, z = 2.69, p < 0.007) of the CEO’s gender indicates that companies managed by 
male CEOs tend to disclose more FLID than companies managed by female CEOs. This 
result supports H3, which proposes a positive and significant relationship between the level 
of FLID and the persence of male CEOs, and corroborate findings that gender deversity has 
an impact on the decision-making process (e.g. Siciliano 1996; Erhardt et al. 2003; Sartawi et 
al. 2014). It confirms that gender diversity is considered as one of the attributes affecting 
corporate voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Gibbins et al. 1990; Nalikka 2009). It might 
also be consistent with signalling theory, that managers are more likely to disclose more and 
certain information to investors to signal that they are better than other managers, for the 
purpose of enhancing their reputation (Campbell et al. 2001).  
With regard to the coefficient of CEOs’ overconfidence, the study introduces empirical 
evidence that overconfidence has a positive and significant (coef. = .0239732, z = 2.11, p < 
0.034) (coef. = .1918623, z = 8.06, p < 0.000) effect on the level of FLID, based on net buyer 
and leverage ratio methods respectively. A possible explanation is that, overconfident 
managers are likely to be more optimistic about future circumstances. Thus, the results of the 
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two panels support H4, which proposes a positive significant relationship between CEOs’ 
overconfidence and the level of FLID. This suggests that confident managers are risk takers 
(Malmendier and Tate 2005a), agreeing with Francis et al. (2008a) and Demerjian et al. 
(2012), who found a positive relationship between the CEO’s reputation and managerial 
talent as proxies for overconfidence, and financial reporting quality measured by the level of 
voluntary disclosure. It also corroborates the result of Hribar and Yang (2010), who found a 
positive relationship between CEO’s overconfidence and voluntary forecasts. The results of 
the current study are consistent with agency theory: managers know that owners will attempt 
to control their activities through bonding and monitoring actions, so may be motivated to 
convince stockholders that they are acting optimally; disclosures may be a means of 
achieving this. Thus, agency theory explains why managers voluntarily disclose more 
information (Watson et al. 2002). Furthermore, according to signalling theory, managers of 
high quality companies are more likely to distinguish themselves from lower quality 
companies through voluntary disclosures (An et al. 2011). In this regard, Salama et al. (2006) 
suggested that disclosure may help improve a company’s reputation in the market and 
enhance relations with the community, regulatory agencies, media and non-governmental 
organizations. This is consistent with stakeholder theory: voluntary disclosure is considered 
as a strategic initiative for companies to discharge their accountability, and in consequence 
reduce information asymmetry and help to build a good relationship with stakeholders 
(Lundholm and Van Winkle 2006; An et al. 2011).  
The findings reveal that the main motivations for managers of Jordanian companies to 
disclose more FLID are to provide shareholders with greater and value-relevant information 
to assist them in making rational decisions. Consequently, more FLID reduces information 
asymmetry and helps to build a good relationship with stakeholders. Furthermore, these 
findings indicate that managers of high quality non-financial Jordanian companies are more 
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likely to distinguish themselves from lower quality companies through voluntary disclosures. 
Therefore, Both agency and signalling theories may provide a sensible explanation for FLID 
practices in Jordanian companies.  
 With regard to the control variables, the regression results show that dividend ratio has a 
highly significant and positive association (coef. = .0586593, z = 3.14, p < 0.002) (coef. = 
.0502298, z = 2.78, p < 0.005) with the level of FLID. This result is similar to that of 
Basiddiq and Hussainey (2012) and Wang and Hussainey (2013), who reported a positive 
relationship between dividend ratio and FLID. It suggests that firms with higher levels of 
FLID are more inclined to pay larger dividends. Jordanian companies with a higher dividend 
ratio tend to use FLID and dividend payments as alternative methods to convey important 
information to investors. This finding suggests that Jordanian companies were found to 
disclose more dividend ratio than other types of ratios (e.g. liquidity ratios, leverage ratio) 
since a dividend ratio could be a sign of high performance and may attract more investors to 
the company. In a developing country like Jordan, management with a high dividend ratio are 
more likely to disclose more information than management with a low dividend ratio. This 
finding is consistent with signalling theory which argues that firms will be more liable to 
signal their act to investors when their performance is good (Watson 2002). 
With regard to institutional ownership, the coefficient of this variable is significant and 
negatively (coef. = -.0591668, z = -2.33, p < 0.020) (coef. = -.0482082, z = -1.95, p < 0.052) 
related to the level of FLID. In general,  
However, the other control variables (company size, profitability, industry type, board 
characteristics, managerial ownership, family ownership and blockholder ownership) show 
no significant relationship with the level of FLID. Regression results have not shown any 
relationship between these variables and level of FLID, consistent with several studies, 
although several found an insignificant relationship between the level of FLID and 
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profitability (e.g. Aljifri 2008; Mathuva 2012; Sartawi et al. 2014). This result suggests that 
profitable firms are not motivated to disclose more information voluntarily because their 
investors are already satisfied (Wallace and Naser 1996). The results of this study are also 
consistent with previous studies in failing to find any evidence of a relationship between the 
level of FLID and industry type, board characteristics and ownership structure (e.g. Wallace 
et al. 1994; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Akhtaruddin 2005; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan 2010; 
Sartawi et al. 2014). The findings of this study confirm that family ownership and block 
holders did not affect the level of FLID, since the majority of family owners and block 
holders in Jordanian companies have one or more representatives on the board of directors. 
Table 6.4 Panel A: Association between CEOs’ characteristics and the level of FLID with 
overconfidence measured by net buyer method. 
Dependent Variable: FLID       
Method: Random-effects GLS regression. 
Sample: 201 
Group variable: Company 
Number of groups: 6 
Number of observations: 1206 
FLID Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
CAGE -.0015846 .0004963 -3.19 0.001*** -.0025574 -.0006118 
CGEND .0610475 .0288725 2.11 0.035** .0044585 .1176366 
COVER .0239732 .0113501 2.11 0.034** .0017274 .046219 
5FSIZE 3.43e-11 4.18e-11 0.82 0.411 -4.75e-11 1.16e-10 
FPROF .0322521 .0461889 0.70 0.485 -.0582765 .1227807 
FDIVID .0586593 .0186536 3.14 0.002*** .0220989 .0952197 
FISIN 1.44e-12 1.39e-11 0.10 0.918 -2.59e-11 2.88e-11 
BDSIZE -.0027823 .0031498 -0.88 0.377 -.0089557 .0033911 
BDUAL .0075602 .0171493 0.44 0.659 -.0260518 .0411721 
BMEET .0014005 .0028072 0.50 0.618   -.0041014 .0069024 
BINDEP .0069712 .0060892 1.14 0.252 -.0049633 .0189058 
MOWNE .0520774 .0774298 0.67 0.501 -.0996822 .203837 
                                                     
5 Following previous studies company’s size is measured by using the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
year-end (Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; Samaha et al. 2012; Wang and Hussainey 2013). 
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FOWNE -.0000245 .0001852 -0.13 0.895 -.0003875 .0003385 
INISTITU -.0591668 .0254134 -2.33 0.020** -.1089762 -.0093573 
BLOCKH -.0047866 .0117347 -0.41 0.683 -.0277862 .0182131 
_ cons .3490898 .0736177 4.74 0.000 .2048017 .4933778 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.2569 
0.000 
     
 
Panel B: Association between CEOs’ characteristics and FLID with overconfidence 
measured by the leverage ratio.  
FLID Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
CAGE -.0011973 .0004832 -2.48 0.013*** -.0021443 -.0002503 
CGEND .0415782 .0154479 2.69 0.007*** .0113008 .0718556 
COVER .1918623 .0237966 8.06 0.000*** .1452217 .2385028 
FSIZE 2.78e-11 4.07e-11 0.68 0.494 -5.19e-11 1.08e-10 
FPROF .0867602 .0457343 1.90 0.058** -.0028774 .1763977 
FDIVID .0502298 .0180364 2.78 0.005*** .0148792 .0855805 
FISIN 9.16e-13 1.35e-11 0.07 0.946 -2.56e-11 2.74e-11 
BDSIZE -.0029124 .0030699 -0.95 0.343 -.0089292 .0031044 
BDUAL .0079785 .0167 0.48 0.633 -.0247529 .0407099 
BMEET .0016117 .0027355 0.59 0.556 -.0037498 .0069731 
BINDEP .0042051 .0059202 0.71 0.478 -.0073982 .0158085 
MOWNE .0419184 .0754199 0.56 0.578 -.105902 .1897387 
FOWNE .0000534 .0001805 0.30 0.767 -.0003003 .0004071 
INISTITU -.0482082 .0247651 -1.95 0.052** -.096747 .0003306 
BLOCKH -.0252158 .0138679 -1.82 0.069* -.0523964 .0019649 
_ cons .3452598 .0649729 5.31 0.000 .2179153 .4726044 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.2345 
0.000 
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6.5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
6.5.1. ALTERNATIVE MEASUREMENT OF CEO OVERCONFIDENCE 
The net buyer and leverage ratio were applied as primary proxies for CEO’ overconfidence 
(Malmendier and Tate 2005a; Billett and Qian 2008; Hackbarth 2008), and the current study 
has examined whether the primary findings are robust to using less noisy proxies for 
overconfidence by employing another proxy (Hribar and Yang 2015). Previous studies have 
demonstrated that companies’ investment decisions are associated with managerial 
overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Ben-David et al. 2010; Campbell et al. 2011) 
and that overconfident CEOs are more likely to overinvest in capital projects (Malmendier 
and Tate 2005a; Ben-David et al. 2010). Following Campbell et al. (2011) and Ahmed and 
Duellman (2013), this study measures CEOs’ overconfidence as a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 if the company’s capital expenditure scaled by the lagged value of total 
assets in a current period is higher than the median of company expenditure scaled by the 
lagged value of total assets for the industry type in the same year; otherwise, 0. This 
measurement is based on the result of Malmendier and Tate (2005a), that managers who are 
overconfident are more likely to overinvest in capital-intensive projects; and the results of 
Ben-David et al. (2010) that in companies where executives  are overconfident, there is 
greater capital expenditure.  
The results of random-effects panel regression analysis of CEOs’ personal characteristics and 
the control variables on the level of FLID are presented in Table 6.5. Regression analysis 
shows that the value of R2 is around 38%, which is similar to the findings of (Bamber et al. 
2010) and higher than that reported in Table 6.4, which uses net buyer and leverage ratio as 
proxies for overconfidence. The P-Value is highly significant at the level 1%. 
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The coefficient of age shows a highly negative and significant relationship with the level of 
FLID (coef. = -.0017858, z = -3.61, p < 0.001). These results are in line with the main results 
presented in Table 6.4, suggesting that companies with younger CEOs are more likely to 
provide more FLID than those with older CEOs. The result is consistent with the findings of 
(Bamber et al. 2010). The coefficient of CEOs gender is positively and significantly (coef. = 
.581859, z = 2.01, p < 0.044) associated with the level of FLID, implying that companies 
managed by males tend to disclose more FLID than companies managed by females. This 
finding supports the primary results in Table 6.4 and is consistent with previous studies 
(Erhardt et al. 2003; Sartawi et al. 2014). 
The results confirm the initial analysis that the degree of overconfidence has a significant 
positive effect (coef. = .0279078, z = 2.46, p < 0.014) on the level of FLID, suggesting that 
overconfident managers are risk takers. These results also confirm the main results presented 
in Table 6.4 and are consistent with previous studies (Hribar and Yang 2015). In respect to 
the control variables’ coefficients, the findings presented in Table 6.5 reveal the same 
direction and significance as the main results in Table 6.4. 
Based on the above discussion, the coefficients of CEOs’ personal characteristics on the level 
of FLID, using capital expenditure as an alternative measurement of overconfidence, are in 
line with the main results presented in Table 6.4. This suggests that the primary findings are 
consistent and robust with different types of CEO overconfidence measurements, and are not 
affected by the different proxies of overconfidence.  
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Table 6.5: Association between CEOs’ personal characteristics and FLID with 
overconfidence measured by capital expenditure. 
Dependent Variable: FLID       
Method: Random-effects GLS regression. 
Sample: 201 
Group variable: Company 
Number of groups: 6 
Number of observations: 1206 
FLID Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
CAGE -.0017858 .0004942 -3.61 0.001*** -.0027545 -.0008172 
CGEND .0581859 .0288881 2.01 0.044** .0015663 .1148055 
COVER .0279078 .0113407 2.46 0.014** .0056803 .0501352 
FSIZE 4.56e-11 4.20e-11 1.08 0.278 -3.68e-11 1.28e-10 
FPROF .0269114 .0460657 0.58 0.559 -.0633757 .1171984 
FDIVID .0649896 .0184398 3.52 0.000*** .0288483 .1011309 
FISIN -3.27e-12 1.41e-11 -0.23 0.817 -3.09e-11 2.44e-11 
BDSIZE -.0032706 .0031589 -1.04 0.300 -.0094619 .0029206 
BDUAL .0016278 .0172478 0.09 0.925 -.0321773 .0354329 
BMEET .0011094 .0028129 0.39 0.693 -.0044037 .0066225 
BINDEP .0076598 .0060978 1.26 0.209 -.0042918 .0196113 
MOWNE .0477655 .0774987 0.62 0.538 -.1041291 .1996601 
FOWNE -.0000157 .0001849 -0.08 0.932 -.0003781 .0003467 
INISTITU -.0597762 .0254667 2.23 0.019*** -.10969 -.0098624 
BLOCKH -.0045131 .0117363 -0.38 0.701 -.0275158 .0184895 
_ cons .3772139 .0734716 5.13 0.000 .2332122 .5212157 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.388 
0.0001 
     
FLIDit= Forward-looking disclosure index of the company i in the year t, expressed as % total FLID out of all items. 
CAGE= CEO’s age, measured by the difference between the CEO’s date of birth and years of the study period. CGEND= 
CEO’s gender, take value one if CEO male, and 0 if CEO female. COVER= CEO overconfidence, dummy variable, 
measured by using capital expenditures, takes the value of one if the company’s capital expenditures scaled by lagged total 
assets in a given year is higher than the median level of company’ expenditures scaled by lagged total assets for the 
company’s industry type in that year, otherwise takes the value of zero. FSIZE= Firm size, the natural logarithm of firm’s 
total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROI (net income before tax divided be total assets). FDIVID= dividends 
ratio measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same period. FLEVER= leverage ratio used as another 
proxy for CEO overconfidence, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. FISIN= industry type, measured 
by using the ISIN number, as stated by Jordanian Securities Depository Centre. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total 
numbers of the board members. BDUAL= Board duality, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO and 
chairperson are the same person and zero if otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by 
the board of directors. BINDEP= board independence, measured by the total number of outside directors. MOWNE= 
managerial ownership. Measured by the percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the total number of 
shares. FOWNE= family ownership, Measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the family, a dummy variable 
would take one if a family or an individual holds 10% or more of equity and the value zero if otherwise. INSTITUT = 
institutional ownership, measured by dummy variable would take one if any institutional held shares and zero if otherwise.  
BLOCKH= block-holders ownership, measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has an external 
stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares, and the value of zero if otherwise.       
***. Coefficient is significant at the 0.01. **.  Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 *.  Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 
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6.5.2. DEALING WITH ENDOGENEITY 
In order to address the endogeneity bias problem, the literature suggests two options; the use 
of instrumental variables (IV) (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Coles 
et al. 2008; McKnight and Weir 2009; Choi et al. 2010) and a simultaneous system equation 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Cornett et al. 2008; Coles et al. 2008; Al Farooque et al. 
2010), as reported in the previous chapter.  
Again, this study used both Durbin and Hausman tests to check for bias in the endogenous 
and independent variables (Gujarati 2008). The tests gave an X2 of 5.52 % and 5.85% (P<  
0.0169, P< 0.0179) respectively, which suggests that the null hypothesis is rejected. Both 
instrumental variable and two-stage regression were therefore used to control for the 
endogeneity and simultaneity problems. The results of the two-stage regression of FLID on 
CEOs’ characteristics are presented in Table 6.6, panels A and B.  
The coefficient of FLID is negatively and significantly (coef. = -.0025205, z = -2.40, p < 
0.016) (coef. = -.0026513, z = -2.53, p < 0.011) related to the CEO’s age. This result is in 
line with those of the panel regression random effect model reported in Table 6.4. In addition, 
the level of significance is higher than with the main results. The coefficient of CEO’s gender 
is significant and positively associated with FLID (coef. = .3024688, z = 6.64, p < 0.001) 
(coef. = .2287371, z = -2.53, p < 0.000). The two-stage regression analysis shows quite 
similar results to the panel regression in Table 6.4, corroborating the results of Lin et al. 
(2014), who found a positive and simultaneous relation between CEO characteristics and 
internal control quality. The coefficient of FLID is significant and positively (coef. 
= .1060139, z = 4.70, p < 0.001) (coef. = .1545815, z = 2.97, p < 0.003) related to 
overconfidence, which suggests that these results are consistent with the main findings in 
Table 6.4. Regarding the control variables, the findings reported in Table 6.6 show similar 
results to those reported in Table 6.4, although, some values reveal greater significance in 
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Table 6.6; nevertheless, the direction and significance of the association with FLID remain 
the same. In summary, the instrumental variable two-stage model results are consistent with 
the primary results presented in Table 6.4, implying that the simultaneity problem between 
FLID and CEO characteristics does not affect the main results of FLID and other control 
variables. 
Table 6.6 Panel A: Instrumental variable two-stage regression model (using linear 
regression model) CEO overconfidence measured by using net buyer method. 
Dependent Variable: FLID       
Method: Random-effects GLS regression. 
Sample: 201 
Group variable: Company 
Number of groups: 6 
Number of observations: 1206 
FLID Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
LACAGE -.0025205 .0010484 -2.40 0.016*** -.0045753 -.0004657 
LACGEND .3024688 .0455752 6.64 0.001*** .213143 .3917946 
LACOVER .1060139 .0225793 4.70 0.001*** .0617593 .1502684 
FSIZE 2.37e-10 3.64e-11 6.51 0.001*** 1.66e-10 3.09e-10 
FPROF -.067299 .0409973 -1.64 0.101* -.1477503 .0131524 
FDIVID .0727807 .0169273 4.30 0.000*** .0395633 .1059981 
FISIN 6.92e-12 8.45e-12 0.82 0.413 -9.65e-12 2.35e-11 
BDSIZE .0040664 .0020405 1.99 0.047** .0000623 .0080705 
BDUAL .0140643 .0118778 1.18   0.237 -.0092443 .0373728 
BMEET -.0011452 .0020891 -0.55 0.584 -.0052447 .0029544 
BINDEP .005462 .0040991 1.33 0.183 -.0025819 .0135059 
MOWNE -.0587541 .0549102 -1.07 0.285 -.1665075 .0489993 
FOWNE -.0479093 .0190686 -2.51 0.012*** -.0853288 -.0104898 
INISTITU -.0467553 .0169309 -2.76 0.006*** -.0799797 -.0135309 
BLOCKH -.0008176 .0091672 -0.09 0.929 -.0188069 .0171718 
_ cons .2858471 .0256788 11.13 0.000 .2354562 .3362381 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.781 
0.000 
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Panel B: CEO Overconfidence measured using leverage ratio method. 
FLID Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
LACAGE -.0026513 .0010487 -2.53 0.011*** -.0047066 -.0005959 
LACGEND .2287371 .0472767 4.84 0.000*** .1360765 .3213977 
LACOVER .1545815 .0521344 2.97 0.003*** .0523999 .256763 
FSIZE 2.32e-10 3.93e-11 5.91 0.000*** 1.55e-10 3.09e-10 
FPROF -.0173048 .0442269 -0.39 0.696 -.1040938 .0694842 
FDIVID .0744217 .0182607 4.08 0.000*** .0385876 .1102558 
FISIN 6.92e-12 8.22e-12 0.84 0.400 -9.19e-12 2.30e-11 
BDSIZE .0051425 .0022012 2.34 0.020** .0008229 .009462 
BDUAL .0187075 .0128135 1.46 0.145 -.0064372 .0438521 
BMEET -.002104 .0022537 -0.93 0.351 -.0065265 .0023184 
BINDEP .0032182 .004422 0.73 0.467 -.0054593 .0118958 
MOWNE -.0742387 .0592357 -1.25 0.210 -.1904804 .0420031 
FOWNE -.0730847 .0205708 -3.55 0.000*** -.1134519 -.0327174 
INISTITU -.045036 .0182646 -2.47 0.014*** -.0808777 -.0091943 
BLOCKH .0067907 .0098894 0.69 0.492 -.0126158 .0261972 
_ cons .2746264 .0277016 9.91 0.000 .2202659 .328987 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.755 
0.000 
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6.6. SUMMARY 
This chapter examines the effect of CEOs’ personal characteristics on the level of FLID in 
Jordanian listed companies, 2008 to 2013. Males manage 95% of companies in the study’s 
sample, and the overall results indicate that CEO gender and overconfidence have a positive 
and significant association with the level of FLID among non-financial Jordanian companies. 
The regression further shows a significant negative association between the level of FLID 
and the CEO’s age, suggesting that older CEOs of non-financial Jordanian companies are less 
likely to issue forecasts than younger CEOs. This finding is consistent with agency and 
signalling theory. According to agency theory, managers make voluntary disclosures to 
mitigate the agency problem by reducing the information asymmetry and to demonstrate that 
they are managing the company effectively (Barako et al. 2006). Signalling theory suggests 
that disclosing more voluntary information helps managers to discriminate their action from 
others (Campbell et al. 2001); enhancing their reputation and maintaining their position will 
result in a greater likelihood of more information disclosure by younger CEOs (Hu and 
Kumar 2004).  
The study found a positive association between the level of FLID and the dividend ratio of 
the company. However, the regression analysis reveals that the coefficients of institutional 
and blockholder ownership are negatively and significantly related to the level of FLID.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CEOS’ CHARACTERISTICS AND EM 
PRACTICES: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to achieve the third objective regarding the impact of CEOs’ personal 
characteristics on EM practices.  
It is structured as follows: Section 7.2 discusses the descriptive statistics and section 7.3 
presents the results of multicollineraity tests. Section 7.4 outlines and critically analyses the 
findings in relation to the above objective. Section 7.5 provides a summary of the chapter. 
7.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS   
Table 7.1 shows the key descriptive statistical analysis (mean, median, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum values) for all variables related to the study sample. The dependent 
variable EM is the absolute DA values measured by the two Jones models and the Kothari 
model. The descriptive statistics reveal that the respective minimum values of EM are 0.000, 
0.001 and 0.008 and the maximum values 0.870, 0.925 and 0.826, indicating a considerable 
spread in the rates. The respective mean values are 0.098, 0.097 and 0.095 (i.e DA around 
9%), similar to the findings of Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010), and ALghamdi and Ali (2012), who 
documented average values of DA in Jordanian and Saudi listed companies respectively, both 
around 10%. However, the results imply that the magnitude of EM in Jordan may be greater 
than that found by Klein (2002), Katmun (2012) and Ugbede et al. (2013), for US, UK and 
Malaysian companies, with an average absolute value of DA of 7%, 6.5%, and 7.5% 
respectively. Nevertheless, it is less than the results of Roodposhti and Chashmi (2010) and 
González and García-Meca (2014), who found the mean value of DA among companies 
listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and Latin American companies to be 16% and 11% 
respectively. This study’s median values of 0.061, 0.060 and 0.059 (SD 0.114, 0.112, 0.110) 
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employed as a benchmark to distinguish between high and low levels of EM. The descriptive 
statistical analysis for the independent and control variables were discussed in Chapter 6 (see 
section 6.2). 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics of EM practices and CEOs’ personal characteristics. 
Variable N Minim Maxim Mean Median STAN-DEV 
EMJOM 1206 .0000195 .870591 .0988983 .0614999 .1146811 
EMMJO 1206 .0001612 .92508 .0973779 .0606376 .112734 
EMKOM 1206 .0000821 .8267049 .0954769 .0591708 .1102237 
CGEND 1206 0 1 .9519071 1 .2140512 
CAGE 1206 26 84 51.11 51.00 11.266 
COVER 1206 0 1 0.4054 0.000 0.4911 
6FSIZE 1206 .93e+03 3.23e+09 5.55e+07 1.87e+07 1.57e+08 
FPROF 1206 -0.85904 0.9500 0.0012302 0.01109 .1217121 
FDIVID 1206 0 0.9751 0.1882211 0 0.307755 
FLEVER 1206 0.0002 0.97808 0.2950135 0.240055 0.2320937 
FISIN 1206 1 201 .3631841 101 .481111 
BSIZE 1206 3 19 8.011 7 2.4494 
BDUAL 1206 0 1 .2056 0 .40433 
BMEET 1206 3 28 7.5729 7 2.1378 
BINDEP 1206 0 8 2.0207 2 1.2345 
MOWNE 1206 0 .7185 .03528 0 .08595 
FOWNE 1206 0 .9450 0.6127 .15472 .27206 
INSTITU 1206 0 1 .35547 .3320 .76537 
BLOCKH 1206 0 1 .48922 0 .50009 
 EMJOM= the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a measure of the degree of EM by using original Jones model. 
EMMJO= the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a measure of the degree of EM by using modified Jones model.  
EMKOM= the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a measure of the degree of EM by using Kothari model. 
CGEND= CEO’s gender, take value one if CEO male and 0 if CEO female. CAGE= CEO’s age, measured by the difference 
between the CEO’s date of birth and years of the study period. COVER= CEO overconfidence, the proportion of CEO share 
ownership, options, and stock exercise. Measured by Net Buyer method.  FSIZE= Firm size, the natural logarithm of firm’s 
total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROI (net income before tax divided be total assets). FDIVID= dividends 
ratio measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same period. FLEVER= leverage ratio used as another 
                                                     
6Following previous studies company’s size is measured by using the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
year-end (Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; Samaha et al. 2012; Wang and Hussainey 2013). 
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proxy for CEO overconfidence, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. FISIN= industry type, measured 
by using the ISIN number, as stated by Jordanian Securities Depository Centre. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total 
numbers of the board members. BDUAL= Board duality, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO and 
chairperson are the same person and zero if otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by 
the board of directors. BINDEP= board independence, measured by the total number of outside directors. MOWNE= 
managerial ownership, measured by the percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the total number of 
shares. FOWNE= family ownership, measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the family, a dummy variable 
would take one if a family or an individual holds 10% or more of equity and the value zero if otherwise. INSTITU = 
institutional ownership, measured by dummy variable would take one if any institutional held shares and zero if otherwise. 
BLOCKH= block-holders ownership, measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has an external 
stockholder owning 5% or more of the outstanding shares, and the value of zero if otherwise. 
 
7.3. MULTICOLLINEARITY 
This section examines the correlation between the absolute value of DA as a proxy for EM 
and all explanatory and control variables, applying the Pearson and Spearman correlation 
matrix to inspect the association between dependent, independent and control variables for 
multicollinearity (e.g. Rahman and Ali 2006; Abdel-Fattah 2008).  
Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show that the highest correlation is between the board size and board 
independence, with a coefficient of 41.5%. Therefore, the problem of multicollinearity does 
not exist among the data set used in these models. Table 7.5 shows the VIF coefficients of 
each independent variable. According to Gujarati (2003, 2008), the multicollinearity problem 
does not exist if the VIF is less than 10; it can be seen from Table 7.5 that the maximum 
value of VIF is 1.36 and the mean 1.12, confirming that multicollinearity does not exist 
among the independent variables and that the results are free from the effects of 
multicollinearity.  
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Table 7.2: Correlation Matrix First Model. 
Variables EMMJO CGEND CAGE COVER FSIZE FPROF FDIVI FLEVE FISIN BSIZE BDUAL BMEET BINPEN MOWNE FOWNE INSTIT BLOCK 
EMMJO 1.000                 
CGEND 0.018 1.000                
CAGE 0.007 0.073** 1.000               
COVER 0.055 -0.018 -0.148** 1.000              
FSIZE -0.080** 0.025 0.020 0.017 1.000             
FPROF -0.011 0.008 -0.001 -0.007 0.013 1.000            
FDIVID 0.008 -0.024 0.092** 0.117** 0.068** 0.371** 1.000           
FLEVER -0.011* 0.082** -0.152** 0.206** 0.032 -0.156** 0.034 1.000          
FISIN 0.027 -0.037** -0.012 0.009 0.049* -0.021** 0.029 -0.023 1.000         
BSIZE -0.101** -0.047 -0.012 0.005 0.271** 0.017 0.040 0.026 0.040 1.000        
BDUAL 0.036 0.005 0.010 -0.077** -0.019 -0.068** 0.009 -0.001 -0.102** -0.061* 1.000       
BMEET -0.035 -0.022 0.024 -0.012 0.062* 0.052* -0.029 -0.027 -0.084** 0.007 0.022 1.000      
BINDEP -0.006** 0.130** -0.034 0.012 0.049* -0.007 0.062* 0.047* 0.009 0.415** 0.139** -0.081** 1.000     
MOWNE -0.015 -0.030 -0.038 -0.032 -0.066* -0.015 -0.025 0.036 -0.063* -0.117** 0.239** 0.016 0.083 1.000    
FOWNE -0.010 -0.007 0.034 0.035 0.001 -0.040 -0.017 -0.034 0.034 -0.014 -0.013 0.006 -0.048 -0.009 1.000   
INSTITU -0.009 0.064* 0.042 -0.033 0.033 0.052* 0.021 -0.083** 0.024 0.055* -0.139** -0.049* 0.011 -0.170 -0.041 1.000  
BLOCKH -0.025 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.046 -0.082** -0.053* 0.019 -0.022 -0.010 0.035 -0.025 0.023 0.027 -0.028 -0.009 1.000 
EMMJO= the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a measure of the degree of EM by using modified Jones model. CAGE= CEO’s age, measured by the difference between the CEO’s date of birth and years of the 
study period. CGEND= CEO’s gender, take value one if CEO male, and 0 if CEO female. COVER= CEO overconfidence, the proportion of CEO share ownership, options, and stock exercise. FSIZE= Firm size, the 
natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. FPROF= profitability, measured by ROI (net income before tax divided be total assets). FDIVID= dividends ratio measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same 
period. FLEVER= leverage ratio used as another proxy for CEO overconfidence, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. FISIN= industry type, measured by using the ISIN code, as stated by 
Jordanian Securities Depository Centre. BSIZE= board size, measured by the total numbers of the board. BDUAL= Board duality, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO and chairperson are the same 
person and zero if otherwise. BMEET= Board meeting, the number of meetings per year held by the board of directors. BINDEP= board independence, measured by the total number of outside directors. MOWNE= 
managerial ownership. Measured by the percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by the total number of shares. FOWNE= family ownership, measured by the proportion of total shares owned by the 
family, a dummy variable would take one if a family or an individual holds 10% or more of equity and the value zero if otherwise. INSTITU = institutional ownership, measured by dummy variable would take one if any 
institutional held shares and zero if otherwise.  BLOCKH= block-holders ownership, measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has an external stockholder owning 5% or more of the 
outstanding shares, and the value of zero if otherwise.       
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01, **.   Correlation is significant at the 0.05, *.   Correlation is significant at the 0.10 
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Table 7.3: Correlation Matrix Second Model. 
Variables EMJM CGEND CAGE COVER FSIZE FPROF FDIVI FLEVE FISIN BSIZE BDUAL BMEET BINPEN MOWNE FOWNE INSTIT BLOCK 
EMJM 1.000                 
CGEND 0.023 1.000                
CAGE -0.003 0.073** 1.000               
COVER 0.045 -0.018 -0.148** 1.000              
FSIZE -0.078** 0.025 0.020 0.017 1.000             
FPROF -0.003 0.008 -0.001 -0.007 0.013 1.000            
FDIVID 0.019 -0.024 0.092** 0.117** 0.068** 0.371** 1.000           
FLEVER -0.012** 0.082** -0.152** 0.206** 0.032 -0.156** 0.034 1.000          
FISIN 0.026 -0.037** -0.012 0.009 0.049* -0.021** 0.029 -0.023 1.000         
BSIZE -0.103** -0.047 -0.012 0.005 0.271** 0.017 0.040 0.026 0.040 1.000        
BDUAL 0.052 0.005 0.010 -0.077** -0.019 -0.068** 0.009 -0.001 -0.102** -0.061* 1.000       
BMEET -0.035 -0.022 0.024 -0.012 0.062* 0.052* -0.029 -0.027 -0.084** 0.007 0.022 1.000      
BINDEP -0.006** 0.130** -0.034 0.012 0.049* -0.007 0.062* 0.047* 0.009 0.415** 0.139** -0.081** 1.000     
MOWNE -0.017 -0.030 -0.038 -0.032 -0.066* -0.015 -0.025 0.036 -0.063* -0.117** 0.239** 0.016 0.083 1.000    
FOWNE -0.011 -0.007 0.034 0.035 0.001 -0.040 -0.017 -0.034 0.034 -0.014 -0.013 0.006 -0.048 -0.009 1.000   
INSTITU -0.019 0.064* 0.042 -0.033 0.033 0.052* 0.021 -0.083** 0.024 0.055* -0.139** -0.049* 0.011 -0.170 -0.041 1.000  
BLOCKH -0.031 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.046 -0.082** -0.053* 0.019 -0.022 -0.010 0.035 -0.025 0.023 0.027 -0.028 -0.009 1.000 
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Table 7.4: Correlation Matrix Third Model. 
Variables EMKOM CGEND CAGE COVER FSIZE FPROF FDIVI FLEVE FISIN BSIZE BDUAL BMEET BINPEN MOWNE FOWNE INSTIT BLOCK 
EMKOM 1.000                 
CGEND 0.020 1.000                
CAGE -0.003 0.073** 1.000               
COVER 0.040 -0.018 -0.148** 1.000              
FSIZE -0.061 0.025 0.020 0.017 1.000             
FPROF -0.012 0.008 -0.016 -0.007 0.013 1.000            
FDIVID 0.003 -0.024 0.092** 0.117** 0.068** 0.371** 1.000           
FLEVER -0.007 0.082** -0.152** 0.206** 0.032 -0.156** 0.034 1.000          
FISIN 0.049 -0.137** -0.012 0.009 0.049* -0.021** 0.029 -0.023 1.000         
BSIZE -0.094 -0.047 -0.012 0.005 0.271** 0.017 0.040 0.026 0.040 1.000        
BDUAL 0.044 0.005 0.010 -0.077** -0.019 -0.068** 0.009 -0.001 -0.102** -0.061* 1.000       
BMEET -0.026 -0.022 0.024 -0.012 0.062* 0.052* -0.029 -0.027 -0.084** 0.007 0.022 1.000      
BINDEP -0.016 0.130** -0.034 0.012 0.049* -0.007 0.062* 0.047* 0.009 0.415** 0.139** -0.081** 1.000     
MOWNE -0.012 -0.030 -0.038 -0.032 -0.066* -0.015 -0.025 0.036 -0.063* -0.117** 0.239** 0.016 0.083 1.000    
FOWNE -0.013 -0.007 0.034 0.035 0.001 -0.040 -0.017 -0.034 0.034 -0.014 -0.013 0.006 -0.048 -0.009 1.000   
INSTITU -0.020 0.064* 0.042 -0.033 0.033 0.052* 0.021 -0.083** 0.024 0.055* -0.139** -0.049* 0.011 -0.170 -0.041 1.000  
BLOCKH 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.046 -0.082** -0.053* 0.019 -0.022 -0.010 0.035 -0.025 0.023 0.027 -0.028 -0.009 1.000 
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Table 7.5: VIF Test Results. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
BSIZE 1.36 0.735871 
BINDEP 1.31 0.765823 
FPROF 1.22 0.816691 
FDIVID 1.22 0.887376 
BDUAIL 1.13 0.909320 
FLEVER 1.12 0.892108 
MOWNE 1.12 0.896686 
FSIZE 1.10 0.909160 
COVER 1.10 0.912060 
CGEND 1.07 0.936515 
FOWNE 1.06 0.942859 
FISIN 1.04 0.960483 
BMEET 1.03 0.970041 
INSTITU 1.01 0.987370 
BLOCKH 1.01 0.990753 
MEAN VIF                                                                         1.12 
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7.4. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The association between CEO’s personal characteristics and EM practices is tested by cross-
sectional panel regression (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008; Peni and Vähämaa 2010). The 
rationale and procedure are the same as those described in the previous two chapters. The 
result of the panel regressions test is highly significant (P-Value = 0.000), indicating that 
panel data is more appropriate (Gujarati 2008). However, the outcome of the Hausman test is 
not statistically significant (P-Value = 0.3581), so the study cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of random effects. Consequently, it estimates random effect models (see Appendix 7A and 
B). 
The Pesaran CD result is not statistically significant (P-Value = 0.3835) meaning that there is 
no serial correlation across entities. The outcome of the Modified Wald test (P-Value = 
0.6218) indicated no heteroscedasticity. The estimated results of the random-effects panel 
regression analysis are presented in the Table 7.6. The estimates are presented in three panels, 
corresponding to the three models used. The respective values of overall R2 for the three 
models are relatively small (22%, 23% and 19%). These values indicate that the combination 
of the independent variables demonstrate 22%, 23% and 19% of variation of the dependent 
variable. Nevertheless, it should be noted that low R2 vaules are typical in this type of 
accruals regression (Xie et al. 2003a; Geiger and North 2006; Davidson III et al. 2007; 
Jenkins and Velury 2008; Peni and Vähämaa 2010). Table 7.6 also shows that the P-Value is 
highly significant at the level (0.001, 0.003 and 0.005) in the three panels, implying that this 
model is highly significant and has a good explanatory power of disclosure.  
The results of the regression coefficients are also presented in Table 7.6, showing the impact 
of CEOs’ characteristics on EM practices. No relationship is observed between age and EM 
practices and the coefficients, although positive, are insignificant in all three models (coef. 
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= .0001485, z = 0.48, p < 0.629) (coef. = 0.0000145, z = 0.01, p < 0.962) (coef. = .0000173, 
z = 0.06, p < 0.954). This result is inconsistent with that of Davidson III et al. (2007), who 
investigated whether the CEO’s age and career horizon affect EM practices and found that 
companies with older CEOs, whose retirement period is fast approaching, are associated with 
EM upwards behaviour. They suggested that retiring executives are likely to be motivated to 
increase profits in their last years. The result of this study does not support hypothesis H5; 
which proposes apositive relationship between the CEO’s age and EM peactices, hence, the 
formulated hypothesis must be rejected. 
Similarly, the estimated results of regressions analysis indicated no relationship between 
CEO gender and EM practices. The estimated coefficients appear statistically insignificant 
(coef. = .0088579, z = 0.52, p < 0.600) (coef. = .012633, z = 0.73, p < 0.462) (coef. 
= .0116059, z = 0.70, p < 0.482). This result is consistent with previous studies (Geiger and 
North 2006; Jiang et al. 2008; Matsunaga and Yeung 2008; Peni and Vähämaa 2010; Hili and 
Affess 2012). A possible explanation for the lack of a significant relationship is simply the 
extremely small number of female CEOs in Jordanian companies. Thus, H6 is rejected.  
With regard to the relationship between CEOs’ overconfidence and EM practices, the 
regression results indicate that the coefficient of overconfidence is positively and 
significantly (coef. = .0165582, z = 2.30, p < 0.02) (coef. = .0143235, z = 1.96, p < 0.05) 
related to DA at a high level in the two Jones models. However, the Kothari (2005) model 
shows that overconfidence has a positive and significant (coef. = .0124519, z = 1.77, p < 
0.07) relationship with EM, lower than in the Jones models. These results confirm that 
overconfident managers are more likely to engage in EM behaviour than those managers who 
feel less confident; this may be because overconfident CEOs are less under the influence of 
stakeholders and that individual characteristics work against regulators’ attempts to mitigate 
EM practices (Banerjee et al. 2013; Hsieh et al. 2014). This result supports hypothesis H7, 
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which states that there is a positive and significant relationship between CEOs’ 
overconfidence and EM practices. Hence, H7 is accepted.  
This finding is consistent with previous literature (e.g. Hribar and Yang 2010; Schrand and 
Zechman 2012; Hsieh et al. 2014; Hribar and Yang 2015). For example, Schrand and 
Zechman (2012) found a positive relation between overconfidence and financial reporting 
fraud. Hribar and Yang (2010) also found a positively relationship, suggesting that over-
confident CEOs are more inclined to practice EM. Furthermore, this result supports the 
notion that overconfident CEOs are more likely to be risk takers (Malmendier and Tate 
2005a). These results corroborate the study by Lewis et al. (2014), which suggests that 
“differences in environmental strategy can be explained by CEOs’ characteristics”. The 
findings indicate that overconfident managers are more likely to issue further optimistic 
management forecasts, which will put them in a risky position in meeting future forecasts; 
consequently, they become involved in EM practices  (Hribar and Yang 2010; Schrand and 
Zechman 2012). The result of the current study is consistent with the central assumption of 
agency theory that “all individual action is driven by self-interest and that individuals will 
employ accounting choices in an opportunistic behaviour to achieve their objectives” (An et 
al. 2011).  
The study’s analysis includes some control variables such as firm size. The regression results 
indicate that firm size has a significant and negative (coef. = -4.33e-11, z = -1.69, p < 0.090) 
(coef. = .0286263, z = -1.73, p < 0.084) association with EM practices, supporting the notion 
that small firms are subject to less pressure from authority, and consequently managers have 
more incentive to engage in EM practices. This result suggests that large Jordanian 
companies are less likely be involvd in EM activity than small ones. One possible 
explanation for this, is that large Jordanian companies are subject to more pressure from the 
authority. Consequently, they follow corporate governance principles better than small ones 
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do. This finding is consistent with many other studies  (Clarkson et al. 1994; Cahan and 
Hossain 1996; Adams and Hossain 1998; Eng and Mak 2003; Kent and Ung 2003; Gul and 
Leung 2004; Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Celik et al. 2006; Clarkson et al. 2006; Lim et al. 
2007; Kelton and Yang 2008). 
In relation to board size, the coefficient of this variable is negatively and significantly (coef. 
= -.0036771, z = -1.92, p < 0.055) (coef. = -.0037374, z = -1.90, p < 0.057) (coef. = -
.0030855, z = -1.66, p < 0.097) associated with the level of EM, suggesting that companies 
with large boards are more likely to report lower EM. This result is consistent with the notion 
that large boards of directors are more active in controlling and monitoring opportunistic 
managerial behaviour (Zahra and Pearce 1989). It is also consistent with previous studies 
which found that board size is powerfully and negatively linked to the levels of EM practices 
(Xie et al. 2003a; Peasnell et al. 2005; Yu 2006; Abed et al. 2012; González and García-Meca 
2014). An acceptable explanation is that in smaller boards, the dominance of blockholders or 
executive managers is expected, while a variety of members from different positions is 
normally found only in larger boards. Therefore, larger boards have better supervision of 
managers’ behaviour. 
Conversely, several studies conducted in Asia, specifically Taiwan, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
show a significant and positive association between the size of the board of directors and the 
level of EM (e.g. Kao and Chen 2004; Rahman and Ali 2006). In spite of these countries’ 
comparable level of development with Jordan, Jordanian boards have essentially different 
characteristics, including culture, political and economic aims, and practices of corporate 
goverance. 
In respect to the board duality, the regression results show a positive and significant (coef. 
= .0179888, z = 1.72, p < 0.086) (coef. = .0215515, z = 2.01, p < 0.044) (coef. = .0170918, z 
= 1.69, p < 0.092) relationship with the level of EM. The results indicate that the monitoring 
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ability of the board of directors is less if the CEO is also chairman of the board (Gulzar 
2011). This finding is in line with agency theory, which suggests that separation of the roles 
of CEO and chairman of the board of directors increases the board’s independence from 
management, leading to better monitoring and overseeing (Jensen 1993). This result is 
consistent with previous studies such as Klein (2002) and Sarkar et al. (2008), who found that 
DA as a proxy for EM are positively associated with CEO duality. The findings of the current 
study support the agency theory view that CEOs with excessive power over their boards can 
easily manipulate earnings. 
Conversely, none of the coefficients of control variables (profitability, dividends ratio, 
leverage ratio, industry type, board meetings, board independence and ownership structure) 
has a significant influence on EM practices, regression results showing no relationship. These 
findings are similar to previous studies that found no relationship between EM practices and 
different company characteristics and corporate governance factors (e.g. Chung et al. 2002; 
Ebrahim 2007; Habbash 2010; Sun et al. 2010; Hamad and Abu-Nassar 2013; González and 
García-Meca 2014). 
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Table 7.6: Panel A: Association between CEOs’ personal characteristics and EM 
measured by Modified Jones (1995) Model. 
Dependent Variable: EMMJO       
Method: Random-effects GLS regression. 
Sample: 201 
Group variable: Company  
Number of groups: 6 
Number of observations: 1206 
EMMOJ Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
CAGE .0001485 .0003076 0.48 0.629 -.0004545 .0007515 
CGEND .0088579 .0168892 0.52 0.600 -.0242443 .0419601 
COVER .0165582 .0071839 2.30 0.021*** .002478 .0306385 
7FSIZE -4.33e-11 2.55e-11 -1.69 0.090* -9.34e-11 6.77e-12 
FPROF -.0114939 .0290234 -0.40 0.692 -.0683787 .0453909 
FDIVID .0025825 .0115583 0.22 0.823 -.0200713 .0252363 
FLEVER -.0039524 .0154366 -0.26 0.798 -.0342077 .0263028 
FISIN 7.84e-12 8.43e-12 0.93 0.353 -8.69e-12 2.44e-11 
BSIZE -.0036771 .00192 -1.92 0.055** -.0074402 .000086 
BDUAL .0179888 .010463 1.72 0.086* -.0025182 .0384959 
BMEET -.0012704 .0017248 -0.74 0.461 -.0046509 .00211 
BINDEP .0022999 .00371 0.62 0.535 -.0049716 .0095713 
MOWNE -.0736546 .0473894 -1.55 0.120 -.166536 .0192268 
FOWNE -.0000659 .000115 -0.57 0.567 -.0002913 .0001595 
INISTITU -.0012786 .0154823 -0.08 0.934 -.0316235 .0290662 
BLOCKH -.0025194 .0064202 -0.39 0.695 -.0151028 .010064 
_ cons .0851672 .0446472 1.91 0.056 -.0023396 .172674 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.221 
0.001 
     
 
 
 
                                                     
7 Following previous studies company’s size is measured by using the natural logarithm of total assets at the 
year-end (Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; Samaha et al. 2012; Wang and Hussainey 2013). 
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Panel B: Association between CEOs’ personal characteristics and EM measured by Jones 
(1991) Model. 
EMJOM Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
CAGE -3.24e-06 .0003125 -0.01 0.962 -.0006156 .0006092 
CGEND .012633 .0171897 0.73 0.462 -.0210583 .0463242 
COVER .0143235 .0072975 1.96 0.050** .0000207 .0286263 
FSIZE .0286263 2.61e-11 -1.73 0.084* -9.63e-11 6.01e-12 
FPROF -.0069187 .0294229 -0.24 0.814 -.0645866 .0507492 
FDIVID .006942 .006942 0.59 0.554 -.0160301 -.0160301 
FLEVER -.0030132 .0156829 -0.19 0.848 -.0337511 .0277248 
FISIN 8.03e-12 8.67e-12 0.93 0.355 -8.97e-12 -8.97e-12 
BSIZE -.0037374 .0019669 -1.90 0.057** -.0075924 .0001176 
BDUAL .0215515 .0107116 2.01 0.044** .0005571 .0425459 
BMEET -.0014029 .0017574 -0.80 0.425 -.0048473 .0020415 
BINDEP .0018484 .0037993 0.49 0.627 -.0055981 .0092949 
MOWNE -.0792058 .0484283 -1.64 0.102* -.1741234 .0157119 
FOWNE -.0000659 .0001165 -0.57 0.571 -.0002942 .0001624 
INISTITU -.004455 .015873 -0.28 0.779 -.0355654 .0266554 
BLOCKH -.0032494 .0065048 -0.50 0.617 -.0159985 .0094997 
_ cons .0934208 .0456787 2.05 0.041 .0038922 .1829495 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.2370 
0.0003 
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Panel C: Association between CEOs’ personal characteristics and EM measured by 
Kothari (2005) model. 
EMKOTH Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
CAGE .0000173 .0003014 0.06 0.954 -.0005735 .0006082 
CGEND .0116059 .0164963 0.70 0.482 -.0207262 .0439379 
COVER .0124519 .0070373 1.77 0.077 -.001341 .0262448 
FSIZE -3.61e-11 2.48e-11 -1.45 0.146 -8.47e-11 1.26e-11 
FPROF -.0062556 .028517 -0.22 0.826 -.0621478 .0496366 
FDIVID .0004796 . .0113519 0.04 0.966 -.0217697 .0227288 
FLEVER -.0002119 .0151182 -0.01 0.989 -.0298431 .0294193 
FISIN 1.27e-11 1.27e-11 1.27e-11 0.117 -3.17e-12 2.86e-11 
BDSIZE -.0030855 -.0030855 -1.66 0.097* -.0067264 .0005554 
BDUAL .0170918 .0101326 1.69 0.092* -.0027679 .0369514 
BMEET -.0008302 .0016819 -0.49 0.622 -.0041266 .0024662 
BINDEP .0006181 .0006181 0.17 0.863 -.0064207 .0076569 
MOWNE -.0522047 .0460126 -1.13 0.257 -.1423877 .0379783 
FOWNE -.0000929 .0001132 -0.82 0.412 -.0003147 .0001289 
INISTITU -.0045985 .0149627 -0.31 0.759 -.0339249 .0247278 
BLOCKH -.0020542 .0063139 -0.33 0.745 -.0144292 .0103208 
_ cons .0666381 .0432866 .0432866 0.124 -.0182021 .1514782 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
0.196 
0.005 
     
 
7.4.1. TESTING ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM 
Further analysis was conducted to check whether the endogeneity and simultaneity problems 
between dependent and independent variables might affect the relationship between EM 
practices and CEOs’ personal characteristics. Following the method used by Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991); Coles et al. (2008) and Choi et al. (2010), the current study used lagged 
values of CEO variables as an IV and lagged values of EM as dependent variables (Hazarika 
et al. 2012). The Durbin and Hausman tests show values of X2 (9.47% and 7.11%) (P= 
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0.0309, P= 0.0413) respectively, which suggest that the proposal of no endogeneity between 
the independent and dependent variables is rejected. The presence of endogeneity and 
simultaneity between the dependent and independent variables may affect the findings of the 
study, so an IV and Two-Stage (2SLS) regression method was employed to control the effect 
of these problems. 
The results of this regression of EM practices on CEOs’ personal characteristics are presented 
in Table 7.7. After controlling for the simultaneity and endogeneity problems, the coefficient 
of EM practices is not significantly (coef. = .0003764, z = 0.67, p < 0.504) (coef. 
= .0000638, z = 0.21, p < 0.834) related to the lagged value of the CEO’s age. This result is 
consistent with the primary results of the panel regression model presented in Table 7.6. In 
relation to CEO’s gender, Table 7.7 panel A and B reports an insignificant relationship (coef. 
= .0105425, z = 0.43, p < 0.665) (coef. = .0150012, z = 0.97, p < 0.332) between the 
coefficient of EM and the lagged value of CEO’s gender. This finding is in line with previous 
findings reported in Table 7.6.  
With regard to the CEO’s overconfidence, Table 7.7 shows that the coefficient of EM 
practices has a significant and positive (coef. = .0283985, z = 1.94, p < 0.052) (coef. 
= .012633, z = 1.90, p < 0.058) relationship with the lagged value of CEO’s overconfidence. 
This result is similar to the primary result presented in Table 7.6. It also corroborates the 
findings of Hilary and Hsu (2011) who examined whether attribution bias is a reason for 
overconfidence in managerial forecasts, and found a positive and simultaneous relationship 
between overconfidence and the level of accurate forecasts. Although the level of 
significance is lower than in the previous findings, the direction remains the same. 
With regard to the control variables, the two-stage regression findings reveal relatively 
similar findings, confirming the primary result presented in Table 7.6. Overall, this regression 
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and the instrumental variables model support the main findings in Table 7.6, suggesting that 
the simultaneity and endogeneity problems between EM practices and CEOs’ characteristics 
did not affect the main results. 
Table 7.7: Panel A: Instrumental variables Two-Stage (2SLS) regression model (using 
linear regression model) using lagged independent variables. 
EMMOJ Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
LCAGE .0003764 .0005632 0.67 0.504 -.0007274 .0014802 
LCGEN .0105425 .0243499 0.43 0.665 -.0371824 .0582674 
LOVER .0283985 .0146214 1.94 0.052** -.000259 .057056 
FSIZE -4.25e-11 2.17e-11 -1.96 0.050** -8.50e-11 4.05e-14 
FPROF -.0152426 .0294127 -0.52 0.604 -.0729492 .042464 
FDIVID .0055178 .0115251 0.48 0.632 -.017094 .0281297 
FLEVER -.0091316 .0145416 -0.63 0.530 -.0376617 .0193985 
FISIN 8.35e-12 6.30e-12 1.32 0.185 -4.01e-12 2.07e-11 
BSIZE -.0047412 .0015383 -3.08 0.002*** -.0077593 -.001723 
BDUAL .0104164 .008492 1.23 0.220 -.0062446 .0270775 
BMEET -.0014152 .0015368 -0.92 0.357 -.0044304 .0016 
BINDEP .003563 .0029852 1.19 0.233 -.0022939 .0094198 
MOWNE -.0536106 .0397056 -1.35 0.177 -.1315116 .0242903 
FOWNE -.0000655 .0001196 -0.55 0.584 -.0003 .0001691 
INISTITU -.0038422 .012258 -0.31 0.754 -.0278919 .0202076 
BLOCKH -.0005672 .006607 .006607 0.932 -.0135298 .0123955 
_ cons .0904247 .0375897 2.41 0.016 .0166751 .1641744 
R Sq. value 
P. value 
23.2% 
0.030 
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Panel B: Instrumental variables Two-Stage (2SLS) regression model (using linear 
regression model) using lagged dependent variables. 
LEMMOJ Coefficient. Std. Err. Z P IZI [95%Conf. Interval] 
CAGE .0000638 .0003037 0.21 0.834 -.0005316 .0006591 
CGEND .0150012 .0154538 0.97 0.332 -.0152877 .0452901 
COVER .012633 .0066641 1.90 0.058** -.0004284 .0256944 
FSIZE -4.03e-11 2.16e-11 -1.86 0.063* -8.27e-11 2.13e-12 
FPROF -.0119392 .0293346 -0.41 0.684 -.0694924 .045614 
FDIVID .0058648 .0114587 0.51 0.609 -.0166167 .0283464 
FLEVER -.0052877 .0142768 -0.37 0.711 -.0332982 .0227227 
FISIN 7.08e-12 6.26e-12 1.13 0.258 -5.20e-12 1.94e-11 
BSIZE -.0048103 .0015373 -3.13 0.002*** -.0078264 -.0017943 
BDUAL .009979 .0084583 .0084583 0.238 -.0066159 .0265738 
BMEET -.0013439 .0015352 -0.88 -0.88 -.004356 .0016681 
BINDEP .0031734 .0029791 1.07 0.287 -.0026714 .0090183 
MOWNE -.0548541 -.054854 -1.38 0.167 -.132703 .0229948 
FOWNE -.0000551 .0001194 -0.46 0.645 -.0002894 .0001792 
INISTITU -.003613 .0122142 -0.30 0.767 -.0275767 .0203507 
BLOCKH -.0003734 .0066042 -0.06 0.955 -.0133305 .0125837 
_ cons       
R Sq. value 
P. value 
19.3% 
0.037 
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7.5. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the study objective to investigate the effect of CEOs’ personal characteristics 
on EM practices is described. In particular, using a sample of 201 non-financial Jordanian 
listed companies for the fiscal years 2008 to 2013, with 1,206 company-year observations, 
the study focuses on the CEOs’ age, gender and overconfidence. The empirical tests indicate 
that overconfidence has a positive and significant association with EM practices among non-
financial Jordanian companies, consistent with the central assumption of agency theory that 
“all individual action is driven by self-interest and that individuals will employ accounting 
choices in an opportunistic behaviour to achieve their objectives” (An et al. 2011).  
A possible explanation for these findings is that overconfident managers of non-financial 
Jordanian companies are more likely to issue further optimistic management forecasts, which 
will place them in a risky position in meeting forecasts for the future, and consequently lead 
to EM practices (Hribar and Yang 2010; Schrand and Zechman 2012; Hribar and Yang 
2015). The results of our empirical analysis indicate that there is no relationship between the 
CEO’s gender or age and EM practices among Jordanian companies. 
Regarding the effect of a company’s characteristics and corporate governance factors on EM 
practices, the coefficient of company size, board size and managerial ownership are found to 
be negatively and significantly related to discretionary accruals. However, the coefficient of 
board duality reveals that companies with high board duality are more likely to engage in EM 
practices.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
This study aims to achieve three objectives: i) To examine the relationship between the level 
of FLID and EM practices in non-financial Jordanian companies; ii) To investigate the effect 
of CEOs’ personal characteristics on the level of FLID; and iii) To examine the effect of 
CEOs’ personal characteristics on EM practices. In respect of the first objective, the literature 
related to voluntary disclosures and EM action provides two different perspectives: 
managerial opportunism and long-term perspective. The first view argued that firms with a 
higher level of voluntary disclosure are more likely to be involved in EM practices, and the 
proponents of this viewpoint found a positive relationship between these variables (Patten 
and Trompeter 2003; Prior et al. 2008; Heltzer 2011; Yip et al. 2011; Jiang and Xin 2012). 
On the other hand, proponents of the second perspective argued that companies with a higher 
level of voluntary disclosure are less likely to be involved in EM behaviour and found a 
negative relationship between them (Lobo and Zhou 2001; Hunton et al. 2006; Katmun 2012; 
Yadollah et al. 2012). 
With regard to the second and third objectives, the literature reports that financial reporting 
practices vary predictably with particular individual characteristics of CEOs (Dikolli et al. 
2012; Schrand and Zechman 2012; Davidson et al. 2013), and this is the reason for second 
and third objectives. To this end, annual reports published for the financial years 2008-2013 
are used for primary data collection, supplemented by press releases and direct 
communication with analysts. However, the current study uses the assumptions of agency and 
signalling theories as the most relevant in understanding the link between EM, asymmetric 
information and voluntary disclosure. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 reviews the study findings. Section 8.3 
outlines potential limitations. Section 8.4 presents implications of the study, and section 8.5 
suggests areas for future research. 
8.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FLID AND EM PRACTICES 
Chapter 5 presented the findings relating to the first study objective, employing both 
univariate and multivariate analysis. One hypothesis was identified to answer this objective, 
and the result suggests that the level of FLID affects the magnitude of EM. In particular, 
companies with a high level of FLID report a lower degree of EM. This supports H1, that 
there is a negative relationship between the level of FLID and EM practices, as the study 
findings indicate that the coefficients of the level of FLID are negatively and significantly 
related to EM practices. Companies with a high level of FLID are thus less likely to engage in 
EM practices. Agency theory predicts that agency problems arise when both the agent and 
principal seek to maximize their own interests, which are not aligned. Asymmetric 
information is a key factor leading to the agency problem of conflicting interests. Pursuant to 
agency theory, companies may use different methods, such as voluntary disclosure, to reduce 
conflicting interests between managers and owners as well as other stakeholders (Sun et al. 
2010; An et al. 2011). Furthermore, the findings of the current study are consistent with 
signalling theory’s assumption of a long-term perspective, which suggests that companies 
with a high level of voluntary disclosure are not only concerned about increasing current 
profits and managers’ wealth, but are looking to create and improve a strong future 
relationship with shareholders (Singhvi and Desai 1971).  
The use of the alternative measurement of DA based on the PM model revealed that the main 
findings are consistent and robust with the different measurements of EM. In respect of the 
endogeneity and simultaneity problems, tests showed the main findings to be consistent and 
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robust, unaffected by the endogeneity problem in the relationship between the level of FLID 
and EM practices. 
8.3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEOS’ PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
AND THE LEVEL OF FLID 
The second objective was addressed in Chapter six using both univariate and multivariate 
analysis. The study seeks to examine the effect of CEOs’ personal characteristics (age, 
gender and overconfidence) on the level of FLID. The literature indicates that managers play 
a significant role in their company’s voluntary disclosure decisions which might impact 
investors’ choices (Bamber et al. 2010; Li 2010; Schleicher and Walker 2010). To achieve 
the objective, three hypotheses were formulated, the overall results suggesting that CEOs’ 
personal characteristics do affect the level of FLID. Hypothesis H2, that there is a negative 
relationship between age and the level of FLID, is shown by the regression results to be true. 
Older managers tend to avoid risks more than younger ones, whereas the latter aim to signal 
their capability to shareholders. Hypothesis H3 predicted that there is a positive relationship 
between the presence of male CEO’s and the level of FLID. The result reveals that they are 
positively and significantly related, suggesting that companies managed by male CEOs tend 
to disclose more FLID than those managed by females. Third, the findings based on the three 
measurements of CEOs’ overconfidence provide empirical evidence that overconfidence has 
a significant effect on the level of FLID, supporting hypothesis H4, which has expected a 
positive relationship between CEO’s overconfidence and the level of FLID. 
The results of the study are consistent with agency theory: managers aware that owners will 
continue to control their activities through bonding and monitoring actions may have be 
motivated to convince stockholders that they are acting optimally; disclosures may been a 
means of achieving this. Thus, agency theory provides an explanation for managers 
voluntarily disclosing more information (Watson et al. 2002). Furthermore, according to 
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signalling theory, managers of high-quality companies are more likely to distinguish 
themselves from lower-quality companies through voluntary disclosures (An et al. 2011). 
Salama et al. (2006) suggested that disclosure might help to improve a company’s reputation 
in the market and enhance relations with the community, regulatory agencies, media and non-
governmental organizations. This is consistent with stakeholder theory: voluntary disclosure 
is considered as a strategic initiative for companies to discharge their accountability, and as a 
consequence reduce information asymmetry and help to build a good relationship with 
stakeholders (Lundholm and Van Winkle 2006; An et al. 2011).  
To sum up, the study’s findings suggest that managers of non-financial Jordanian companies 
are more likely to pay attention to the benefits of voluntary disclosure. Since the majority of 
non-financial Jordanian companies are owned by family, managers of these companies might 
be motivated to disclose more FLID than managers of non-family companies. 
The use of the different measurement of CEOs’ overconfidence has confirmed that the main 
findings are consistent and robust with the different proxies for overconfidence. In respect of 
the endogeneity and simultaneity problems, the study tested whether their existence affects 
the primary results. It was observed that the main results concerning FLID and CEOs 
characteristics are consistent and robust and are not affected by endogeneity and simultaneity. 
8.4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEOS’ PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
AND EM PRACTICES 
The third objective of this study is to investigate the effect of CEOs’ personal characteristics 
on EM practices. In order to achieve this, three hypotheses were developed. H5 expects that 
the association between the CEO’s age and EM practices will be negative. However, the 
regression results indicate that the coefficient of age and EM are not statistically significant; 
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therefore, the study does not confirm any relationship between CEOs’ age and EM practices 
based on the three measurements of EM. Thus, the formulated hypothesis must be rejected.   
H6 suggested a positive relationship between the presence of male CEOs and EM practices, 
but the estimated results of regression analysis indicated that there is no such relationship. 
The lack of a significant association may simply be because of the extremely small number of 
female CEOs in Jordanian companies. Thus, hypothesis H6 is rejected.  
In respect to hypothesis H7, the results confirm it, that there is a positive relationship between 
CEOs’ overconfidence and EM practices: companies with overconfident CEOs report a high 
level of EM. The result of the current study is consistent with the central assumption of 
agency theory that “all individual action is driven by self-interest and that individuals will 
employ accounting choices in an opportunistic behaviour to achieve their objectives” (An et 
al. 2011). Furthermore, this finding supports the notion that overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to be risk takers, as they are more likely to issue further optimistic management 
forecasts, which will put them in a precarious position in the future, and consequently lead to 
EM practices (Schrand and Zechman 2012). H7 is therefore accepted.  
The use of the alternative measurement of EM has confirmed that the main findings are 
consistent and robust to the different proxies of EM practices. In respect of the endogeneity 
and simultaneity problems, the study has tested whether or not their existence affects the 
primary results; it was observed that the main results concerning EM and CEOs’ 
characteristics are consistent and robust and are not affected by endogeneity or simultaneity.  
8.5.  THE STUDY’S IMPLICATIONS 
The first purpose of the study is to investigate the relationship between the level of FLID and 
EM practices. The results indicate that companies with a higher level of FLID, according to 
their annual reports, are less likely to manipulate reported earnings. Accordingly, these 
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findings may have implications for various stakeholders in their efforts to constrain EM 
practices and improve the quality of monitoring tools. FLID is often seen as a potentially 
powerful instrument to constrain EM behaviour, so these findings may have practical 
implications for shareholders and market members to enhance their decision making when 
evaluating the reliability and quality of financial reports. In addition, the findings provide 
empirical evidence that enables managers in assessing their financial transparency and 
accountability, in turn helping firms to improve investors’ perceptions of the quality of 
financial reporting. Therefore, managers should give priority to developing suitable and 
complete voluntary disclosures. The results reported in the study will assist managers wishing 
to understand more precisely how FLID affects EM actions. In addition, the findings may be 
used by boards of directors to assess the quality of financial reporting based on the level of 
FLID. The findings may also help to inform regulators and policy makers about the 
importance of FLID in protecting investors’ rights. The current study provides empirical 
evidence that FLID is useful in constraining EM levels, and can help regulators and policy 
makers in developing future schemes and regulations in the financial reporting regulatory 
framework. 
In addition, Financial analysts may use these findings to assess how the level of FLID will 
mitigate EM practices and thus affect capital market decisions. If the market perceives that 
companies with higher levels of FLID are associated with higher financial reporting quality, 
the reported financial statement may be observed as more reliable for investment decisions 
and credit assessment. 
Again, the findings can be used as empirical support for stock market authorities to evaluate 
the current FLID requirements and their role in improving the quality of financial reports. 
From a research perspective, the findings are useful for academics interested in examining the 
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different aspects of FLID as one of the determinants of EM to control the effects of 
opportunistic behaviour. 
Concerning the effect of CEOs’ characteristics on the level of FLID and EM practices, the 
findings of the current study are useful for exploring which might be expected to affect the 
integrity of financial reporting. The empirical results illustrate how CEOs’ characteristics 
affect the decision-making process and consequently financial reporting. The reported 
earnings should closely reflect the reality of the company’s financial activity during the 
reporting period. Our findings may therefore be valuable to a number of users of financial 
information, and assist them in making the right decisions about a firm’s future performance; 
corporate reported earnings help users to assess the company’s future performance. For 
regulators, consideration of these characteristics could be relevant to on-going improvement 
of corporate governance and financial reporting. The findings are also important for boards of 
directors considering the benefits and costs of managers, because the manager’s 
characteristics affect not only the company’s performance but also influence financial 
reporting decisions. The findings may have implications for other emerging markets and 
financial companies. 
8.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
While a significant effort was made to ensure that the study objectives were met and the 
research questions answered, it should be mentioned that the study suffers from several 
limitations regarding scope, study period and data collection. First, one limitation is that the 
sample size is limited to the non-financial Jordanian companies publicly listed on the ASE. 
Financial companies were excluded from the study sample, as explained in Chapter 4 (see 
section 4.6.1); consequently, this issue may limit the generalization of the study findings. 
However, this is consistent with the literature (Naser et al. 2002; Al-Akra and Hutchinson 
2013; Athanasakou and Hussainey 2014). The level of voluntary disclosure and transparency 
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varies significantly among countries (Patelli and Prencipe 2007), so our findings  on methods 
of disclosure may not be appropriate for companies listed in other countries. However, 
previous studies have given strong evidence that may enable the generalization of this study’s 
results to a large number of developing countries that have same the standards and 
regulations. 
Secondly, the data used in this study was collected from sources such as financial reports, 
which are available to the public, and from other databases. Consequently, any problems or 
issues of significance, which affect the disclosure of data or accounting practice, will have a 
negative impact on the validity of the research findings. 
Furthermore, the data is limited to the period 2008 to 2013, with 2008 being considered by 
economists as the year when the global financial crisis started. Thus, it is possible that the 
results may have been driven by changes in specific year(s) during or after the crisis.  
Thirdly, although the accrual methods have been criticized in the literature for the likelihood 
of their misclassifying total accruals into components, DA and NDA, the low degree of 
detectability of DA by users of financial reports when used for EM makes it a suited 
instrument for implementing opportunistic accounting choices. The perspective of EM 
indicated in this study is related to opportunistic EM behaviour. However, managers may use 
EM to provide private information to a firm’s shareholders regarding future returns, which in 
turn maximizes the firm’s value. Therefore, the findings of this study are restricted to the 
assumption of opportunistic EM rather than the informative EM perspective. However, the 
literature on EM practices does not provide a clear technique for distinguishing between the 
informative and opportunistic perspectives.  
Further limitations may be related to gathering and scoring procedures of the level of FLID 
index, which has been widely used in previous studies and has been followed by this study. 
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As discussed in the methodology chapter (see section 4.7.2.). The scoring procedures in the 
current study includes process that are considered to by subjective. However, every possible 
effort has been made to minimize subjective instruments.    
Fourth, the study model may suffer from the omission of certain variables, resulting in factor 
bias correlated to both the level of FLID and EM. However, numerous steps have been taken 
to reduce the probability of correlated variables, including using different measurements, 
additional control variables, tests for endogeneity and random or fixed effects models.  
Fifth, the methodology and results do not include proxy for other personal characteristics of 
CEOs, such as reputation, experience and being a founder of the company that may affect the 
decision-making process. However, there is a strong argument for considering 
overconfidence as a proxy for reputation (Francis et al. 2008a; Demerjian et al. 2012), 
especially as the study found no available data by which to measure CEOs’ reputation. With 
regard to the CEO’s experience, this study considered including it in the study model, but 
multicollinearity between this variable and CEO’s age resulted in its being dropped. Also, the 
proportion of CEO founders proved to be very small (2.4%), so this variable was excluded 
from the research design. Finally, the choice of control variables may not be comprehensive, 
and there may be other factors that significantly affect the level of FLID, EM practices, and 
CEOs’ characteristics. However, unavailability of data meant that factors such as audit 
committee characteristics were excluded from the study model. Previous studies have 
reported that state ownership also has an effect of the level of FLID and EM practices (Eng 
and Mak 2003; Ding et al. 2007; Huafang and Jianguo 2007), but again this variable was 
excluded since the Jordanian government has very few shares in listed companies (less than 
2%) (JSC 2015). Finally, multicollinearity between a firm’s profitability and its growth ratio 
(book to market value) resulted in firm’s growth being dropped from the model.  
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8.7.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several potential areas for future study on the association between FLID, EM 
practices and CEOs’ characteristics. First, while this study has investigated the relationship 
between FLID and EM practices among non-financial companies, it would be interesting to 
examine this association among financial institutions, to achieve a comprehensive 
understanding of EM activities and the role of monitoring tools. Our findings reveal a 
significant association between CEOs’ personal characteristics and the level of FLID among 
non-financial Jordanian companies, so it might be worthwhile to seek further evidence among 
financial companies. Future studies could also pay more attention to the relationship between 
FLID and EM practices among family and non-family companies, and exploring this issue 
could contribute substantially to the literature on FLID and EM activities.  
Secondly, as noted in the previous section, the results of this study are based on the 
perception of EM as an opportunistic behaviour rather than looking at it from an informative 
perspective. In addition, the current study has used total DA as a proxy for EM in 
investigating the association between EM and the level of FLID. Therefore, an important 
avenue for future studies is to use different proxies for EM, such as short-term and long-term 
DA, as well as considering real EM activities. 
Thirdly, the findings show that the level of FLID is negatively and significantly related to the 
incidence of EM practices. Thus, another avenue for future research is how the level of FLID 
and corporate governance attributes in constraining EM could take into account their joint 
and individual effects on the quality of financial reporting. Such considerations may 
contribute to an understanding of the effect of voluntary disclosures and corporate 
governance mechanisms on the quality of accounting reports. 
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Fourthly, the current study investigates the relationship between the level of FLID and EM 
practices. It would be attractive for future studies to consider whether other disclosure 
contexts, such as backward-looking disclosures and the cost of voluntary disclosures, affect 
EM practices.  
Finally, while the study has tested for endogeneity between FLID, EM and CEOs’ 
characteristics by using an instrumental variable, one possible avenue for future studies might 
be using a simultaneous system equation to control for endogeneity, as suggested by Coles et 
al. (2008) and Al Farooque et al. (2010).  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1A: Compliance with the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
principles; Jordan and the world 
 
Source: Alwshah (2009, P. 22) 
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Appendix 1B: MENA countries: Financial development index, 2002-2003 (based on qualitative and quantitative data, scale 0-10*) 
Source: Creane et al. (2004, P. 13) 
 Financial 
development 
Index 
Banking 
Sector 
Non-
Financial 
sector 
Regulation and 
Supervision 
Monetary Sector 
and Policy 
Financial 
Openness 
Institutional 
Environment 
Bahrain 7.7 7.3 5.0 9.3 7.8 8.0 8.9 
Lebanon 7.0 8.7 3.3 7.7 8.3 7.0 5.2 
Jordan 6.9 7.1 6.3 8.7 6.5 8.0 5.4 
Kuwait 6.8 7.4 5.0 8.0 6.6 8.0 5.9 
United Arab 
Emirates 
6.6 7.9 5.0 6.7 5.8 8.0 5.9 
Saudi Arabia 6.4 7.8 3.3 8.0 6.4 8.0 4.2 
Pakistan 6.0 5.8 6.3 7.7 7.4 4.0 3.9 
Oman 5.9 6.1 5.0 8.3 4.2 8.0 4.8 
Qatar 5.7 6.8 0.7 6.7 5.7 8.0 6.3 
Tunisia 5.6 7.7 4.7 5.3 4.5 5.0 5.0 
Morocco 5.5 5.6 4.7 7.3 6.8 4.0 3.8 
Egypt 5.4 6.0 6.3 5.3 5.6 6.0 3.2 
Sudan 4.7 5.7 0.7 3.7 6.2 7.0 4.5 
Djibouti 4.1 3.8 1.3 5.0 6.0 7.0 2.0 
Yamen 3.9 4.1 0.7 3.3 5.0 9.0 2.2 
Mauritania 3.5 3.8 0.7 3.0 3.9 5.0 4.5 
Algeria 3.2 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.4 4.0 2.3 
Iran 2.5 1.9 3.3 4.7 0.5 4.0 2.4 
Syria 1.1 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 2.4 
Libya 1.0 1.3 0.7 2.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Average 5.0 5.5 3.3 5.7 5.1 5.9 4.2 
Scale: Very Low = below 2.5, Low = 2.5-5.0, Medium = 5.0-6.0, High = 6.0-7.5, Very high = above 7.5 
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Appendix 2: List of 35 forward-looking Key words 
Number Forward Key words 
1 Accelerate 
2 Anticipate 
3 Await 
4 Coming financial year(s) 
5 Coming months 
6 Confidence (or confident) 
7 Convince 
8 Current financial year 
9 Envisage 
10 Estimate 
11 Eventual 
12 Expect 
13 Forecast 
14 Forthcoming 
15 Hope 
16 Intend (or intention) 
17 Likely (or unlikely) 
18 Look forward (or look ahead) 
19 Next 
20 Novel 
21 Optimistic 
22 Outlook 
23 Planned (or planning) 
24 Predict 
25 Prospect 
26 Remain 
27 Renew 
28 Scope for (or scope to) 
29 Shall 
30 Shortly 
31 Should 
32 Soon 
33 Will 
34 Well placed (or well positioned) 
35   Year(s) ahead 
Source: (Hussainey et al. 2003, P. 277). 
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Appendix 3: FLID categories and items 
 Financial FLID items 
1. Income 
2. Profit. 
3. Loss. 
4. Cash flow. 
5. Capital. 
6. Return on equity. 
7. Sales. 
8. Capital expenditures. 
9. Production. 
10. Cost. 
11. Expenses. 
 
 Non-financial FLI items 
 Strategies items: 
1. Goals for performance. 
2. Mission. 
3. Objectives. 
 
 Company structure 
1. Financial structure. 
2. Change in ownership. 
3. Industry type. 
4. Human and intellectual capital. 
5. Mergers and acquisitions. 
6. Technological structure. 
 
 Environment 
1. Legal and regulatory. 
2. Political. 
3. Economic conditions. 
4. Social responsibility. 
5. Competitive position. 
6. Financial and non-financial resources. 
7. Risks. 
8. Relationship 
Source: Authors’ development. 
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Appendix 4: Normality of Data Distribution 
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Appendex 5A: Hausman’s test Results (FLID and EM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2973
                          =       14.05
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
 blockholder      .0135921     .0121208        .0014714        .0042159
instititio~l      .0060999    -.0000987        .0061986        .0310735
      family     -.0000666    -.0000625       -4.07e-06        .0000346
  managerial      -.147249    -.0762749       -.0709742        .0598827
independence     -.0039744     .0025444       -.0065188        .0062034
     meeting     -.0013421    -.0013223       -.0000198        .0015089
     duality      .0473417     .0175745        .0297672        .0170932
   boardsize      .0041949    -.0038457        .0080406        .0034657
    leverage      .0664863     .0685767       -.0020903        .0077308
    divident      .0032217     .0033045       -.0000828        .0050222
proftability     -.0223717    -.0212412       -.0011305        .0116913
        size     -3.46e-11    -4.15e-11        6.90e-12        3.01e-11
         fli     -.0357862      -.05053        .0147438         .008086
                                                                              
                   Fixed        Random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
        is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators for anything
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (12) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (13); be sure this
. hausman Fixed .
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Appendex 5B: Breusch and pagan test (FLID and EM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =    62.98
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0019851       .0445548
                       e     .0105606       .1027646
               positi~mj     .0127089        .112734
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        positivemj[Company,t] = Xb + u[Company] + e[Company,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
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Appendix 6A: Chapter Six, Hausman’s test Results (CEO’s characteristics and FLID) 
 
 
Appendix 6B: Breusch and pagan test (CEO’s characteristics and FLID) 
 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.8109
                          =        9.31
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      family      .0000551     1.59e-06        .0000535        .0000445
 blockholder       .010867    -.0033445        .0142115        .0538677
instititio~l     -.0229651     -.033708        .0107429         .045445
  managerial     -.0017856     -.056921        .0551354        .0780095
     meeting      .0016884     .0018662       -.0001777        .0019301
 independent     -.0056368    -.0088597        .0032229        .0075849
     duality      .0026293      .011338       -.0087087        .0223516
   boardsize     -.0000158     .0052781       -.0052939        .0068142
    leverage      .0820101     .0654116        .0165985        .0121503
    divident      .0366449     .0337286        .0029164        .0065189
proftability      .0088415     .0228969       -.0140554        .0152463
        size      7.09e-11     3.18e-11        3.91e-11        3.87e-11
     overcon      .0015881     .0021977       -.0006096        .0054185
      gender      .0859272     .0616937        .0242335        .0213139
         age     -.0021095    -.0017834       -.0003261        .0002284
                                                                              
                   Fixed        Random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        coefficients are on a similar scale.
        be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (14) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (15); be sure this is what you expect, or there may
. hausman Fixed .
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =    78.27
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0038666       .0621819
                       e     .0180472       .1343397
                     fli     .0224387       .1497957
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        fli[Companies,t] = Xb + u[Companies] + e[Companies,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
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Appendix 7A: Chapter Seven, Breusch and pagan test (CEO’s characteristics and EM) 
 
 
Appendix 7B: Hausman’s test Results (CEO’s characteristics and EM) 
 
 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =    62.09
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0020265       .0450163
                       e     .0106476       .1031872
               positi~mj     .0127089        .112734
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        positivemj[Company,t] = Xb + u[Company] + e[Company,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
                Prob>chi2 =      0.3581
                          =       15.30
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
blockholders     -.0054872    -.0025194       -.0029678        .0022376
instititio~l      .0056643    -.0012786        .0069429        .0312038
      family     -.0000675    -.0000659       -1.53e-06        .0000348
  managerial     -.1478251    -.0736546       -.0741705        .0603231
     meeting      -.001327    -.0012704       -.0000565        .0015138
independence     -.0045927     .0022999       -.0068925        .0062456
     duality       .048538     .0179888        .0305492        .0171613
   boardsize      .0044769    -.0036771         .008154        .0034808
    leverage      .0061417    -.0039524        .0100942        .0094504
    divident      .0019349     .0025825       -.0006476         .005055
proftability     -.0110448    -.0114939        .0004491        .0119278
        size     -3.51e-11    -4.33e-11        8.17e-12        3.02e-11
     overcon      .0174392     .0165582         .000881        .0043388
      gender     -.0014894     .0088579       -.0103472        .0132363
         age      .0002541     .0001485        .0001056          .00018
                                                                              
                   Fixed        Random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        coefficients are on a similar scale.
        be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (14) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (15); be sure this is what you expect, or there may
. hausman Fixed .
